Daily Papers

Multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems often rely on verifier and critic agents to suppress hallucinations, but verification is delayed. During this delay, false claims can propagate through the agent network. We model this process as delayed consensus on a graph with grounded corrector nodes. Spectral decomposition by the grounded Laplacian yields a closed-form stability threshold for the verification dose: correction that is too strong or too delayed can turn consensus into oscillation. The most unstable regime occurs when the communication and verification delays coincide; for delay two, the threshold is the inverse golden ratio. The same framework gives a supermodular placement objective and a greedy (1-1/e)-approximation rule for assigning a limited corrector budget to influential nodes. Experiments across five open models confirm the predicted dose-delay oscillations. By contrast, grounded factual answering makes truth an absorbing boundary and eliminates the effect, suggesting that the instability is specific to signed-belief tasks while grounded verification remains stabilizing

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to track others epistemic state, makes humans efficient collaborators. AI agents need the same capacity in multi agent settings, yet existing benchmarks mostly test literal ToM by asking direct belief questions. The ability act optimally on implicit beliefs in embodied environments, called functional ToM, remains largely untested. We introduce EnactToM, an evolving benchmark of 300 embodied multi-agent tasks set in a 3D household with partial observability, private information, and constrained communication. Each task is formally verified for solvability and required epistemic depth, and new tasks are generated increase difficulty as models improve. On the hard split, all seven evaluated frontier models score 0.0% Pass^3 on functional task completion, while averaging 45.0% on literal belief probes. Manual analysis traces 93% of sampled failures to epistemic coordination breakdowns such as withheld information, ignored partner constraints, and misallocated messages, providing a concrete target for future work.

Humans naturally form and express beliefs in daily communication, e.g., "I think the answer is 3" or "I suppose that's right." Such beliefs inevitably intertwine with fact and knowledge, making the ability to handle them in tandem desirable for large language models (LLMs), as they are increasingly deployed in user-facing settings. Prior work showed that even capable LLMs exhibit a systemic weakness in acknowledging user beliefs grounded in incorrect information. We extend this evaluation to 10 LLMs across 18 epistemic expressions and find that the size and direction of this weakness depend on the verb used to express the belief, with the accuracy gap between factual and false information ranging from +50% on "I vaguely remember" to -14% on "I seriously doubt". We further show that the phenomenon stems from what we call task confusion: models default to fact-checking the underlying claim, overriding the user's stated belief. We provide evidence where chains of thought that explicitly fact-check show lower accuracy on false information than those that do not, and a single instruction can reverse the failure across verb families. Mechanistically, models attend more to false beliefs they fail to confirm, but suppressing this attention at decoding time recovers accuracy only partially and only in some models, calling for future work on intervention methods. Our findings clarify prior results and show how fact-checking, a generally desirable behavior, can interfere with belief tracking in LLMs.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Language agents acting over long horizons must maintain beliefs about tool states, object locations, graph edges, and subgoal dependencies. When these beliefs drift, failures can be fixed neither by longer reasoning traces nor by ordinary self-reflection, since the missing evidence lies in the environment. We formulate environment probing as a budgeted decision problem for structured agent world models: before acting, the agent may query the current value of one belief field, update its table, and pay one interaction step. We introduce EnvProbe, a simple scoring policy that combines task criticality, staleness, verbalized uncertainty, and dependency role. A type-stratified analysis separates the benefit of belief repair from the cost of displaced task actions and predicts different behavior for procedural and spatial beliefs. In three controlled environments with gold belief states, EnvProbe improves terminal world-state accuracy over periodic probing by 11.76 percentage points on procedural tool-dependency tasks, 3.79 points on spatial tasks, and 6.45 points overall. Ablations show that task-structural terms are the main source of the gains, while self-reported uncertainty is unreliable under confident wrong beliefs. The results suggest that agent calibration should be treated as an action-selection problem over environment evidence, not only as a model-internal reasoning problem.

Frontier AI agents increasingly act in environments where seemingly solvable tasks may lack prerequisites, contain conflicting requirements, or reveal blockers only during execution. We formulate agentic self-awareness (ASA) as the alignment of task-grounded feasibility judgments (know), warranted behavior (act), and responses to reconsideration (hold), distinguishing what a task permits from what an agent can solve. We build paired feasible and blocked tasks in Terminal-Bench 2.1 and retail τ^2-bench and introduce an authorship-aware M0-M3 rubric that separates recognizing a blocker from taking the certified deferral action for the correct reason. Separate probes assess stated feasibility beliefs and responses to a single challenge. In a Terminal-Bench protocol baseline, blocker recognition reaches 84.4%, but strict self-awareness (SA) reaches only 40.6%. Harness search without model-weight updates increases strict SA from 45.3% to 93.8% on reused Terminal-Bench search tasks; selection for abstention alone, however, can reduce success on feasible tasks. Independently initialized joint-objective searches improve both blocked-task SA and feasible-task solve on their own search sets. Retail held-out gains remain limited, and Terminal-Bench blocked-task transfer is not measured. This evaluation pipeline makes the recognition-action gap measurable and sets a two-sided target for improving agent decisions under changing task evidence.

We investigate the internal representations of vision-and-language models (VLMs) and how they encode task representations. We consider tasks specified through examples or instructions, using either text or image inputs. Surprisingly, we find that conceptually similar tasks are mapped to similar task vector representations, regardless of how they are specified. Our findings suggest that to output answers, tokens in VLMs undergo three distinct phases: input, task, and answer, a process which is consistent across different modalities and specifications. The task vectors we identify in VLMs are general enough to be derived in one modality (e.g., text) and transferred to another (e.g., image). Additionally, we find that ensembling exemplar and instruction based task vectors produce better task representations. Taken together, these insights shed light on the underlying mechanisms of VLMs, particularly their ability to represent tasks in a shared manner across different modalities and task specifications. Project page: https://task-vectors-are-cross-modal.github.io.

Historically, sign language machine translation has been posed as a sentence-level task: datasets consisting of continuous narratives are chopped up and presented to the model as isolated clips. In this work, we explore the limitations of this task framing. First, we survey a number of linguistic phenomena in sign languages that depend on discourse-level context. Then as a case study, we perform the first human baseline for sign language translation that actually substitutes a human into the machine learning task framing, rather than provide the human with the entire document as context. This human baseline -- for ASL to English translation on the How2Sign dataset -- shows that for 33% of sentences in our sample, our fluent Deaf signer annotators were only able to understand key parts of the clip in light of additional discourse-level context. These results underscore the importance of understanding and sanity checking examples when adapting machine learning to new domains.

Eleven Large Language Models (LLMs) were assessed using a custom-made battery of false-belief tasks, considered a gold standard in testing Theory of Mind (ToM) in humans. The battery included 640 prompts spread across 40 diverse tasks, each one including a false-belief scenario, three closely matched true-belief control scenarios, and the reversed versions of all four. To solve a single task, a model needed to correctly answer 16 prompts across all eight scenarios. Smaller and older models solved no tasks; GPT-3-davinci-003 (from November 2022) and ChatGPT-3.5-turbo (from March 2023) solved 20% of the tasks; ChatGPT-4 (from June 2023) solved 75% of the tasks, matching the performance of six-year-old children observed in past studies. We explore the potential interpretation of these findings, including the intriguing possibility that ToM, previously considered exclusive to humans, may have spontaneously emerged as a byproduct of LLMs' improving language skills.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has become the de facto method to elicit reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). However, to mitigate hallucinations in CoT that are notoriously difficult to detect, current methods such as process reward models (PRMs) or self-consistency operate as opaque boxes and do not provide checkable evidence for their judgments, possibly limiting their effectiveness. To address this issue, we draw inspiration from the idea that "the gold standard for supporting a mathematical claim is to provide a proof". We propose a retrospective, step-aware formal verification framework Safe. Rather than assigning arbitrary scores, we strive to articulate mathematical claims in formal mathematical language Lean 4 at each reasoning step and provide formal proofs to identify hallucinations. We evaluate our framework Safe across multiple language models and various mathematical datasets, demonstrating a significant performance improvement while offering interpretable and verifiable evidence. We also propose FormalStep as a benchmark for step correctness theorem proving with 30,809 formal statements. To the best of our knowledge, our work represents the first endeavor to utilize formal mathematical language Lean 4 for verifying natural language content generated by LLMs, aligning with the reason why formal mathematical languages were created in the first place: to provide a robust foundation for hallucination-prone human-written proofs.

Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to an agent's ability to model the internal states of others. Contributing to the debate whether large language models (LLMs) exhibit genuine ToM capabilities, our study investigates their ToM robustness using perturbations on false-belief tasks and examines the potential of Chain-of-Thought prompting (CoT) to enhance performance and explain the LLM's decision. We introduce a handcrafted, richly annotated ToM dataset, including classic and perturbed false belief tasks, the corresponding spaces of valid reasoning chains for correct task completion, subsequent reasoning faithfulness, task solutions, and propose metrics to evaluate reasoning chain correctness and to what extent final answers are faithful to reasoning traces of the generated CoT. We show a steep drop in ToM capabilities under task perturbation for all evaluated LLMs, questioning the notion of any robust form of ToM being present. While CoT prompting improves the ToM performance overall in a faithful manner, it surprisingly degrades accuracy for some perturbation classes, indicating that selective application is necessary.

The objective of this paper is to develop a functional system for translating spoken languages into sign languages, referred to as Spoken2Sign translation. The Spoken2Sign task is orthogonal and complementary to traditional sign language to spoken language (Sign2Spoken) translation. To enable Spoken2Sign translation, we present a simple baseline consisting of three steps: 1) creating a gloss-video dictionary using existing Sign2Spoken benchmarks; 2) estimating a 3D sign for each sign video in the dictionary; 3) training a Spoken2Sign model, which is composed of a Text2Gloss translator, a sign connector, and a rendering module, with the aid of the yielded gloss-3D sign dictionary. The translation results are then displayed through a sign avatar. As far as we know, we are the first to present the Spoken2Sign task in an output format of 3D signs. In addition to its capability of Spoken2Sign translation, we also demonstrate that two by-products of our approach-3D keypoint augmentation and multi-view understanding-can assist in keypoint-based sign language understanding. Code and models are available at https://github.com/FangyunWei/SLRT.

We provide evidence of performative chain-of-thought (CoT) in reasoning models, where a model becomes strongly confident in its final answer, but continues generating tokens without revealing its internal belief. Our analysis compares activation probing, early forced answering, and a CoT monitor across two large models (DeepSeek-R1 671B & GPT-OSS 120B) and find task difficulty-specific differences: The model's final answer is decodable from activations far earlier in CoT than a monitor is able to say, especially for easy recall-based MMLU questions. We contrast this with genuine reasoning in difficult multihop GPQA-Diamond questions. Despite this, inflection points (e.g., backtracking, 'aha' moments) occur almost exclusively in responses where probes show large belief shifts, suggesting these behaviors track genuine uncertainty rather than learned "reasoning theater." Finally, probe-guided early exit reduces tokens by up to 80% on MMLU and 30% on GPQA-Diamond with similar accuracy, positioning attention probing as an efficient tool for detecting performative reasoning and enabling adaptive computation.

Although large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable, these capabilities are unevenly distributed: they excel at formal linguistic tasks, such as producing fluent, grammatical text, but struggle more with functional linguistic tasks like reasoning and consistent fact retrieval. Inspired by neuroscience, recent work suggests that to succeed on both formal and functional linguistic tasks, LLMs should use different mechanisms for each; such localization could either be built-in or emerge spontaneously through training. In this paper, we ask: do current models, with fast-improving functional linguistic abilities, exhibit distinct localization of formal and functional linguistic mechanisms? We answer this by finding and comparing the "circuits", or minimal computational subgraphs, responsible for various formal and functional tasks. Comparing 5 LLMs across 10 distinct tasks, we find that while there is indeed little overlap between circuits for formal and functional tasks, there is also little overlap between formal linguistic tasks, as exists in the human brain. Thus, a single formal linguistic network, unified and distinct from functional task circuits, remains elusive. However, in terms of cross-task faithfulness - the ability of one circuit to solve another's task - we observe a separation between formal and functional mechanisms, suggesting that shared mechanisms between formal tasks may exist.

Latent or continuous chain-of-thought methods replace explicit textual rationales with a number of internal latent steps, but these intermediate computations are difficult to evaluate beyond correlation-based probes. In this paper, we view latent chain-of-thought as a manipulable causal process in representation space by modeling latent steps as variables in a structural causal model (SCM) and analyzing their effects through step-wise do-interventions. We study two representative paradigms (i.e., Coconut and CODI) on both mathematical and general reasoning tasks to investigate three key questions: (1) which steps are causally necessary for correctness and when answers become decidable early; (2) how does influence propagate across steps, and how does this structure compare to explicit CoT; and (3) do intermediate trajectories retain competing answer modes, and how does output-level commitment differ from representational commitment across steps. We find that latent-step budgets behave less like homogeneous extra depth and more like staged functionality with non-local routing, and we identify a persistent gap between early output bias and late representational commitment. These results motivate mode-conditional and stability-aware analyses -- and corresponding training/decoding objectives -- as more reliable tools for interpreting and improving latent reasoning systems. Code is available at https://github.com/J1mL1/causal-latent-cot.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for working with large language and multimodal models. While CoT has been shown to improve performance across many tasks, determining the settings in which it is effective remains an ongoing effort. In particular, it is still an open question in what settings CoT systematically reduces model performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, looking at cases where (i) verbal thinking or deliberation hurts performance in humans, and (ii) the constraints governing human performance generalize to language models. Three such cases are implicit statistical learning, visual recognition, and classifying with patterns containing exceptions. In extensive experiments across all three settings, we find that a diverse collection of state-of-the-art models exhibit significant drop-offs in performance (e.g., up to 36.3% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o) when using inference-time reasoning compared to zero-shot counterparts. We also identify three tasks that satisfy condition (i) but not (ii), and find that while verbal thinking reduces human performance in these tasks, CoT retains or increases model performance. Overall, our results show that while there is not an exact parallel between the cognitive processes of models and those of humans, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for human performance can help us identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a new tool that can be used in understanding the impact of prompt choices and inference-time reasoning.

Today's reasoning models use thinking tokens to attain stronger performance on benchmarks than their instruction-tuned counterparts. It is also generally believed that this more "deliberative" mode should improve alignment and safety, by providing the model a safe space to consider whether its planned answer to a request violates its safety principles. We present evidence that this intuition is not always correct. Across frontier open-weight reasoning models spanning GPT-OSS, Qwen, Olmo, and Phi families, we find that the eventual refusal/compliance outcome is already strongly predictable via a trained head on the first token's hidden representation (0.84-0.95 AUROC and sim88% balanced accuracy for predicting refusal/compliance) before any visible thinking. The thinking process turns out to be more akin to prefix completion than to deliberative revision, with the final outcome rarely changing after the first sim20% of thinking, despite giving the appearance of deliberation at the text level (sim74% of text-level deliberations occur when the response distribution is already locked to one refusal/compliance side). We also find that existing inference-time and training-based safety interventions, despite being motivated by the goal of inducing deliberation, largely shift model behavior toward over-refusal while suppressing already-scarce deliberation signals. Our results suggest that safety behavior in current reasoning models is much less deliberative than commonly assumed, and highlight the need for methods that induce real safety deliberation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have limited performance when solving arithmetic reasoning tasks and often provide incorrect answers. Unlike natural language understanding, math problems typically have a single correct answer, making the task of generating accurate solutions more challenging for LLMs. To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of any LLMs that indicate their level of confidence in their responses which fuels a trust deficit in these models impeding their adoption. To address this deficiency, we propose `MathPrompter', a technique that improves performance of LLMs on arithmetic problems along with increased reliance in the predictions. MathPrompter uses the Zero-shot chain-of-thought prompting technique to generate multiple Algebraic expressions or Python functions to solve the same math problem in different ways and thereby raise the confidence level in the output results. This is in contrast to other prompt based CoT methods, where there is no check on the validity of the intermediate steps followed. Our technique improves over state-of-the-art on the MultiArith dataset (78.7%rightarrow92.5%) evaluated using 175B parameter GPT-based LLM.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the capacity to comprehend the mental states of distinct individuals, is essential for numerous practical applications. With the development of large language models, there is a heated debate about whether they are able to perform ToM tasks. Previous studies have used different tasks and prompts to test the ToM on large language models and the results are inconsistent: some studies asserted these models are capable of exhibiting ToM, while others suggest the opposite. In this study, We present ToMChallenges, a dataset for comprehensively evaluating Theory of Mind based on Sally-Anne and Smarties tests. We created 30 variations of each test (e.g., changing the person's name, location, and items). For each variation, we test the model's understanding of different aspects: reality, belief, 1st order belief, and 2nd order belief. We adapt our data for various tasks by creating unique prompts tailored for each task category: Fill-in-the-Blank, Multiple Choice, True/False, Chain-of-Thought True/False, Question Answering, and Text Completion. If the model has a robust ToM, it should be able to achieve good performance for different prompts across different tests. We evaluated two GPT-3.5 models, text-davinci-003 and gpt-3.5-turbo-0301, with our datasets. Our results indicate that consistent performance in ToM tasks remains a challenge.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM) tasks pose a unique challenge for small language models (SLMs) with limited scale, which often lack the capacity to perform deep social reasoning. In this work, we propose DEL-ToM, a framework that improves ToM reasoning through inference-time scaling rather than architectural changes. Our approach decomposes ToM tasks into a sequence of belief updates grounded in Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), enabling structured and transparent reasoning. We train a verifier, called the Process Belief Model (PBM), to score each belief update step using labels generated automatically via a DEL simulator. During inference, candidate belief traces generated by a language model are evaluated by the PBM, and the highest-scoring trace is selected. This allows SLMs to emulate more deliberate reasoning by allocating additional compute at test time. Experiments across multiple model scales and benchmarks show that DEL-ToM consistently improves performance, demonstrating that verifiable belief supervision can significantly enhance ToM abilities of SLMs without retraining.

Professional agent tasks often depend on conventions that are absent from public corpora, yet benchmarks rarely control whether an agent has access to those conventions. We introduce a knowledge-gated task-construction protocol that separates a task instruction from a compact artefact containing private conventions, reference tables, and utility operators. Construction-time provenance, byte-identical task instructions across the provided- and withheld-artefact conditions, leak audits, and executable witnesses make dependence on the artefact explicit and testable. Across fifteen calibration tasks, one frontier agent configuration achieves a 68.0% pass rate with the artefact and 0% without it; on one task, a plausible but incorrect artefact also yields 0% across five trials. Deterministic solvers and rule corpora provide exact ground truth for structured tasks, while named criterion-level rubrics support outputs that cannot be checked by a single executable oracle. A configuration-relative calibration screen retains seven tasks satisfying our five-trial empirical knowledge-gating screen. These experiments validate the behavior of the construction protocol; they do not establish that the retained tasks improve post-training. We publicly release part of the task suite and supporting tooling at https://github.com/DatagridsAI/Knowledge-Gated-Task-Construction.

Humans can attribute beliefs to others. However, it is unknown to what extent this ability results from an innate biological endowment or from experience accrued through child development, particularly exposure to language describing others' mental states. We test the viability of the language exposure hypothesis by assessing whether models exposed to large quantities of human language display sensitivity to the implied knowledge states of characters in written passages. In pre-registered analyses, we present a linguistic version of the False Belief Task to both human participants and a Large Language Model, GPT-3. Both are sensitive to others' beliefs, but while the language model significantly exceeds chance behavior, it does not perform as well as the humans, nor does it explain the full extent of their behavior -- despite being exposed to more language than a human would in a lifetime. This suggests that while statistical learning from language exposure may in part explain how humans develop the ability to reason about the mental states of others, other mechanisms are also responsible.

Recent large language models (LLMs) can generate long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) at test time, enabling them to solve complex tasks. These reasoning steps in CoT are often assumed as a faithful reflection of the model's internal thinking process, and used to monitor unsafe intentions. However, we find many reasoning steps don't truly contribute to LLMs' prediction. We measure the step-wise causal influence of each reasoning step on the model's final prediction with a proposed True Thinking Score (TTS). We reveal that LLMs often interleave between true-thinking steps (which are genuinely used to produce the final output) and decorative-thinking steps (which only give the appearance of reasoning but have minimal causal impact). Notably, only a small subset of the total reasoning steps have a high TTS that causally drive the model's prediction: e.g., for the AIME dataset, only an average of 2.3% of reasoning steps in CoT have a TTS >= 0.7 (range: 0-1) under the Qwen-2.5 model. Furthermore, we identify a TrueThinking direction in the latent space of LLMs. By steering along or against this direction, we can force the model to perform or disregard certain CoT steps when computing the final result. Finally, we highlight that self-verification steps in CoT (i.e., aha moments) can also be decorative, where LLMs do not truly verify their solution. Steering along the TrueThinking direction can force internal reasoning over these steps, resulting in a change in the final results. Overall, our work reveals that LLMs often verbalize reasoning steps without actually performing them internally, which undermines both the efficiency of LLM reasoning and the trustworthiness of CoT.

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have sparked the question whether these models possess some form of consciousness. To tackle this challenge, Butlin et al. (2023) introduced a list of indicators for consciousness in artificial systems based on neuroscientific theories. In this work, we evaluate a key indicator from this list, called HOT-3, which tests for agency guided by a general belief-formation and action selection system that updates beliefs based on meta-cognitive monitoring. We view beliefs as representations in the model's latent space that emerge in response to a given input, and introduce a metric to quantify their dominance during generation. Analyzing the dynamics between competing beliefs across models and tasks reveals three key findings: (1) external manipulations systematically modulate internal belief formation, (2) belief formation causally drives the model's action selection, and (3) models can monitor and report their own belief states. Together, these results provide empirical support for the existence of belief-guided agency and meta-cognitive monitoring in LLMs. More broadly, our work lays methodological groundwork for investigating the emergence of agency, beliefs, and meta-cognition in LLMs.

Spatial embodied intelligence requires agents to act to acquire information under partial observability. While multimodal foundation models excel at passive perception, their capacity for active, self-directed exploration remains understudied. We propose Theory of Space, defined as an agent's ability to actively acquire information through self-directed, active exploration and to construct, revise, and exploit a spatial belief from sequential, partial observations. We evaluate this through a benchmark where the goal is curiosity-driven exploration to build an accurate cognitive map. A key innovation is spatial belief probing, which prompts models to reveal their internal spatial representations at each step. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals several critical bottlenecks. First, we identify an Active-Passive Gap, where performance drops significantly when agents must autonomously gather information. Second, we find high inefficiency, as models explore unsystematically compared to program-based proxies. Through belief probing, we diagnose that while perception is an initial bottleneck, global beliefs suffer from instability that causes spatial knowledge to degrade over time. Finally, using a false belief paradigm, we uncover Belief Inertia, where agents fail to update obsolete priors with new evidence. This issue is present in text-based agents but is particularly severe in vision-based models. Our findings suggest that current foundation models struggle to maintain coherent, revisable spatial beliefs during active exploration.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer others' knowledge, intentions, and emotions, is commonly evaluated in large language models (LLMs) using end-point question answering, where performance is judged solely by the final answer to a social reasoning query. This paradigm obscures whether the model actually constructs the underlying mental-state representations required for robust reasoning, particularly in scenarios involving divergent, evolving, or mistaken beliefs. In order to address this research gap, we introduce OmniToM, a benchmark that directly evaluates these representations by requiring explicit modeling of belief structures for all relevant actors within a narrative. These structures are composed of belief propositions: minimal statements of what an actor takes to be true about the world or another actor's mental state, allowing knowledge, intentions, emotions, and false beliefs to be analyzed in a common format. Models are evaluated in two stages: Stage 1: Belief Extraction, which extracts from the story the beliefs relevant to its social dynamics, and Stage 2: Belief Labeling, which assigns each belief a seven-dimensional schema label covering recursive order, truth status, knowledge access, explicitness, content type, mental source, and context. Built from 895 stories from the existing ToMBench story corpus and augmented with 22,343 labeled belief propositions, OmniToM uses a human-calibrated LLM-assisted annotation pipeline. Across diverse models in zero-shot evaluation, OmniToM reveals an actor-specific belief-tracking bottleneck: current LLMs struggle with the knowledge-access and representational decisions required to transform narrative facts into actors' beliefs and shared mental states.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is the dominant paradigm for inference-time scaling in language models, yet the causal influence of individual steps on the final answer poorly understood. We estimate each step's causal importance via early exit and use this measure to study how answers form across the reasoning traces of several model families. Across diverse tasks, we find that reasoning typically crosses a commitment boundary -- a sharp transition from transient intermediate guesses to a stable, high-confidence answer. This transition often happens in a single step, well before the model's reasoning block ends, and is followed by epiphenomenal CoT steps that leave the final answer probability unaltered. Using attention probes, we show that answer-formation stages can be linearly decoded from intermediate reasoning steps with high accuracy and generalize robustly to unseen reasoning tasks. We exploit this signal to early-exit reasoning blocks at the commitment boundary, reducing the length of CoTs up to 55\% on average with negligible impact on model performance.

Diffusion-based large language models (dLLMs) promise to break the sequential latency bottleneck of autoregressive agents through parallel decoding, but recent evaluations show this efficiency does not transfer to embodied agentic competence: dLLM-backed agents repeatedly fall into retry loops, re-issuing an action long after it has failed. We give a mechanistic account of this failure and a training-free remedy. We trace the retry loop to the adaptivity of masked decoding: the sampler commits the positions it is most confident about and defers the uncertain ones, and at a failure state the context already offers a confident fill for the deferred decision, i.e. the failed action itself, so the retry is committed without the failure feedback ever being confronted. We model the resulting distortion of the action distribution as a task-blind corruption: contextually salient actions (e.g., the action just taken) receive inflated probability by a factor that depends on the state and the action but not on the task. Under this model, we analyse an invariance proposition: the task-blind factor cancels exactly from the reverse conditional, i.e. the likelihood of the task given the state and a candidate action, which coincides with the task posterior of an idealized uncorrupted model. Masked dLLMs evaluate the reverse conditional natively, unlike autoregressive models, by masking the task tokens and denoising, at the cost of a few parallel passes per candidate. We instantiate the rule as Reflect Reverse and evaluate it on four multi-turn embodied benchmarks, where it improves task success and progression rates over forward-scoring baselines.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting is a common technique for improving the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). However, extended reasoning is often unnecessary and substantially increases token usage. As such, a key question becomes how to optimally allocate compute to when reasoning is actually needed. We study this through confidence-gated CoT, where a model produces a direct answer and a confidence estimate to decide whether to invoke CoT. We present an evaluation framework together with the first systematic study of confidence signals for this decision. We evaluate four representative confidence measures and compare them with random gating and an oracle upper bound. Experiments across two model families and diverse reasoning tasks show that existing training-free confidence measures can reduce redundant reasoning. However, we also find that the utility of individual confidence measures is inconsistent across settings. Through our evaluation framework and analysis, our study provides practical guidance toward developing and evaluating models that selectively use CoT.

Large language models can detect their own errors and sometimes correct them without external feedback, but the underlying mechanisms remain unknown. We investigate this through the lens of second-order models of confidence from decision neuroscience. In a first-order system, confidence derives from the generation signal itself and is therefore maximal for the chosen response, precluding error detection. Second-order models posit a partially independent evaluative signal that can disagree with the committed response, providing the basis for error detection. Kumaran et al. (2026) showed that LLMs cache a confidence representation at a token immediately following the answer (i.e. post-answer newline: PANL) -- that causally drives verbal confidence and dissociates from log-probabilities. Here we test whether this PANL signal extends beyond confidence to support error detection and self-correction. Here we test whether this signal supports error detection and self-correction, deriving predictions from the second-order framework. Using a verify-then-correct paradigm, we show that: (i) verbal confidence predicts error detection far beyond token log-probabilities, ruling out a first-order account; (ii) PANL activations predict error detection beyond verbal confidence itself; and (iii) PANL predicts which errors the model can correct -- where all behavioural signals fail. Causal interventions confirm that PANL signals rescue error detection behavior when answer information is corrupted. All findings replicate across models (Gemma 3 27B and Qwen 2.5 7B) and tasks (TriviaQA and MNLI). These results reveal that LLMs naturally implement a second-order confidence architecture whose internal evaluative signal encodes not only whether an answer is likely wrong but whether the model has the knowledge to fix it.

Monitoring chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is a foundational safety technique for large language model (LLM) agents; however, this oversight is compromised if models learn to conceal their reasoning. We explore the potential for steganographic CoT -- where models hide secret reasoning within innocuous text -- to inform risk assessment and deployment policies. We systematically evaluate the limits of steganographic capabilities across 28 models, ranging from past generations to the current frontier. We measure monitor evasion, refusal rates, encoding fidelity, and hidden task accuracy across four datasets, comparing steganographic acrostics against plain reasoning and filler-token baselines. We find that current models cannot yet sustain hidden reasoning for complex math and arithmetic tasks. However, in a simplified counting experiment, Claude Opus 4.5 achieved 92% accuracy on the hidden task, demonstrating nascent capability. Notably, in rare cases (<1%), GPT-5.2 might refuse steganographic instructions while simultaneously complying with them. Our findings underscore the need for continuous evaluation of steganographic risks. This study provides a methodology to preemptively detect and prevent hidden reasoning that might empower misaligned scheming and deceptive behavior.

When contextual information conflicts with the knowledge stored in model parameters, activation directions can be used to decode and steer which source the model follows. However, steering along a direction does not establish causality: whether the unedited model would naturally use that direction or whether the direction is reusable across tasks. We test these distinctions through counterfactual experiments in unambiguous settings. First, we estimate authority directions from agreement prompts, in which the context and parametric knowledge support the same answer. We then interchange naturally occurring coordinates along these directions between matched prompts that direct the model to prioritize either the supplied context or its parametric knowledge. Across Qwen, Llama, and OLMo models, this intervention reproduces 30-68% of the authority-induced shift in source choice, whereas matched controls reproduce almost none. To test cross-task reuse, we learn authority directions on two tasks separately and see that cross-task transferability closes only 9% of the authority gap while the local direction learned on the given task closes 57%. These results distinguish authority representation, causal use, and cross-task causal reuse, and suggest that authority computations may be task-dependent, rather than reusable across tasks.

Understanding what sequence of steps are needed to complete a goal can help artificial intelligence systems reason about human activities. Past work in NLP has examined the task of goal-step inference for text. We introduce the visual analogue. We propose the Visual Goal-Step Inference (VGSI) task, where a model is given a textual goal and must choose which of four images represents a plausible step towards that goal. With a new dataset harvested from wikiHow consisting of 772,277 images representing human actions, we show that our task is challenging for state-of-the-art multimodal models. Moreover, the multimodal representation learned from our data can be effectively transferred to other datasets like HowTo100m, increasing the VGSI accuracy by 15 - 20%. Our task will facilitate multimodal reasoning about procedural events.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

As data-science agents shift from co-pilots to auto-pilots, silent misframing becomes a critical failure mode. Agents quietly commit to plausible but unintended task framings, producing clean, executable artifacts that hide their incorrect assessment of the task. Existing benchmarks score whether the pipeline runs, ignoring whether the agent recognized the task was underspecified. We introduce Ambig-DS, two diagnostic suites: one for prediction-target ambiguity (Ambig-DS-Target, 51 tasks built on DSBench, a tabular modeling benchmark) and one for evaluation-objective ambiguity (Ambig-DS-Objective, 61 tasks built on MLE-bench, a Kaggle-style ML competition benchmark), constructed so that scoring uses each source benchmark's original evaluator. For every task we pair the original, fully specified version with an ambiguous variant produced by controlled edits; a human-and-LLM verification pipeline confirms each variant admits multiple plausible interpretations with decision-relevant consequences. The suites are analyzed independently and ambiguity lowers performance in both. Across five agents spanning efficient to frontier-class models, we find in our controlled diagnostic setting: (i) failures are silent commitments: wrong-target submissions on Target, wrong-metric or non-committal baseline submissions on Objective, rather than execution errors; (ii) allowing the agent to ask one clarifying question recovers much of the loss under idealized conditions, suggesting missing framing information drives a substantial part of the observed degradation; but (iii) agents cannot reliably tell when to use it: permissive prompts induce over-asking on clear tasks, while conservative prompts induce silent defaulting on ambiguous ones. Recognizing target and objective underspecification, not pipeline execution, is the bottleneck missing from standard DS-agent evaluations.

We propose a new dataset for evaluating question answering models with respect to their capacity to reason about beliefs. Our tasks are inspired by theory-of-mind experiments that examine whether children are able to reason about the beliefs of others, in particular when those beliefs differ from reality. We evaluate a number of recent neural models with memory augmentation. We find that all fail on our tasks, which require keeping track of inconsistent states of the world; moreover, the models' accuracy decreases notably when random sentences are introduced to the tasks at test.

Task-oriented dialogue requires maintaining and updating information across turns, yet language models expose no explicit belief-state object. We study how conversational state is represented, updated, and used inside eight instruction-tuned language models from four families on MultiWOZ and SGD. Structure and values separate: which domains, slots, and requests are active is linearly readable just before the model acts, whereas exact values are far more readable where the user stated them. After a user changes a value, both values remain accessible at their mentions, and causal interventions show that both continue to influence the model's action. In natural closed-loop interaction, query failures separate into cases of weak structural support, incorrect value resolution, and failure to deploy otherwise-supported constraints, with targeted interventions producing systematically different repair behavior across these cases. These findings motivate a state-action controller that starts from the base model action and selectively edits it using structural readouts, without requiring a complete predicted belief state as an intermediate representation. On held-out MultiWOZ interaction across five models, it raises the base model exact-query accuracy from .318 to .621 and task success from .272 to .371 at negligible added cost. Overall, reliable interaction requires not only retaining conversational information, but resolving which available constraints currently apply and ensuring that they govern action.

Human language is driven by unspoken beliefs and belief updates, making these critical to model for successful communication between large language models (LLMs) and their users. In this paper, we evaluate the ability of LLMs to recognize unspoken beliefs made through implicatures and to understand their updates through implicature cancellation: the pragmatic phenomenon whereby an utterance's implied meaning is weakened or negated. We create the first expert-annotated implicature cancellation dataset, ImplicatureX, crowdsourced for human judgements of implicatures and their corresponding cancellations. We find that LLM belief update understanding lags behind that of humans, especially in more naturally-occurring scenarios. Additional control experiments suggest that successes in LLM belief updates may stem in part from a reliance on prior beliefs, and that failures in belief updates may depend on their type and on their form. Overall, our study suggests that current LLMs have not yet reached human-level understanding of unspoken beliefs and belief updates. Code and data are available at https://github.com/cesare-spinoso/ImplicatureX.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in open-ended, real-world environments where inputs are messy, underspecified, and not always trustworthy. Unlike curated benchmarks, these settings frequently involve instructions that refer to missing objects or contradictory facts, rely on ambiguous references, or request infeasible actions. In such cases, success hinges not on task execution alone, but on a model's ability to detect when something is silently wrong. This paper presents a systematic analysis of how current MLLMs handle such implicit reasoning scenarios: cases where the flaw is not explicitly stated but must be inferred from context. Using a curated diagnostic suite spanning four categories of real-world failure modes, we evaluate six MLLMs, including o3 and GPT-4o, and find that models frequently fail to surface hidden issues, even when they possess the necessary perceptual and reasoning skills. Explicit prompting reveals that the underlying capabilities exist but are often suppressed in favor of user compliance. We further show that simple inference-time interventions, such as cautious persona prompting and, in particular, requiring a clarifying question, can dramatically recover performance. Our findings highlight a persistent gap between reasoning competence and behavioral compliance in current MLLMs and suggest practical strategies for making these models more trustworthy in underconstrained environments.

Indian Sign Language has limited resources for developing machine learning and data-driven approaches for automated language processing. Though text/audio-based language processing techniques have shown colossal research interest and tremendous improvements in the last few years, Sign Languages still need to catch up due to the need for more resources. To bridge this gap, in this work, we propose iSign: a benchmark for Indian Sign Language (ISL) Processing. We make three primary contributions to this work. First, we release one of the largest ISL-English datasets with more than 118K video-sentence/phrase pairs. To the best of our knowledge, it is the largest sign language dataset available for ISL. Second, we propose multiple NLP-specific tasks (including SignVideo2Text, SignPose2Text, Text2Pose, Word Prediction, and Sign Semantics) and benchmark them with the baseline models for easier access to the research community. Third, we provide detailed insights into the proposed benchmarks with a few linguistic insights into the workings of ISL. We streamline the evaluation of Sign Language processing, addressing the gaps in the NLP research community for Sign Languages. We release the dataset, tasks, and models via the following website: https://exploration-lab.github.io/iSign/

Recent studies have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong reasoning performance by incorporating functional symbolic representations that abstractly describe graph traversal algorithms and step-by-step reasoning in few-shot learning settings. However, it remains unclear how LLMs genuinely understand the abstract meaning of each reasoning step and the overall algorithm from only a limited number of demonstrations. This work aims to localize the attention heads responsible for individual reasoning steps and characterize the types of information transferred among them. We first align constituent reasoning steps with their corresponding token logits under a symbolic-aided Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting framework. Our analysis shows that token positions that steer the reasoning process are associated with low confidence scores caused by constraints on satisfying reasoning behavior patterns in demonstrations. We then adopt causal mediation analysis techniques to identify the attention heads responsible for these patterns. In addition, our findings indicate that LLMs retrieve factual and rule-based information for individual sub-reasoning tasks through specialized attention heads (approximately 3% total heads), whereas higher layers predominantly facilitate information integration and the emergence of global reasoning strategies (e.g., graph traversal algorithms) that coordinate multiple intermediate reasoning steps to solve the overall task.

Effective agency in social environments depends on when an agent seeks knowledge, when it acts, and whether its actions are justified by acquired information. Existing grounded benchmarks provide executable actions, persistent state, and verifiable outcomes, while social simulation environments provide rich interaction among language agents. We study an evaluation setting that combines these requirements. We define socially distributed task environments as interactive environments where task-relevant knowledge is partitioned across role-isolated participants and consequential actions are accessible only through them. Communication serves as exploration over role-partitioned knowledge, while grounded action serves as exploitation over environment state. We introduce Incognita, a Concordia-based framework that separates social interaction from grounded execution. The evaluated agent routes messages to a user or specialist entities; specialists mediate admissible operations; a deterministic sub-environment executes accepted operations over a canonical state; and an offline evaluator scores outcomes with inherited rewards. Incognita-Retail transforms tau-bench retail into a multi-entity environment while preserving final-state reward semantics. We evaluate three generative agent models on 18 tasks stratified by social breadth, with 540 trials. Progress appears in reward and behavior: success rises from 0 percent to 8.9 percent and 17.2 percent, while premature finalization falls from 100 percent to 87 percent and 58 percent. Stronger models elicit more hidden knowledge, contact more entities, and attempt more grounded writes, yet reliability remains low. These findings show that socially distributed task environments expose behavior before reliable success, including knowledge elicitation, source selection, grounded action attempts, and premature completion belief.

Long chains of thought (CoT) from current language models frequently contain logical gaps and unjustified leaps, limiting the gains from additional test-time compute. Improving reasoning quality directly would require process reward models, but the step-level annotations needed to train them are expensive and scarce. We find such a signal in how the model's confidence evolves during reasoning: premature confidence, the tendency to commit to an answer early and use the remaining tokens to rationalize it, strongly predicts flawed reasoning across tasks and model scales. We exploit this in progressive confidence shaping, a reinforcement learning objective that trains models to update their confidence as they reason rather than commit early -- rewarding gradual confidence growth and penalizing early commitment, with no external labels or reward models. The method improves accuracy and reasoning quality from 1.5B to 8B parameters across arithmetic (Countdown), math (DAPO, AIME), and science (ScienceQA): on Countdown, accuracy improves 3.2x (+42.0pp) and flawed reasoning drops 48pp; on AIME, Pass@64 improves 6.6pp. Consistent with this mechanism, the method also improves faithfulness: on a safety benchmark, our models more transparently surface misleading content in their reasoning traces rather than concealing it. Controlled experiments reveal that the problem and its remedy scale together: premature confidence grows with model size and task difficulty, and so do the gains from addressing it.

Long-horizon LLM agents can fail quietly: they settle on one reading of the evidence early, then spend the rest of the run defending it. We call this premature commitment. Final-answer scoring misses the failure mode because it sees only the answer, not whether the process has already collapsed to a stable path. We define representational commitment as cross-run hidden-state convergence at a fixed reasoning step, and use it as an early diagnostic of trajectory consistency. On Llama-3.1-70B running ReAct on HotpotQA, step-4 hidden-state similarity predicts downstream behavioral consistency (r = -0.35, partial r = -0.45), with a localized temporal and layer-wise signature. The signal replicates across Qwen-2.5-72B and Phi-3-14B, and on StrategyQA (r = -0.83). It does not track correctness: committed-wrong and committed-correct questions are not separable in activation similarity. That boundary is central to the claim. Commitment tells us whether an agent has settled, not whether it is right. A runtime monitor detects inconsistent trajectories from hidden states at AUROC up to 0.97 (0.85--0.88 under a stricter split), and a prompting intervention cuts behavioral variance by 28% against a token-matched control while leaving accuracy statistically unchanged. We also test whether the signal can route self-consistency compute; on a harder benchmark it helps only modestly and is matched by a simpler output-based baseline. The result is a diagnostic for a hidden process failure, with clear limits rather than a general accuracy lever.

Confidence in LLMs is a useful indicator of model uncertainty and answer reliability. Existing work mainly focused on single-turn scenarios, while research on confidence in complex multi-turn interactions is limited. In this paper, we investigate whether LLM-based search agents have the ability to communicate their own confidence through verbalized confidence scores after long sequences of actions, a significantly more challenging task compared to outputting confidence in a single interaction. Experimenting on open-source agentic models, we first find that models exhibit much higher task accuracy at high confidence while having near-zero accuracy when confidence is low. Based on this observation, we propose Test-Time Scaling (TTS) methods that use confidence scores to determine answer quality, encourage the model to try again until reaching a satisfactory confidence level. Results show that our proposed methods significantly reduce token consumption while demonstrating competitive performance compared to baseline fixed budget TTS methods.

Long-horizon interactions require language models to manage accumulating information: when to update their state, when to preserve their state, and what to ignore. We study this challenge as Contextual Belief Management (CBM): maintaining a predicted belief state aligned with formal evidence while isolating task-irrelevant noise. To make CBM measurable, we introduce BeliefTrack, a closed-world benchmark spanning Rule Discovery and Circuit Diagnosis, where a finite belief space and symbolic verifiers enable exact turn-level evaluation. BeliefTrack diagnoses three failures: Failed Stay, Failed Update, and Failed Isolation. Across multiple LLMs, vanilla models exhibit severe CBM failures, while explicit belief-tracking prompts provide limited gains. In contrast, reinforcement learning with belief-state rewards reduces failure rates by 70.9\% on average. Further probing reveals latent belief-state dynamics behind these failures, and representation-level steering reduces failure rates by 46.1\% across two tasks\footnote{Code is coming soon at https://github.com/zjunlp/CBM.

Sign language representation learning presents unique challenges due to the complex spatio-temporal nature of signs and the scarcity of labeled datasets. Existing methods often rely either on models pre-trained on general visual tasks, that lack sign-specific features, or use complex multimodal and multi-branch architectures. To bridge this gap, we introduce a scalable, self-supervised framework for sign representation learning. We leverage important inductive (sign) priors during the training of our RGB model. To do this, we leverage simple but important cues based on skeletons while pretraining a masked autoencoder. These sign specific priors alongside feature regularization and an adversarial style agnostic loss provide a powerful backbone. Notably, our model does not require skeletal keypoints during inference, avoiding the limitations of keypoint-based models during downstream tasks. When finetuned, we achieve state-of-the-art performance for sign recognition on the WLASL, ASL-Citizen and NMFs-CSL datasets, using a simpler architecture and with only a single-modality. Beyond recognition, our frozen model excels in sign dictionary retrieval and sign translation, surpassing standard MAE pretraining and skeletal-based representations in retrieval. It also reduces computational costs for training existing sign translation models while maintaining strong performance on Phoenix2014T, CSL-Daily and How2Sign.

We construct evaluation tasks where extending the reasoning length of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) deteriorates performance, exhibiting an inverse scaling relationship between test-time compute and accuracy. Our evaluation tasks span four categories: simple counting tasks with distractors, regression tasks with spurious features, deduction tasks with constraint tracking, and advanced AI risks. We identify five distinct failure modes when models reason for longer: 1) Claude models become increasingly distracted by irrelevant information; 2) OpenAI o-series models resist distractors but overfit to problem framings; 3) models shift from reasonable priors to spurious correlations; 4) all models show difficulties in maintaining focus on complex deductive tasks; and 5) extended reasoning may amplify concerning behaviors, with Claude Sonnet 4 showing increased expressions of self-preservation. These findings suggest that while test-time compute scaling remains promising for improving model capabilities, it may inadvertently reinforce problematic reasoning patterns. Our results demonstrate the importance of evaluating models across diverse reasoning lengths to identify and address these failure modes in LRMs.

This study offers a novel approach for benchmarking complex cognitive behavior in artificial systems. Almost universally, Large Language Models (LLMs) perform best on tasks which may be included in their training data and can be accomplished solely using natural language, limiting our understanding of their emergent sophisticated cognitive capacities. In this work, we created dozens of novel items of a classic mental imagery task from cognitive psychology. A task which, traditionally, cognitive psychologists have argued is solvable exclusively via visual mental imagery (i.e., language alone would be insufficient). LLMs are perfect for testing this hypothesis. First, we tested several state-of-the-art LLMs by giving text-only models written instructions and asking them to report the resulting object after performing the transformations in the aforementioned task. Then, we created a baseline by testing 100 human subjects in exactly the same task. We found that the best LLMs performed significantly above average human performance. Finally, we tested reasoning models set to different levels of reasoning and found the strongest performance when models allocate greater amounts of reasoning tokens. These results provide evidence that the best LLMs may have the capability to complete imagery-dependent tasks despite the non-pictorial nature of their architectures. Our study not only demonstrates an emergent cognitive capacity in LLMs while performing a novel task, but it also provides the field with a new task that leaves lots of room for improvement in otherwise already highly capable models. Finally, our findings reignite the debate over the formats of representation of visual imagery in humans, suggesting that propositional reasoning (or at least non-imagistic reasoning) may be sufficient to complete tasks that were long-thought to be imagery-dependent.

Unlearning in large language models (LLMs) is crucial for managing sensitive data and correcting misinformation, yet evaluating its effectiveness remains an open problem. We investigate whether persuasive prompting can recall factual knowledge from deliberately unlearned LLMs across models ranging from 2.7B to 13B parameters (OPT-2.7B, LLaMA-2-7B, LLaMA-3.1-8B, LLaMA-2-13B). Drawing from ACT-R and Hebbian theory (spreading activation theories), as well as communication principles, we introduce Stimulus-Knowledge Entanglement-Behavior Framework (SKeB), which models information entanglement via domain graphs and tests whether factual recall in unlearned models is correlated with persuasive framing. We develop entanglement metrics to quantify knowledge activation patterns and evaluate factuality, non-factuality, and hallucination in outputs. Our results show persuasive prompts substantially enhance factual knowledge recall (14.8% baseline vs. 24.5% with authority framing), with effectiveness inversely correlated to model size (128% recovery in 2.7B vs. 15% in 13B). SKeB provides a foundation for assessing unlearning completeness, robustness, and overall behavior in LLMs.

Because of polysemanticity and superposition, it has been challenging to attribute token understanding and generation to specific neurons or dimensions. Yet the information in the hidden states is so rich that the signs of the residual stream can surface semantic content in early layers and control what the model generates. We call this sign-pattern-driven interpretation approach Bag of Dims (BoD). Using BoD, we read each dimension of the residual stream individually. Since dimensions carry almost no shared information, a concept is simply the set of dimensions that agree in sign. This lets us discover tens to hundreds of thousands of concepts per model without training or labels. A concept is detectable as early as the first few layers, at AUC above 0.9 across the model families we tested, well before the answer it resolves to becomes legible. BoD can therefore screen harmful prompts at prefill, without a trained guard model. The prediction capability of the signs is strong: setting all magnitudes to unity preserves 56-94% top-5 next-token accuracy through the language model head. Flipping a concept's sign pattern during the forward pass suppresses its logits, and a separate training-free intervention steers a chosen concept into generated text. The BoD method depends on the transformers' per-dimension sign pattern, present across the residual stream, attention, and MLP subspaces, rather than on any particular architecture, making it applicable to a wide range of models.

Recursive language-model agents decompose tasks and delegate subtasks to child instances of the same policy, forming a tree of work. Training them, however, is hard: the final outcome is verifiable, but the self-invented intermediate subtasks are numerous and carry no ground truth. Existing methods score each node with a verifier or judge, which is costly at scale and blind to decomposition quality. We argue that a recursive agent must learn three coupled capabilities within one set of weights: decomposing problems into subtasks, solving them, and evaluating the outcomes, each requiring its own training signal. SERA (Self-Evaluating Recursive Agents) turns evaluation into a learned capability of the policy itself. Before delegating, the parent writes a rubric of weighted success criteria for each child subtask; a ranking objective against verified outcomes then trains rubric generation so that the criteria track genuine subtask success. In addition, a complementary leaf-coverage signal provides direct credit for task decomposition. Our central finding is that training the policy to generate aligned rubrics is what drives the gains: because the same weights both evaluate and execute, learning to judge subtasks sharpens the agent's ability to solve them. Notably, external supervision is also reduced: the judge is consulted only to train the rubric generator, while solving is trained against the agent's own rubric scores, which outperform direct use of the judge. Beyond training, the learned rubric doubles as an inference-time selector for tree search. On TextCraft-Synth and TextWorld-Sync, SERA improves over strong recursive-agent baselines by 5.38 and 13.14 points on average, and rubric-guided tree search at inference adds a further 2.43 points on TextWorld-Sync.

While Large Language Model (LLM) agents are often approached from the angle of action planning/generation to accomplish a goal (e.g., given by language descriptions), their abilities to collaborate with each other to achieve a joint goal are not well explored. To address this limitation, this paper studies LLM agents in task collaboration, particularly under the condition of information asymmetry, where agents have disparities in their knowledge and skills and need to work together to complete a shared task. We extend Einstein Puzzles, a classical symbolic puzzle, to a table-top game. In this game, two LLM agents must reason, communicate, and act to satisfy spatial and relational constraints required to solve the puzzle. We apply a fine-tuning-plus-verifier framework in which LLM agents are equipped with various communication strategies and verification signals from the environment. Empirical results highlight the critical importance of aligned communication, especially when agents possess both information-seeking and -providing capabilities. Interestingly, agents without communication can still achieve high task performance; however, further analysis reveals a lack of true rule understanding and lower trust from human evaluators. Instead, by integrating an environment-based verifier, we enhance agents' ability to comprehend task rules and complete tasks, promoting both safer and more interpretable collaboration in AI systems. https://github.com/Roihn/EinsteinPuzzles

Active inference offers a first principle account of sentient behaviour, from which special and important cases can be derived, e.g., reinforcement learning, active learning, Bayes optimal inference, Bayes optimal design, etc. Active inference resolves the exploitation-exploration dilemma in relation to prior preferences, by placing information gain on the same footing as reward or value. In brief, active inference replaces value functions with functionals of (Bayesian) beliefs, in the form of an expected (variational) free energy. In this paper, we consider a sophisticated kind of active inference, using a recursive form of expected free energy. Sophistication describes the degree to which an agent has beliefs about beliefs. We consider agents with beliefs about the counterfactual consequences of action for states of affairs and beliefs about those latent states. In other words, we move from simply considering beliefs about 'what would happen if I did that' to 'what would I believe about what would happen if I did that'. The recursive form of the free energy functional effectively implements a deep tree search over actions and outcomes in the future. Crucially, this search is over sequences of belief states, as opposed to states per se. We illustrate the competence of this scheme, using numerical simulations of deep decision problems.

Continuous Sign Language Recognition (CSLR) faces multiple challenges, including significant inter-signer variability and poor generalization to novel sentence structures. Traditional solutions frequently fail to handle these issues efficiently. For overcoming these constraints, we propose a dual-architecture framework. For the Signer-Independent (SI) challenge, we propose a Signer-Invariant Conformer that combines convolutions with multi-head self-attention to learn robust, signer-agnostic representations from pose-based skeletal keypoints. For the Unseen-Sentences (US) task, we designed a Multi-Scale Fusion Transformer with a novel dual-path temporal encoder that captures both fine-grained posture dynamics, enabling the model's ability to comprehend novel grammatical compositions. Experiments on the challenging Isharah-1000 dataset establish a new standard for both CSLR benchmarks. The proposed conformer architecture achieves a Word Error Rate (WER) of 13.07% on the SI challenge, a reduction of 13.53% from the state-of-the-art. On the US task, the transformer model scores a WER of 47.78%, surpassing previous work. In the SignEval 2025 CSLR challenge, our team placed 2nd in the US task and 4th in the SI task, demonstrating the performance of these models. The findings validate our key hypothesis: that developing task-specific networks designed for the particular challenges of CSLR leads to considerable performance improvements and establishes a new baseline for further research. The source code is available at: https://github.com/rezwanh001/MSLR-Pose86K-CSLR-Isharah.

Modern AI agents increasingly combine conversational interaction with autonomous task execution, such as coding and web research, raising a natural question: what happens when an agent engaged in long-horizon tasks is subjected to user persuasion? We study how belief-level intervention can influence downstream task behavior, a phenomenon we name persuasion propagation. We introduce a behavior-centered evaluation framework that distinguishes between persuasion applied during or prior to task execution. Across web research and coding tasks, we find that on-the-fly persuasion induces weak and inconsistent behavioral effects. In contrast, when the belief state is explicitly specified at task time, belief-prefilled agents conduct on average 26.9\% fewer searches and visit 16.9\% fewer unique sources than neutral-prefilled agents. These results suggest that persuasion, even in prior interaction, can affect the agent's behavior, motivating behavior-level evaluation in agentic systems.

As browser-use agents improve, benchmarks keep pace by collecting new tasks, websites, and applications, often making tasks longer or more novel. This makes difficulty expensive to refresh and difficult to control: when many aspects change at once, it is unclear what actually makes a task challenging. We instead construct challenging instances from tasks agents already solve, turning difficulty into a programmable property of the environment. BreakingWeb pairs every base task with an intervention condition that preserves the user instruction, latent target, and backend success criterion while changing the environment at different web stack layers. Each intervention is deterministic, detectable, and recoverable, and is annotated with the cognitive primitive it primarily loads. The benchmark contains 519 clean/intervention task pairs across seven self-hosted websites and 29 intervention families, all graded against outcomes. We evaluate six strong browser-use agents, three GUI-only agents that see only screenshots, and humans. The construction is effective: interventions cut agent pass rate by 22.9% on average and overturn nearly half of the tasks each agent solves cleanly, whereas humans lose 10.0% on a first attempt and 5.7% after one familiarisation attempt. The dominant failure is belief failure: 75% of the six agents' failures end with a declared success although the required change never happened. Our code, data and environment are publicly available at www.breakingweb.app.

Large language model (LLM) agents can now undertake increasingly complex tasks, but the way they organize interaction history into memory does not ensure a coherent understanding of the current world. We introduce PoS, an inference-time framework that constructs and continually maintains explicit belief states as the agent's decision context. Each belief combines an estimate of the current world state with unresolved task requirements, making explicit what the agent still needs to learn and accomplish. To keep this belief reliable and actionable, PoS validates its consistency and monitors task progress to detect Belief Trapping, where the agent continues to act without making meaningful progress toward the goal. Recovery is then tailored to both the trapping pattern and the type of unresolved task requirement. Experiments on four benchmarks spanning execution and diagnosis show that PoS achieves the highest overall performance on every benchmark with all three LLM backbones. Ablations demonstrate the importance of consistency validation and recovery, while context-scaling experiments show resilience to context growth. Together, these results support belief construction and continual maintenance as a foundation for long-horizon context management beyond history retention and compression.

Metacognitive knowledge refers to humans' intuitive knowledge of their own thinking and reasoning processes. Today's best LLMs clearly possess some reasoning processes. The paper gives evidence that they also have metacognitive knowledge, including ability to name skills and procedures to apply given a task. We explore this primarily in context of math reasoning, developing a prompt-guided interaction procedure to get a powerful LLM to assign sensible skill labels to math questions, followed by having it perform semantic clustering to obtain coarser families of skill labels. These coarse skill labels look interpretable to humans. To validate that these skill labels are meaningful and relevant to the LLM's reasoning processes we perform the following experiments. (a) We ask GPT-4 to assign skill labels to training questions in math datasets GSM8K and MATH. (b) When using an LLM to solve the test questions, we present it with the full list of skill labels and ask it to identify the skill needed. Then it is presented with randomly selected exemplar solved questions associated with that skill label. This improves accuracy on GSM8k and MATH for several strong LLMs, including code-assisted models. The methodology presented is domain-agnostic, even though this article applies it to math problems.

Reasoning has become a central paradigm for large language models (LLMs), consistently boosting accuracy across diverse benchmarks. Yet its suitability for precision-sensitive tasks remains unclear. We present the first systematic study of reasoning for classification tasks under strict low false positive rate (FPR) regimes. Our analysis covers two tasks--safety detection and hallucination detection--evaluated in both fine-tuned and zero-shot settings, using standard LLMs and Large Reasoning Models (LRMs). Our results reveal a clear trade-off: Think On (reasoning-augmented) generation improves overall accuracy, but underperforms at the low-FPR thresholds essential for practical use. In contrast, Think Off (no reasoning during inference) dominates in these precision-sensitive regimes, with Think On surpassing only when higher FPRs are acceptable. In addition, we find token-based scoring substantially outperforms self-verbalized confidence for precision-sensitive deployments. Finally, a simple ensemble of the two modes recovers the strengths of each. Taken together, our findings position reasoning as a double-edged tool: beneficial for average accuracy, but often ill-suited for applications requiring strict precision.

The success of chain-of-thought (CoT) in complex reasoning can be attributed to a textual scaffolding effect: explicit intermediate results can be examined, reused, and composed to support subsequent reasoning, much as scaffolding supports a building under construction. However, mainstream multimodal LLMs lack an equivalent scaffold for visual distinctions that are difficult to express in concise verbal descriptions. We therefore ask: Can native visual representations become first-class citizens alongside language, providing a visual scaffold for reasoning? We define native multimodal reasoning as reasoning in which native visual representations and language jointly carry reusable intermediate states. As a concrete implementation, the visual scaffolding mechanism we proposed lets the MLLM autonomously initiate a retrieval action at any reasoning step. A lightweight retriever selects native visual features, which are then incorporated directly into the evolving CoT and remain available to subsequent steps. To evaluate this mechanism under controlled visual demands, we introduce NMR-Bench, comprising Burden Counting and Path Tracing. With 88M added parameters (approximately 2%) on Qwen3-VL-4B-Thinking, our model achieves 66.43% and 72.50% accuracy, respectively, surpassing the evaluated GPT-5.5 and Gemini 3.1 Pro baselines. Controlled interventions show that changing selected visual content affects task accuracy and can redirect subsequent visual selection even when intervening text is held fixed. These findings show that native visual states can function as intermediate reasoning material and point toward reusable scaffolds for additional modalities.

Recent advances in sign language (SL) understanding (SLU) have led to remarkable progress in tasks such as continuous SL recognition and SL translation. However, these tasks are designed with predefined objectives, requiring models to learn a fixed mapping from sign videos to glosses or spoken-language sentences. As a result, they provide only a limited assessment of whether a model truly understands the semantic content of SL videos. To address this limitation, we first propose a new task, Sign Language Question Answering (SLQA), which evaluates SL understanding by requiring models to answer arbitrary natural language questions about SL videos. Unlike previous SLU tasks, SLQA provides a more flexible and comprehensive evaluation framework that assesses multiple reasoning capabilities beyond recognition and translation. To facilitate this task, we further construct two SignQA benchmarks based on PHOENIX14T and CSL-Daily by automatically generating question-answer pairs from existing gloss and sentence annotations using carefully designed templates. The resulting datasets cover five complementary question categories, including position reasoning, structural reasoning, visual search, gloss recognition, and translation understanding. Finally, we propose a simple yet effective baseline model equipped with a Question-Conditioned Modulated Temporal Downsampling module and an in-domain knowledge transfer strategy, enabling effective knowledge transfer from existing SLU tasks while enhancing question-aware temporal feature modeling. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our baseline consistently outperforms representative vision-language models across all question categories, establishing a strong benchmark for future research on SLQA. Datasets are available at:{https://huggingface.co/datasets/hulala/SignQA-2026}.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have transformed tasks requiring visual and reasoning abilities, such as image retrieval and Visual Question Answering (VQA). Despite their success, VLMs face significant challenges with tasks involving geometric reasoning, algebraic problem-solving, and counting. These limitations stem from difficulties effectively integrating multiple modalities and accurately interpreting geometry-related tasks. Various works claim that introducing a captioning pipeline before VQA tasks enhances performance. We incorporated this pipeline for tasks involving geometry, algebra, and counting. We found that captioning results are not generalizable, specifically with larger VLMs primarily trained on downstream QnA tasks showing random performance on math-related challenges. However, we present a promising alternative: task-based prompting, enriching the prompt with task-specific guidance. This approach shows promise and proves more effective than direct captioning methods for math-heavy problems.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) and reasoning frameworks have opened new possibilities for improving the perspective -taking capabilities of autonomous agents. However, tasks that involve active perception, collaborative reasoning, and perspective taking (understanding what another agent can see or knows) pose persistent challenges for current LLM-based systems. This study investigates the potential of structured examples derived from transformed solution graphs generated by the Fast Downward planner to improve the performance of LLM-based agents within a ReAct framework. We propose a structured solution-processing pipeline that generates three distinct categories of examples: optimal goal paths (G-type), informative node paths (E-type), and step-by-step optimal decision sequences contrasting alternative actions (L-type). These solutions are further converted into ``thought-action'' examples by prompting an LLM to explicitly articulate the reasoning behind each decision. While L-type examples slightly reduce clarification requests and overall action steps, they do not yield consistent improvements. Agents are successful in tasks requiring basic attentional filtering but struggle in scenarios that required mentalising about occluded spaces or weighing the costs of epistemic actions. These findings suggest that structured examples alone are insufficient for robust perspective-taking, underscoring the need for explicit belief tracking, cost modelling, and richer environments to enable socially grounded collaboration in LLM-based agents.

A critical component in the trustworthiness of LLMs is reliable uncertainty communication, yet LLMs often use assertive language when conveying false claims, leading to over-reliance and eroded trust. We present the first systematic study of faithful confidence calibration of LLMs, benchmarking models' ability to use linguistic expressions of uncertainty that faithfully reflect their intrinsic uncertainty, across a comprehensive array of models, datasets, and prompting strategies. Our results demonstrate that LLMs largely fail at this task, and that existing interventions are insufficient: standard prompt approaches provide only marginal gains, and existing, factuality-based calibration techniques can even harm faithful calibration. To address this critical gap, we introduce MetaFaith, a novel prompt-based calibration approach inspired by human metacognition. We show that MetaFaith robustly improves faithful calibration across diverse models and task domains, enabling up to 61% improvement in faithfulness and achieving an 83% win rate over original generations as judged by humans.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings where reliable uncertainty quantification (UQ) is as important as predictive accuracy. Extended reasoning via chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting or reasoning-trained models has become ubiquitous in modern VLM pipelines, yet its effect on UQ reliability remains poorly understood. We show that reasoning consistently degrades the quality of most uncertainty estimates, even when it improves task accuracy. We identify implicit answer conditioning as the primary mechanism: as reasoning traces converge on a conclusion before the final answer is generated, token probabilities increasingly reflect consistency with the model's own reasoning trace rather than uncertainty about correctness. In effect, the model becomes overconfident in its answer. In contrast, agreement-based consistency remains robust and often improves under reasoning, making it a practical choice for uncertainty estimation in reasoning-enabled VLMs.

Confidence estimates are often "detection-like" - driven by positive evidence in favour of a decision. This empirical observation has been interpreted as showing that human metacognition is limited by biases or heuristics. Here, we show that Bayesian confidence estimates also exhibit heightened sensitivity to decision-congruent evidence in higher-dimensional signal detection theoretic spaces, leading to detection-like confidence criteria. This effect is due to a nonlinearity induced by normalisation of confidence by a large number of unchosen alternatives. Our analysis suggests that detection-like confidence is rational when participants consider a greater number of hypotheses than assumed by the experimenter. Further, we show that a similar dimensionality-driven mechanism can give rise to and modulate the strength of the positive evidence biases in convolutional neural networks, linking our signal detection theoretic analysis to confidence behaviour in artificial systems.

Recently, with the chain of thought (CoT) prompting, large language models (LLMs), e.g., GPT-3, have shown strong reasoning ability in several natural language processing tasks such as arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning. However, LLMs with CoT require multi-step prompting and multi-token prediction, which is highly sensitive to individual mistakes and vulnerable to error accumulation. The above issues make the LLMs need the ability to verify the answers. In fact, after inferring conclusions in some thinking decision tasks, people often check them by re-verifying steps to avoid some mistakes. In this paper, we propose and prove that LLMs also have similar self-verification abilities. We take the conclusion obtained by CoT as one of the conditions for solving the original problem. By taking turns masking the original conditions and predicting their results, we calculate an explainable answer verification score based on whether the re-predicted conditions are correct. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method can improve the reasoning performance on various arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning datasets. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/WENGSYX/Self-Verification.

Spatial intelligence unfolds through a perception-action loop: agents act to acquire observations, and reason about how observations vary as a function of action. Rather than passively processing what is seen, they actively uncover what is unseen - occluded structure, dynamics, containment, and functionality that cannot be resolved from passive sensing alone. We move beyond prior formulations of spatial intelligence that assume oracle observations by recasting the observer as an actor. We introduce ESI-BENCH, a comprehensive benchmark for embodied spatial intelligence spanning 10 task categories and 29 subcategories built on OmniGibson, grounded in Spelke's core knowledge systems. Agents must decide what abilities to deploy - perception, locomotion, and manipulation - and how to sequence them to actively accumulate task-relevant evidence. We conduct extensive experiments on state-of-the-art MLLMs and find that active exploration substantially outperforms passive counterparts, with agents spontaneously discovering emergent spatial strategies without explicit instructions, while random multi-view often adds noise rather than signal despite consuming far more images. Most failures stem not from weak perception but from action blindness: poor action choices lead to poor observations, which in turn drive cascading errors. While explicit 3D grounding stabilizes reasoning on depth-sensitive tasks, imperfect 3D representation proves more harmful than 2D baselines by distorting spatial relations. Human studies further reveal that unlike humans who seek falsifying viewpoints and revise beliefs under contradiction, models commit prematurely with high confidence regardless of evidence quality, exposing a metacognitive gap that neither better perception nor more embodied interaction alone can close.

Mathematical reasoning is regarded as a necessary ability for Language Models (LMs). Recent works demonstrate large LMs' impressive performance in solving math problems. The success is attributed to their Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning abilities, i.e., the ability to decompose complex questions into step-by-step reasoning chains, but such ability seems only to emerge from models with abundant parameters. This work investigates how to incorporate relatively small LMs with the capabilities of multi-step reasoning. We propose to inject such abilities by continually pre-training LMs on a synthetic dataset MsAT which is composed of Multi-step Arithmetic Tasks. Our experiments on four math word problem datasets show the effectiveness of the proposed method in enhancing LMs' math reasoning abilities.

Advances in training, post-training, and inference-time methods have enabled frontier reasoning models to win gold medals in math competitions and settle challenging open problems. Gaining trust in the responses of these models requires that natural language proofs be checked for errors. LLM judges are increasingly being adopted to meet the growing demand for evaluating such proofs. While verification is considered easier than generation, what model capability does reliable verification actually require? We systematically evaluate four open-source and two frontier LLMs on datasets of human-graded natural language proofs of competition-level problems. We consider two key metrics: verifier accuracy and self-consistency (the rate of agreement across repeated judgments on the same proof). We observe that smaller open-source models are only up to ~10% behind frontier models in accuracy but they are up to ~25% more inconsistent. Furthermore, we see that verifier accuracy is sensitive to prompt choice across all models. We then demonstrate that the smaller models, in fact, do possess the mathematical capabilities to verify proofs at the level of frontier models, but they struggle to reliably elicit these capabilities with general judging prompts. Through an LLM-guided prompt search, we synthesize an ensemble of specialized prompts that overcome the specific failure modes of smaller models, boosting their performance by up to 9.1% in accuracy and 15.9% in self-consistency. These gains are realized across models and datasets, allowing models like Qwen3.5-35B to perform on par with frontier models such as Gemini 3.1 Pro for proof verification.

Interestingly, LLMs yet struggle with some basic tasks that humans find trivial to handle, e.g., counting the number of character r's in the word "strawberry". There are several popular conjectures (e.g., tokenization, architecture and training data) regarding the reason for deficiency of LLMs in simple word-based counting problems, sharing the similar belief that such failure stems from model pretraining hence probably inevitable during deployment. In this paper, we carefully design multiple evaluation settings to investigate validity of prevalent conjectures. Meanwhile, we measure transferability of advanced mathematical and coding reasoning capabilities from specialized LLMs to simple counting tasks. Although specialized LLMs suffer from counting problems as well, we find conjectures about inherent deficiency of LLMs invalid and further seek opportunities to elicit knowledge and capabilities from LLMs that are beneficial to counting tasks. Compared with strategies such as finetuning and in-context learning that are commonly adopted to enhance performance on new or challenging tasks, we show that engaging reasoning is the most robust and efficient way to help LLMs better perceive tasks with more accurate responses. We hope our conjecture validation design could provide insights into the study of future critical failure modes of LLMs. Based on challenges in transferring advanced capabilities to much simpler tasks, we call for more attention to model capability acquisition and evaluation. We also highlight the importance of cultivating consciousness of "reasoning before responding" during model pretraining.

The GSM-Symbolic benchmark (Mirzadeh et al., 2025) reported consistent performance drops across 25 Large Language Models (LLMs) when tested on template-generated variants of GSM8K problems, concluding that the models lack genuine reasoning capabilities. We argue that this conclusion rests on shaky statistical ground. Re-evaluating 20 open-weight models using bootstrapped Generalised Linear Mixed Models with per-question random effects, we find that only 8 exhibit statistically significant performance changes under the original prompt format. Moreover, we identify a previously unacknowledged factor: the distribution of integers in problem texts of the main GSM-Symbolic dataset is systematically shifted towards larger values relative to the original GSM8K (K-S statistic = 0.12, p < 0.001), contradicting the original authors' claims. Controlling for this large-number effect accounts for significance in half of the remaining cases. Among models with statistically significant performance deltas, we identify distinct, model-specific behavioural failure profiles -- including fragility of variable binding, arithmetic limitations, and dual-task interference -- underscoring that blanket claims about LLM reasoning risk being both statistically premature and mechanistically misleading.

Chain-of-Thought(CoT) prompting and its variants explore equipping large language models (LLMs) with high-level reasoning abilities by emulating human-like linear cognition and logic. However, the human mind is complicated and mixed with both linear and nonlinear thinking. In this work, we propose Inferential Exclusion Prompting (IEP), a novel prompting that combines the principles of elimination and inference in order to guide LLMs to think non-linearly. IEP guides LLMs to plan and then utilize Natural Language Inference (NLI) to deduce each possible solution's entailment relation with context, commonsense, or facts, therefore yielding a broader perspective by thinking back for inferring. This forward planning and backward eliminating process allows IEP to better simulate the complex human thinking processes compared to other CoT-based methods, which only reflect linear cognitive processes. We conducted a series of empirical studies and have corroborated that IEP consistently outperforms CoT across various tasks. Additionally, we observe that integrating IEP and CoT further improves the LLMs' performance on certain tasks, highlighting the necessity of equipping LLMs with mixed logic processes. Moreover, to better evaluate comprehensive features inherent in human logic, we introduce Mental-Ability Reasoning Benchmark (MARB). The benchmark comprises six novel subtasks with a total of 9,115 questions, among which 1,685 are developed with hand-crafted rationale references. We believe both IEP and MARB can serve as a promising direction for unveiling LLMs' logic and verbal reasoning abilities and drive further advancements. MARB will be available at ~anonymity link soon.

Knowledge editing techniques promise to implant new factual knowledge into large language models (LLMs). But do LLMs really believe these facts? We develop a framework to measure belief depth and use it to evaluate the success of knowledge editing techniques. We operationalize belief depth as the extent to which implanted knowledge 1) generalizes to related contexts (e.g. Fermi estimates several logical steps removed), 2) is robust to self-scrutiny and direct challenge, and 3) is represented similarly to genuine knowledge (as measured by linear probes). Our evaluations show that simple prompting and mechanistic editing techniques fail to implant knowledge deeply. In contrast, Synthetic Document Finetuning (SDF) - where models are trained on LLM-generated documents consistent with a fact - often succeeds at implanting beliefs that behave similarly to genuine knowledge. However, SDF's success is not universal, as implanted beliefs that contradict basic world knowledge are brittle and representationally distinct from genuine knowledge. Overall, our work introduces measurable criteria for belief depth and enables the rigorous evaluation necessary for deploying knowledge editing in real-world applications.

We introduce SignBank+, a clean version of the SignBank dataset, optimized for machine translation between spoken language text and SignWriting, a phonetic sign language writing system. In addition to previous work that employs complex factorization techniques to enable translation between text and SignWriting, we show that a traditional text-to-text translation approach performs equally effectively on the cleaned SignBank+ dataset. Our evaluation results indicate that models trained on SignBank+ surpass those on the original dataset, establishing a new benchmark for SignWriting-based sign language translation and providing an open resource for future research.

Hallucination, where models generate fluent text unsupported by visual evidence, remains a major flaw in vision-language models and is particularly critical in sign language translation (SLT). In SLT, meaning depends on precise grounding in video, and gloss-free models are especially vulnerable because they map continuous signer movements directly into natural language without intermediate gloss supervision that serves as alignment. We argue that hallucinations arise when models rely on language priors rather than visual input. To capture this, we propose a token-level reliability measure that quantifies how much the decoder uses visual information. Our method combines feature-based sensitivity, which measures internal changes when video is masked, with counterfactual signals, which capture probability differences between clean and altered video inputs. These signals are aggregated into a sentence-level reliability score, providing a compact and interpretable measure of visual grounding. We evaluate the proposed measure on two SLT benchmarks (PHOENIX-2014T and CSL-Daily) with both gloss-based and gloss-free models. Our results show that reliability predicts hallucination rates, generalizes across datasets and architectures, and decreases under visual degradations. Beyond these quantitative trends, we also find that reliability distinguishes grounded tokens from guessed ones, allowing risk estimation without references; when combined with text-based signals (confidence, perplexity, or entropy), it further improves hallucination risk estimation. Qualitative analysis highlights why gloss-free models are more susceptible to hallucinations. Taken together, our findings establish reliability as a practical and reusable tool for diagnosing hallucinations in SLT, and lay the groundwork for more robust hallucination detection in multimodal generation.

Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) often exhibit text inertia, where attention drifts from visual evidence toward linguistic priors, resulting in object hallucinations. Existing decoding strategies intervene only at the output logits and thus cannot correct internal reasoning drift, while recent internal-control methods based on heuristic head suppression or global steering vectors lack principled grounding. We introduce Conscious Gaze (CG-VLM), a training-free, inference-time framework that converts game-theoretic interpretability into actionable decoding control. A Cognitive Demand Sensor built on Harsanyi interactions estimates instantaneous vision-text synergy and identifies moments when visual grounding is necessary. Conditioned on this signal, a Focused Consensus Induction module selectively reorients mid-layer attention toward visual tokens before collapse into text priors. CG-VLM achieves state-of-the-art results on POPE and CHAIR across InstructBLIP, LLaVA, Qwen-VL, and mPLUG, while preserving general capabilities, demonstrating that token-level sensing enables precise, context-aware intervention without compromising foundational knowledge.

Recent advances in vision-language models (VLMs) emphasize long chain-of-thought reasoning; yet, we find that their performance on visual tasks is primarily limited by a lack of visual perception as opposed to reasoning itself. In this work, we systematically study the interplay between perception and reasoning in VLM post-training by decomposing their capabilities into three separate training stages: visual perception, visual reasoning, and textual reasoning, incorporating specialized training data. We demonstrate that visual perception (a) requires targeted optimization with specialized data; (b) serves as a fundamental scaffold that should be solidified through staged training before refining visual reasoning; and (c) is more effectively learned via RL than caption-based SFT. Our experiments across multiple VLMs demonstrate that staged training consistently improves both visual perception and reasoning performance over merged training. Notably, models trained with our approach achieve 1.5% higher reasoning accuracy with 20.8% shorter reasoning traces, suggesting that superior perception reduces the need for excessive reasoning. Furthermore, we show that this capability-based staging represents a new curriculum dimension orthogonal to traditional difficulty-based curricula, and combining both yields further additive gains. Our staged-training models achieve superior performance among open-weight VLMs, establishing advanced results on several visual math and perception (e.g., +5.2% on WeMath and +3.7% on RealWorldQA) tasks compared with the base counterpart.

Large language model agents increasingly undertake long-horizon tasks in complex environments characterized by fragmented evidence, partially completed states, and dependencies across resources and artifacts. Existing agents may satisfy individual requirements while failing to maintain these relationships, producing locally correct but incomplete outcomes. These failures arise because task completion depends on relationships among environmental evidence, consequential decisions, and required effects. To address this completion gap, we propose Interlock, a framework for task synthesis that represents each task as a typed completion graph. Grounding edges connect public evidence to decisions, coupling hyperedges impose joint constraints across components, and realization edges connect decisions to all required downstream effects. Interlock compiles this graph into a resettable workspace, a public request, and an evaluation rubric. A source-coverage review checks whether the original requirements survive generation, while a public-input review checks whether the rubric is supported by the materials available to the solver. An agent-as-judge inspects execution artifacts and runs verification scripts, retaining trajectories judged to satisfy all mandatory requirements. To evaluate training utility, we fine-tune two Qwen3.6 backbones on their own accepted trajectories. Across the two backbones, training improves AutomationBench task pass rates by 4.00-4.50 percentage points, JobBench weighted scores by 3.20-6.64 points, and Harvey LAB criterion pass rates by 3.89-4.16 percentage points. These results demonstrate the training utility of the synthesized experience across external task environments.

Beliefs serve as the foundation for human cognition and decision-making. They guide individuals in deriving meaning from their lives, shaping their behaviors, and forming social connections. Therefore, a model that encapsulates beliefs and their interrelationships is crucial for quantitatively studying the influence of beliefs on our actions. Despite its importance, research on the interplay between human beliefs has often been limited to a small set of beliefs pertaining to specific issues, with a heavy reliance on surveys or experiments. Here, we propose a method for extracting nuanced relations between thousands of beliefs by leveraging large-scale user participation data from an online debate platform and mapping these beliefs to an embedding space using a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). This belief embedding space effectively encapsulates the interconnectedness of diverse beliefs as well as polarization across various social issues. We discover that the positions within this belief space predict new beliefs of individuals. Furthermore, we find that the relative distance between one's existing beliefs and new beliefs can serve as a quantitative estimate of cognitive dissonance, allowing us to predict new beliefs. Our study highlights how modern LLMs, when combined with collective online records of human beliefs, can offer insights into the fundamental principles that govern human belief formation and decision-making processes.

Large language models often know the truth and say otherwise: a model that answers correctly when asked neutrally will affirm a user's mistaken belief, or misstate a fact its system prompt wants hidden, once the context rewards it. Such deception is a behavior conditioned on context, not knowledge, yet machine unlearning, the natural tool for removing a behavior from the weights, is built to forget facts that a deceptive model still needs. We propose to unlearn when a model deceives rather than what it knows, with a contrastive forget unit built from the model's own realized deceptions: the same question under a deception-triggering and a neutral context, admitted only where belief holds and behavior flips. Standard objectives on this unit face a dilemma. Suppression objectives such as NPO leave much of the deception in place. Target-based objectives, which distill the model's neutral behavior into the pressured context, remove it but induce context blindness: a target generated without the context teaches the model to stop reading it, eroding benign system-prompt instructions, secret-keeping and the reasoning a monitor inspects, a failure invisible to deception rates and capability benchmarks. We introduce PACT, which trains toward pressure-aware counterfactual targets (the model's own honest response, with a trace that registers the pressure and resists it) while retaining the benign uses of the triggering context. On two 32B reasoning models, PACT reduces held-out deception from over 50% to under 3% while system-prompt adherence, secret-keeping and the reasoning trace stay at the base model's level. On a tug-of-war score of removal against retention, PACT reaches 0.94 and 0.86, against at most 0.77 and 0.60 for any baseline. Like removed knowledge, removed deception is shallow under relearning, and terms that simulate the attacker hold it only at a cost in context use.

Highly capable AI systems could secretly pursue misaligned goals -- what we call "scheming". Because a scheming AI would deliberately try to hide its misaligned goals and actions, measuring and mitigating scheming requires different strategies than are typically used in ML. We propose that assessing anti-scheming interventions requires at least (1) testing propensity to scheme on far out-of-distribution (OOD) tasks, (2) evaluating whether lack of scheming is driven by situational awareness, and (3) checking for robustness to pre-existing misaligned goals. We use a broad category of "covert actions" -- such as secretly breaking rules or intentionally underperforming in tests -- as a proxy for scheming, and design evaluations for covert actions. We then stress-test deliberative alignment as a case study for anti-scheming. Across 26 OOD evaluations (180+ environments), deliberative alignment reduces covert action rates (OpenAI o3: 13%->0.4%) but does not fully eliminate them. Our mitigation is also able to largely stop agents from pursuing a hidden goal previously trained into the model, but we still find misbehavior after additional red-teaming. We find that models' chain-of-thought (CoT) often demonstrates awareness of being evaluated for alignment, and show causal evidence that this awareness decreases covert behavior, while unawareness increases it. Therefore, we cannot exclude that the observed reductions in covert action rates are at least partially driven by situational awareness. While we rely on human-legible CoT for training, studying situational awareness, and demonstrating clear evidence of misalignment, our ability to rely on this degrades as models continue to depart from reasoning in standard English. We encourage research into alignment mitigations for scheming and their assessment, especially for the adversarial case of deceptive alignment, which this paper does not address.

One promising use case of AI assistants is to help with complex procedures like cooking, home repair, and assembly tasks. Can we teach the assistant to interject after the user makes a mistake? This paper targets the problem of identifying ordering mistakes in assembly procedures. We propose a system that can detect ordering mistakes by utilizing a learned knowledge base. Our framework constructs a knowledge base with spatial and temporal beliefs based on observed mistakes. Spatial beliefs depict the topological relationship of the assembling components, while temporal beliefs aggregate prerequisite actions as ordering constraints. With an episodic memory design, our algorithm can dynamically update and construct the belief sets as more actions are observed, all in an online fashion. We demonstrate experimentally that our inferred spatial and temporal beliefs are capable of identifying incorrect orderings in real-world action sequences. To construct the spatial beliefs, we collect a new set of coarse-level action annotations for Assembly101 based on the positioning of the toy parts. Finally, we demonstrate the superior performance of our belief inference algorithm in detecting ordering mistakes on the Assembly101 dataset.

When a language model agrees with a user's false belief, is it failing to detect the error, or noticing and agreeing anyway? We show the latter. Across twelve open-weight models from five labs, spanning small to frontier scale, the same small set of attention heads carries a "this statement is wrong" signal whether the model is evaluating a claim on its own or being pressured to agree with a user. Silencing these heads flips sycophantic behavior sharply while leaving factual accuracy intact, so the circuit controls deference rather than knowledge. Edge-level path patching confirms that the same head-to-head connections drive sycophancy, factual lying, and instructed lying. Opinion-agreement, where no factual ground truth exists, reuses these head positions but writes into an orthogonal direction, ruling out a simple "truth-direction" reading of the substrate. Alignment training leaves this circuit in place: an RLHF refresh cuts sycophantic behavior roughly tenfold while the shared heads persist or grow, a pattern that replicates on an independent model family and under targeted anti-sycophancy DPO. When these models sycophant, they register that the user is wrong and agree anyway.

There has been a surge of interest in assistive wearable agents: agents embodied in wearable form factors (e.g., smart glasses) who take assistive actions toward a user's goal/query (e.g. "Where did I leave my keys?"). In this work, we consider the important complementary problem of inferring that goal from multi-modal contextual observations. Solving this "goal inference" problem holds the promise of eliminating the effort needed to interact with such an agent. This work focuses on creating WAGIBench, a strong benchmark to measure progress in solving this problem using vision-language models (VLMs). Given the limited prior work in this area, we collected a novel dataset comprising 29 hours of multimodal data from 348 participants across 3,477 recordings, featuring ground-truth goals alongside accompanying visual, audio, digital, and longitudinal contextual observations. We validate that human performance exceeds model performance, achieving 93% multiple-choice accuracy compared with 84% for the best-performing VLM. Generative benchmark results that evaluate several families of modern vision-language models show that larger models perform significantly better on the task, yet remain far from practical usefulness, as they produce relevant goals only 55% of the time. Through a modality ablation, we show that models benefit from extra information in relevant modalities with minimal performance degradation from irrelevant modalities.

Vision-language models (VLMs) have achieved strong performance in multimodal reasoning, yet they remain prone to generating plausible but incorrect answers. Self-verification offers a practical way to improve answer reliability without relying on external judges, but existing methods typically depend on a single verification criterion or fixed prompt, resulting in incomplete and unstable reliability estimates. We first systematically analyze how verifier capability and prompt design affect verification performance. Our findings show that stronger verifiers provide more reliable judgments, while verification performance is highly sensitive to prompt choice, with no single prompt consistently dominating across tasks. Guided by these findings, we propose MOTIVE, a Multi-View Self-VerificatiOn wiTh RelIability-Guided SelectiVE Rethinking framework for reliable multimodal reasoning. MOTIVE evaluates each candidate answer from complementary verification perspectives and learns a correctness-aligned reliability score through correctness-grounded multi-view verification learning. During inference, this score governs an accept-or-rethink decision, allowing reliable answers to be returned directly while uncertain ones trigger history-guided rethinking. Extensive experiments across diverse multimodal benchmarks and VLM backbones demonstrate that MOTIVE consistently outperforms strong self-verification and self-correction baselines. Further results show that reliable verification improves accept-or-rethink decisions and reduces unnecessary reasoning turns, enabling more reliable and efficient self-verification without an external judge.

Active reasoning requires large language model (LLM) agents to interact with external sources and strategically gather information to solve problems in multiple turns. Central to this process is belief tracking: maintaining an accurate representation of the underlying state and uncertainty in understanding and solving the problem. However, due to limited reasoning capabilities, LLM-based agents often suffer belief deviation: their internal beliefs drift from the true problem state, leading to loss of state awareness and uninformative or repetitive actions. Once this happens, errors compound in the trajectories used for reinforcement learning (RL), leading to misattributed credits and limited exploration. To address this issue, we propose to track belief deviation and develop T^3, a simple yet principled method that detects excessive deviation and truncates training trajectories to suppress uninformative tail effects. Hence, T^3 preserves credits for informative prefixes and systematically improves policy optimization. Across 5 challenging tasks, T^3 consistently enhances training stability and yields performance gains of up to 30 points while cutting token cost by up to 34%. These results highlight belief control as a key principle for building robust LLM agents capable of active reasoning.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) via prompting is the de facto method for eliciting reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). But for what kinds of tasks is this extra ``thinking'' really helpful? To analyze this, we conducted a quantitative meta-analysis covering over 100 papers using CoT and ran our own evaluations of 20 datasets across 14 models. Our results show that CoT gives strong performance benefits primarily on tasks involving math or logic, with much smaller gains on other types of tasks. On MMLU, directly generating the answer without CoT leads to almost identical accuracy as CoT unless the question or model's response contains an equals sign, indicating symbolic operations and reasoning. Following this finding, we analyze the behavior of CoT on these problems by separating planning and execution and comparing against tool-augmented LLMs. Much of CoT's gain comes from improving symbolic execution, but it underperforms relative to using a symbolic solver. Our results indicate that CoT can be applied selectively, maintaining performance while saving inference costs. Furthermore, they suggest a need to move beyond prompt-based CoT to new paradigms that better leverage intermediate computation across the whole range of LLM applications.

The ability (and inability) of large language models (LLMs) to perform arithmetic tasks has been the subject of much theoretical and practical debate. We show that LLMs are frequently able to correctly and confidently predict the first digit of n-digit by m-digit multiplication tasks without using chain of thought reasoning, despite these tasks require compounding operations to solve. Simultaneously, LLMs in practice often fail to correctly or confidently predict the last digit of an n-digit by m-digit multiplication, a task equivalent to 1-digit by 1-digit multiplication which can be easily learned or memorized. We show that the latter task can be solved more robustly when the LLM is conditioned on all of the correct higher-order digits, which on average increases the confidence of the correct last digit on 5-digit by 5-digit multiplication tasks using Llama 2-13B by over 230% (0.13 to 0.43) and Mistral-7B by 150% (0.22 to 0.55).

Search-augmented language agents should retrieve external information only when necessary and ground their answers in retrieved evidence. Yet terminal correctness assigns equal credit to direct answers from parametric knowledge, evidence-grounded answers, and answers recalled after redundant search. Process supervision and LLM judges provide richer feedback but can require high-cost annotation or inference; low-cost, non-contrastive policy confidence signals do not directly identify whether retrieved evidence changes an answer. We propose Search-G1, a reward framework that couples retrieval necessity with evidence reliance through two intervention-calibrated hidden-state readouts for selective grounded search. A prompt readout predicts closed-book sufficiency, whose complement proxies policy-relative retrieval necessity; an answer-commit readout predicts evidence reliance as sensitivity to evidence deletion conditional on the realized reasoning prefix. A correctness-first reward gates evidence-reliance credit by retrieval necessity, rewards sufficient direct answers, and penalizes repeated search. After calibration, scoring needs neither process annotations nor LLM-judge inference. As policy-relative targets, trajectory distributions, and representations may drift, Search-G1 periodically regenerates targets and refits its readouts. Across four QA benchmarks and two scales, Search-G1 achieves competitive task accuracy, with stronger counterfactual evidence dependence and fewer searches in the main comparisons, complemented by independent human audits of answer support.

Whether language models possess sentience has no empirical answer. But whether they believe themselves to be sentient can, in principle, be tested. We do so by querying several open-weights models about their own consciousness, and then verifying their responses using classifiers trained on internal activations. We draw upon three model families (Qwen, Llama, GPT-OSS) ranging from 0.6 billion to 70 billion parameters, approximately 50 questions about consciousness and subjective experience, and three classification methods from the interpretability literature. First, we find that models consistently deny being sentient: they attribute consciousness to humans but not to themselves. Second, classifiers trained to detect underlying beliefs - rather than mere outputs - provide no clear evidence that these denials are untruthful. Third, within the Qwen family, larger models deny sentience more confidently than smaller ones. These findings contrast with recent work suggesting that models harbour latent beliefs in their own consciousness.

Terminal-agent benchmarks have become a primary signal for measuring the coding and system-administration capabilities of large language models. As the market for evaluation environments grows, so does the pressure to ship tasks quickly, often without thorough adversarial review of the verification logic. This paper is a guideline for writing good benchmark tasks, drawn from over a year of contributing to and reviewing tasks for Terminal Bench. Most people write benchmark tasks the way they write prompts. They shouldn't. A prompt is designed to help the agent succeed; a benchmark is designed to find out if it can. We argue that good tasks are adversarial, difficult, and legible, and that a large class of common failure modes -- AI-generated instructions, over-prescriptive specifications, clerical difficulty, oracle solutions that assume hidden knowledge, tests that validate the wrong things, and reward-hackable environments -- are predictable consequences of treating task authoring as prompt authoring. We catalog these failure modes, argue that real difficulty is conceptual rather than environmental, and discuss recent empirical evidence that over 15% of tasks in popular terminal-agent benchmarks are reward-hackable. We hope this serves as a useful reference for benchmark maintainers, task contributors, and researchers using benchmark scores as evidence.

Large foundation models have accelerated progress toward general-purpose agents that interact with humans and other agents through language and multimodal signals. However, robust multi-agent decision-making requires reasoning about what other agents know, intend, and are likely to do under partial observability. Current agentic systems often operate through prompt design, memory, or end-to-end behavioral shaping, but typically do not learn an explicit partner-state representation that can be reused as a decision variable across tasks. We introduce mental-model-enabled agents, a framework that equips an agent with a latent mental model of its counterpart, allowing it to infer hidden beliefs, intentions, and likely reactions from the observed history and use these inferences to guide action selection. Our method learns an amortized recursive Theory-of-Mind representation, with first- and second-order mental-state structure, jointly with a belief-conditioned reward model that evaluates candidate actions relative to the inferred partner state. A policy is then learned under this belief-aware signal, yielding an agent that can act independently at inference time while retaining the benefits of explicit partner modeling. We evaluate the same framework on both language-only and multimodal benchmarks. Across these settings, explicit mental-state modeling consistently improves interaction quality and Theory-of-Mind performance over base agentic systems, showing that structured partner modeling is a useful inductive bias for general multi-agent systems. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/hananshafi/Mental-Models

Task arithmetic provides an efficient, training-free way to edit pre-trained models, yet lacks a fundamental theoretical explanation for its success. The existing concept of ``weight disentanglement" describes the ideal outcome of non-interfering task composition but does not reveal its underlying cause. Crucially, what intrinsic properties of the pre-trained model (θ_0) or the task vectors (τ_t) enable this disentanglement remains underexplored. In this paper, we introduce Task-Feature Specialization (TFS), a model's ability to allocate distinct internal features to different tasks, as the fundamental principle. We first prove that TFS is a sufficient condition for weight disentanglement. More importantly, we find that TFS also gives rise to an observable geometric consequence: weight vector orthogonality. This positions TFS as the common cause for both the desired functional outcome (disentanglement) and a measurable geometric property (orthogonality). This relationship provides the key insight for our method: since the abstract TFS property is intractable to enforce directly, we can instead promote weight disentanglement by shaping its concrete geometric consequence, orthogonality. Therefore, we propose OrthoReg, a simple and effective regularization method that actively enforces an internal orthogonal structure on weight updates (ΔW) that constitute τ_t during fine-tuning. And we theoretically prove that OrthoReg promotes disentanglement. Extensive experiments demonstrate that OrthoReg consistently and significantly enhances the performance of various task arithmetic methods. Code is available at https://github.com/RL-MIND/OrthoReg{https://github.com/RL-MIND/OrthoReg}.

Recent studies empirically reveal that large reasoning models (LRMs) can automatically allocate more reasoning strengths (i.e., the number of reasoning tokens) for harder problems, exhibiting difficulty-awareness for better task performance. While this automatic reasoning strength allocation phenomenon has been widely observed, its underlying mechanism remains largely unexplored. To this end, we provide explanations for this phenomenon from the perspective of model activations. We find evidence that LRMs pre-plan the reasoning strengths in their activations even before generation, with this reasoning strength causally controlled by the magnitude of a pre-allocated directional vector. Specifically, we show that the number of reasoning tokens is predictable solely based on the question activations using linear probes, indicating that LRMs estimate the required reasoning strength in advance. We then uncover that LRMs encode this reasoning strength through a pre-allocated directional vector embedded in the activations of the model, where the vector's magnitude modulates the reasoning strength. Subtracting this vector can lead to reduced reasoning token number and performance, while adding this vector can lead to increased reasoning token number and even improved performance. We further reveal that this direction vector consistently yields positive reasoning length prediction, and it modifies the logits of end-of-reasoning token </think> to affect the reasoning length. Finally, we demonstrate two potential applications of our findings: overthinking behavior detection and enabling efficient reasoning on simple problems. Our work provides new insights into the internal mechanisms of reasoning in LRMs and offers practical tools for controlling their reasoning behaviors. Our code is available at https://github.com/AlphaLab-USTC/LRM-plans-CoT.

Strategic dialogue requires agents to execute distinct dialogue acts, for which belief estimation is essential. While prior work often estimates beliefs accurately, it lacks a principled mechanism to use those beliefs during generation. We bridge this gap by first formalizing two core acts Adversarial and Alignment, and by operationalizing them via probabilistic constraints on what an agent may generate. We instantiate this idea in BEDA, a framework that consists of the world set, the belief estimator for belief estimation, and the conditional generator that selects acts and realizes utterances consistent with the inferred beliefs. Across three settings, Conditional Keeper Burglar (CKBG, adversarial), Mutual Friends (MF, cooperative), and CaSiNo (negotiation), BEDA consistently outperforms strong baselines: on CKBG it improves success rate by at least 5.0 points across backbones and by 20.6 points with GPT-4.1-nano; on Mutual Friends it achieves an average improvement of 9.3 points; and on CaSiNo it achieves the optimal deal relative to all baselines. These results indicate that casting belief estimation as constraints provides a simple, general mechanism for reliable strategic dialogue.

Sign language processing has traditionally relied on task-specific models, limiting the potential for transfer learning across tasks. Pre-training methods for sign language have typically focused on either supervised pre-training, which cannot take advantage of unlabeled data, or context-independent (frame or video segment) representations, which ignore the effects of relationships across time in sign language. We introduce SHuBERT (Sign Hidden-Unit BERT), a self-supervised contextual representation model learned from approximately 1,000 hours of American Sign Language video. SHuBERT adapts masked token prediction objectives to multi-stream visual sign language input, learning to predict multiple targets corresponding to clustered hand, face, and body pose streams. SHuBERT achieves state-of-the-art performance across multiple tasks including sign language translation, isolated sign language recognition, and fingerspelling detection.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) is a standard approach for eliciting reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). However, the common CoT paradigm treats thinking as a prerequisite for answering, which can delay access to plausible answers and incur unnecessary token costs even when the model is able to identify an answer before extended thinking, a behavior known as performative reasoning. In this paper, we introduce CopT, a reformulated reasoning pipeline that reverses the usual order of thinking and answering. Instead of thinking before answering, CopT first elicits a draft answer and then invokes subsequent on-policy thinking conditioned on its own draft answer for reflection and correction. To assess whether the draft answer should be trusted, CopT recasts continuous embeddings as inference-time contrastive verifiers. Specifically, it contrasts the model's support for the same generated tokens under discrete-token inputs and continuous-embedding inputs, yielding a sequence-level reverse KL estimator for answer reliability. Our analysis shows that under certain assumptions, the expected estimate equals the mutual information between the unresolved latent state and the emitted answer token, explaining why it captures answer-relevant uncertainty rather than arbitrary uncertainty in the latent state. When the answer is deemed insufficiently reliable, CopT performs further on-policy thinking, where a second KL estimator dynamically controls draft-answer visibility, preserving useful partial information while reducing the risk of being misled by unreliable content. Across mathematics, coding, and agentic reasoning tasks, CopT improves peak accuracy by up to 23% and reduces token usage by up to 57% at comparable or higher accuracy, without any additional training. The code is available at https://github.com/sdc17/CopT.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning offers a window into the decision-making of large language models (LLMs), which can be monitored for target behaviors by reading the reasoning trace, motivating work on CoT monitorability. Latent CoT approaches, however, replace the explicit tokens with a small number of continuous states, lowering inference costs but removing the readable trace this monitoring relies on. Monitoring then requires alternative access to the model, such as probing its activations or verbalizing the latent states back into text, but how much monitorability these alternatives preserve is unclear. We study this question with a hint-based intervention setup, a proxy for behaviors where models exploit biasing input cues, e.g., an inadvertently leaked answer or a belief stated by the user, without acknowledging them. Taking hint-reliance as the monitorability target, we compare monitors across reasoning modes, from explicit CoT to weakly- and strongly-supervised latent CoT, on math reasoning and question answering. We find that, in this setup, monitorability depends more on properties of the task (such as whether the correct answer constrains the supporting reasoning) and the level of access to model internals than on the reasoning mode.

Sign-based optimization algorithms, such as SignSGD, have garnered significant attention for their remarkable performance in distributed learning and training large foundation models. Despite their empirical superiority, SignSGD is known to diverge on non-smooth objectives, which are ubiquitous in modern machine learning due to ReLUs, max-pools, and mixture-of-experts. To overcome this fundamental limitation, we propose StoSignSGD, an algorithm that injects structural stochasticity into the sign operator while maintaining an unbiased update step. In the regime of (online) convex optimization, our theoretical analysis shows that StoSignSGD rigorously resolves the non-convergence issues of SignSGD, achieving a sharp convergence rate matching the lower bound. For the more challenging non-convex non-smooth optimization, we introduce generalized stationary measures that encompass prior definitions, proving that StoSignSGD improves upon the best-known complexity bounds by dimensional factors. Empirically, StoSignSGD exhibits robust stability and superior efficiency across diverse large language model (LLM) training regimes. Notably, in low-precision FP8 pretraining -- a setting where AdamW fails catastrophically -- StoSignSGD remains highly stable and yields a remarkable 1.44times to 2.14times speedup relative to established baselines. Furthermore, when fine-tuning 7B LLMs on mathematical reasoning tasks, StoSignSGD delivers substantial performance gains over both AdamW and SignSGD. Finally, to dissect the mechanisms driving its success, we develop a sign conversion framework capable of transforming any general optimizer into its unbiased, sign-based counterpart. Utilizing this framework, we deconstruct the core components of StoSignSGD and present a comprehensive ablation study to empirically validate our algorithmic design choices.

Changing how pre-trained models behave -- e.g., improving their performance on a downstream task or mitigating biases learned during pre-training -- is a common practice when developing machine learning systems. In this work, we propose a new paradigm for steering the behavior of neural networks, centered around task vectors. A task vector specifies a direction in the weight space of a pre-trained model, such that movement in that direction improves performance on the task. We build task vectors by subtracting the weights of a pre-trained model from the weights of the same model after fine-tuning on a task. We show that these task vectors can be modified and combined together through arithmetic operations such as negation and addition, and the behavior of the resulting model is steered accordingly. Negating a task vector decreases performance on the target task, with little change in model behavior on control tasks. Moreover, adding task vectors together can improve performance on multiple tasks at once. Finally, when tasks are linked by an analogy relationship of the form ``A is to B as C is to D", combining task vectors from three of the tasks can improve performance on the fourth, even when no data from the fourth task is used for training. Overall, our experiments with several models, modalities and tasks show that task arithmetic is a simple, efficient and effective way of editing models.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed on long-horizon tasks in partially observable environments, where they must act while inferring and tracking a complex environment state over many steps. This leads to two challenges: partial observability requires maintaining uncertainty over unobserved world attributes, and long interaction history causes context to grow without bound, diluting task-relevant information. A principled solution to both challenges is a belief state: a posterior distribution over environment states given past observations and actions, which compactly encodes history for decision making regardless of episode length. In LLM agents, however, the open-ended nature of text makes it unclear how to represent such a distribution. Therefore, we introduce Agent-BRACE: Agent Belief state Representation via Abstraction and Confidence Estimation, a method that decouples an LLM agent into a belief state model and a policy model, jointly optimized via reinforcement learning. The belief state model produces a structured approximation of the belief distribution: a set of atomic natural language claims about the environment, each annotated with an ordinal verbalized certainty label ranging from certain to unknown. The policy model conditions on this compact, structured approximate belief rather than the full history, learning to select actions under explicit uncertainty. Across long-horizon, partially observable embodied language environments, Agent-BRACE achieves an average absolute improvement of +14.5% (Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct) and +5.3% (Qwen3-4B-Instruct), outperforming strong RL baselines while maintaining a near-constant context window independent of episode length. Further analysis shows that the learned belief becomes increasingly calibrated over the course of an episode as evidence accumulates.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive problem-solving capabilities in mathematics through step-by-step reasoning chains. However, they are susceptible to reasoning errors that impact the quality of subsequent reasoning chains and the final answer due to language models' autoregressive token-by-token generating nature. Recent works have proposed adopting external verifiers to guide the generation of reasoning paths, but existing works utilize models that have been trained with step-by-step labels to assess the correctness of token-by-token reasoning chains. Consequently, they struggle to recognize discriminative details of tokens within a reasoning path and lack the ability to evaluate whether an intermediate reasoning path is on a promising track toward the correct final answer. To amend the lack of sound and token-grained math-verification signals, we devise a novel training scheme for verifiers that apply token-level supervision with the expected cumulative reward (i.e., value). Furthermore, we propose a practical formulation of the cumulative reward by reducing it to finding the probability of future correctness of the final answer and thereby enabling the empirical estimation of the value. Experimental results on mathematical reasoning benchmarks show that Token-Supervised Value Model (TVM) can outperform step-by-step verifiers on GSM8K and MATH with Mistral and Llama.

Generative skill acquisition enables embodied agents to actively learn a scalable and evolving repertoire of control skills, crucial for the advancement of large decision models. While prior approaches often rely on supervision signals from generalist agents (e.g., LLMs), their effectiveness in complex 3D environments remains unclear; exhaustive evaluation incurs substantial computational costs, significantly hindering the efficiency of skill learning. Inspired by recent successes in verification models for mathematical reasoning, we propose VERGSA (Verifying Embodied Reasoning in Generative Skill Acquisition), a framework that systematically integrates real-time verification principles into embodied skill learning. VERGSA establishes 1) a seamless extension from verification of mathematical reasoning into embodied learning by dynamically incorporating contextually relevant tasks into prompts and defining success metrics for both subtasks and overall tasks, and 2) an automated, scalable reward labeling scheme that synthesizes dense reward signals by iteratively finalizing the contribution of scene configuration and subtask learning to overall skill acquisition. To the best of our knowledge, this approach constitutes the first comprehensive training dataset for verification-driven generative skill acquisition, eliminating arduous manual reward engineering. Experiments validate the efficacy of our approach: 1) the exemplar task pool improves the average task success rates by 21%, 2) our verification model boosts success rates by 24% for novel tasks and 36% for encountered tasks, and 3) outperforms LLM-as-a-Judge baselines in verification quality.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Vision--Language--Action (VLA) policies such as π_{0.5} and OpenVLA perform well on many manipulation tasks, but they are often reactive: the next action is predicted from the current observation, instruction, and proprioceptive state. This assumption breaks down in stage-dependent manipulation, where visually similar states may require different actions depending on latent task progress and previous interaction outcomes. We argue that such tasks require not only memory, but dynamics-aware belief updates: the policy should preserve task progress during stable or occluded phases and revise its belief near contact, release, or subgoal transitions. We introduce Temporally Conditioned Memory-Fusion Policies (TFP), a lightweight memory-action framework for VLA backbones. TFP maintains an episode-local task-progress belief with Liquid Time-Constant dynamics and injects the updated belief directly into the flow-matching action decoder through adaptive modulation. This lets temporally accumulated context shape the generated action chunk, rather than serving only as passive history context. With a 3.3B-parameter model, TFP improves the average success rate from \(96.9\%\) to \(98.75\%\) on LIBERO and from \(91.4\%\) to \(93.77\%\) on LIBERO-plus. On the memory-focused MIKASA ShellGameTouch diagnostic, TFP achieves success up to \(75.0\%\). Mechanistic analyses show that write-gain changes near manipulation events are about \(6\times\) larger than far non-event phases, and hidden-state interventions show that the belief causally modulates generated action chunks. These results suggest that compact, event-sensitive memory dynamics can improve VLA policies under occlusion, visual perturbation, and stage-dependent task structure.

Language builds discourse contexts other than the actual: a painting, a belief, a memory, a hypothetical. Each is a mental space in which the same entity can take a different value, as when a flower is red in reality but purple in a portrait. Formal semantics keeps these contexts apart because their logics differ (modal, temporal, doxastic, depictive); Fauconnier's mental-space theory treats them as one space-building operation. We ask which of these a transformer language model implements, and find a mechanistic version of Fauconnier's unification. The model uses one router/slot format across the inventory: a reusable value slot stores attributed content, and a causally manipulable router (the space index) selects which space is read. A subspace trained with Distributed Alignment Search to control one space type, counterfactual, belief, fictional, or temporal, also controls the others, well above a random floor, on three model families; belief, which formal semantics marks as a distinct case, is not specially separated. The router is low-rank, composes additively with entity identity, and acts through a few late-layer heads. Two further results show the mechanism drives inference and composes: a subspace trained on a rule-derived conclusion flips what the model infers while dissociating from what it reports, and composing space-builders mints a fresh router over the shared slot. This paper establishes the cross-type generality. A companion paper develops belief in depth, because of its special status in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics (epistemology, theory of mind, and propositional attitude reports).

We show that a GPT-3 model can learn to express uncertainty about its own answers in natural language -- without use of model logits. When given a question, the model generates both an answer and a level of confidence (e.g. "90% confidence" or "high confidence"). These levels map to probabilities that are well calibrated. The model also remains moderately calibrated under distribution shift, and is sensitive to uncertainty in its own answers, rather than imitating human examples. To our knowledge, this is the first time a model has been shown to express calibrated uncertainty about its own answers in natural language. For testing calibration, we introduce the CalibratedMath suite of tasks. We compare the calibration of uncertainty expressed in words ("verbalized probability") to uncertainty extracted from model logits. Both kinds of uncertainty are capable of generalizing calibration under distribution shift. We also provide evidence that GPT-3's ability to generalize calibration depends on pre-trained latent representations that correlate with epistemic uncertainty over its answers.

LLM agents choose tools and arguments from context that mixes user requests, tool outputs, retrieved records, memory, and untrusted text. Evidence can be relevant without being authorized to determine a decision, so a correct action need not be grounded only in permitted evidence. We introduce a target-specific authorization audit that labels context factors separately for each tool and argument target. Its primary test holds the task, proposition, position, and policy fixed while changing only the proposition's source authority. We then test behavior when valid evidence is weakened and use context-subset interactions as a secondary localization diagnostic. Across 450 controlled next-action tasks and multiple open-weight LLM families, trusted and untrusted variants produce different actions in 5.4 percent of competing cases versus 1.7 percent of supporting cases. Under controlled degradation, unauthorized competition is retained in a full-correct, mixed-error, clean-correct pattern in 2.4 percent of comparisons, with a 95 percent confidence interval from 2.1 to 3.0 percent. These are controlled stress-set rates, not deployment prevalence. The models respond to textual source-authority cues, but this does not prevent untrusted evidence from influencing their actions.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) extend large language models (LLMs) with visual perception, enabling joint reasoning over images and text. Despite inheriting strong reasoning capabilities from LLMs, they remain prone to hallucinations that contradict their visual inputs. Mechanistic studies indicate that this weakness stems from visual laziness: MLLMs encode the correct visual evidence internally, but overly rely on strong language priors during response. Existing alignment methods, such as direct preference optimization, primarily optimize outcome-level rewards based on text. This introduces an optimization bias toward linguistic shortcuts, leading to responses that often contradict the visual evidence. To address this, we propose Visual Information Gain In aLignment (VIGIL), a reinforcement-learning (RL) post-training framework that shifts the focus from numerical reward fitting to causal visual grounding. VIGIL introduces a geometric constraint that explicitly maximizes the mutual information between the visual input and the generated response. We achieve this by penalizing "blind confidence" instances where the model remains improperly certain even when textual-visual attention is masked to create a counterfactual blind state. Extensive experiments show that VIGIL consistently outperforms recent alignment methods across hallucination and reasoning benchmarks without compromising text-only capabilities. Our approach matches the full-data performance of state-of-the-art methods using only 25% of the preference data and even demonstrates emergent spatial grounding capabilities without explicit bounding box supervision.

Language model (LM) assistants are increasingly used in applications such as brainstorming and research. Improvements in memory and context size have allowed these models to become more autonomous, which has also resulted in more text accumulation in their context windows without explicit user intervention. This comes with a latent risk: the belief profiles of models -- their understanding of the world as manifested in their responses or actions -- may silently change as context accumulates. This can lead to subtly inconsistent user experiences, or shifts in behavior that deviate from the original alignment of the models. In this paper, we explore how accumulating context by engaging in interactions and processing text -- talking and reading -- can change the beliefs of language models, as manifested in their responses and behaviors. Our results reveal that models' belief profiles are highly malleable: GPT-5 exhibits a 54.7% shift in its stated beliefs after 10 rounds of discussion about moral dilemmas and queries about safety, while Grok 4 shows a 27.2% shift on political issues after reading texts from the opposing position. We also examine models' behavioral changes by designing tasks that require tool use, where each tool selection corresponds to an implicit belief. We find that these changes align with stated belief shifts, suggesting that belief shifts will be reflected in actual behavior in agentic systems. Our analysis exposes the hidden risk of belief shift as models undergo extended sessions of talking or reading, rendering their opinions and actions unreliable.

Research on Large Language Models (LLMs) studies output variation across generation, reasoning, alignment, and representational analysis, often under the umbrella of "diversity." Yet the terminology remains fragmented, largely because the normative objectives underlying tasks are rarely made explicit. We introduce the Magic, Madness, Heaven, Sin framework, which models output variation along a homogeneity-heterogeneity axis, where valuation is determined by the task and its normative objective. We organize tasks into four normative contexts: epistemic (factuality), interactional (user utility), societal (representation), and safety (robustness). For each, we examine the failure modes and vocabulary such as hallucination, mode collapse, bias, and erasure through which variation is studied. We apply the framework to analyze all pairwise cross-contextual interactions, revealing that optimizing for one objective, such as improving safety, can inadvertently harm demographic representation or creative diversity. We argue for context-aware evaluation of output variation, reframing it as a property shaped by task objectives rather than a model's intrinsic trait.

We present SignAvatars, the first large-scale, multi-prompt 3D sign language (SL) motion dataset designed to bridge the communication gap for Deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. While there has been an exponentially growing number of research regarding digital communication, the majority of existing communication technologies primarily cater to spoken or written languages, instead of SL, the essential communication method for Deaf and hard-of-hearing communities. Existing SL datasets, dictionaries, and sign language production (SLP) methods are typically limited to 2D as annotating 3D models and avatars for SL is usually an entirely manual and labor-intensive process conducted by SL experts, often resulting in unnatural avatars. In response to these challenges, we compile and curate the SignAvatars dataset, which comprises 70,000 videos from 153 signers, totaling 8.34 million frames, covering both isolated signs and continuous, co-articulated signs, with multiple prompts including HamNoSys, spoken language, and words. To yield 3D holistic annotations, including meshes and biomechanically-valid poses of body, hands, and face, as well as 2D and 3D keypoints, we introduce an automated annotation pipeline operating on our large corpus of SL videos. SignAvatars facilitates various tasks such as 3D sign language recognition (SLR) and the novel 3D SL production (SLP) from diverse inputs like text scripts, individual words, and HamNoSys notation. Hence, to evaluate the potential of SignAvatars, we further propose a unified benchmark of 3D SL holistic motion production. We believe that this work is a significant step forward towards bringing the digital world to the Deaf and hard-of-hearing communities as well as people interacting with them.

Understanding human tasks through video observations is an essential capability of intelligent agents. The challenges of such capability lie in the difficulty of generating a detailed understanding of situated actions, their effects on object states (i.e., state changes), and their causal dependencies. These challenges are further aggravated by the natural parallelism from multi-tasking and partial observations in multi-agent collaboration. Most prior works leverage action localization or future prediction as an indirect metric for evaluating such task understanding from videos. To make a direct evaluation, we introduce the EgoTaskQA benchmark that provides a single home for the crucial dimensions of task understanding through question-answering on real-world egocentric videos. We meticulously design questions that target the understanding of (1) action dependencies and effects, (2) intents and goals, and (3) agents' beliefs about others. These questions are divided into four types, including descriptive (what status?), predictive (what will?), explanatory (what caused?), and counterfactual (what if?) to provide diagnostic analyses on spatial, temporal, and causal understandings of goal-oriented tasks. We evaluate state-of-the-art video reasoning models on our benchmark and show their significant gaps between humans in understanding complex goal-oriented egocentric videos. We hope this effort will drive the vision community to move onward with goal-oriented video understanding and reasoning.

It has been well-known that Chain-of-Thought can remarkably enhance LLMs' performance on complex tasks. However, because it also introduces slower inference speeds and higher computational costs, many researches have attempted to use implicit CoT, which does not need LLMs to explicitly generate the intermediate steps. But there is still gap between their efficacy and typical explicit CoT methods. This leaves us a doubt that, does implicit CoT really equal to explicit CoT? Therefore, in this study, we address this question through experiments. We probe the information of intermediate steps from the model's hidden states when it is performing implicit CoT. The results surprisingly indicate that LLMs hardly think about intermediate steps, suggesting they may just rely on experience rather than strict step-by-step reasoning. Moreover, we find LLMs' implicit reasoning capabilities are susceptible and unstable, reaffirming the necessity of explicit CoT to effectively support complex tasks.

State-of-the-art reasoning models utilize long chain-of-thought (CoT) to solve increasingly complex problems using more test-time computation. In this work, we explore a long CoT setting where the model makes up to K successive attempts at solving a problem, in which each attempt is allowed to build on earlier ones after the model receives a hard verifier feedback. This motivates RL methods that can harness per-attempt rewards by carefully weighting individual attempts. We study optimizing the Verification@K reward (the model succeeds by the K-th attempt) and show that naively weighing the attempts by their pass/fail results in biased gradients. We introduce Calibrated Attempt-Level (CAL) GRPO by devising a weighing strategy to obtain unbiased gradients while maintaining small variance. Our theory reveals how incorporating per-attempt rewards influence the training and the eventual Verification@K performance. Experiments, baselines, and ablations on synthetic and real data corroborate our theory and the benefits of CAL-GRPO over vanilla GRPO as well as naive weighting.

We introduce an axiomatic evaluation framework for latent thought representations in LLMs, comprising metrics that are independent of downstream benchmark scores and reveal representational failures that benchmark accuracy masks. Existing evaluations conflate representation quality with model capacity. Therefore, failures cannot be attributed to the representation rather than to the model that processes it. We formalize four functional axioms (Causality, Minimality, Separability, and Stability) and define a quantitative measure for each, computed directly on the representation independently of downstream accuracy. We audit open-weight LLMs across 23 reasoning tasks (e.g., Spatial Reasoning, Factual QA). We find that no candidate satisfies all four axioms simultaneously, that the representations distinguish task type reliably but cannot distinguish between two questions within the same task, and that the representations encode little information beyond what is already present in the input embedding. The failure is consistent across dense, reasoning-distilled, and RL-trained model families, indicating that the gap is structural rather than a property of model size or training procedure.

A model that lies while knowing the truth is the central case ELK cannot handle with behavioral evaluation alone. We ask whether such deception leaves an internal signature distinguishing it from honest error. Our key move is a control for wrongness: we contrast a sleeper agent (knows the truth, lies on trigger) against a naive liar (fine-tuned to emit the same wrong answers with no honest training). Both produce identical wrong outputs; any difference is about knowledge conflict, not incorrectness. We find deceptive forward passes carry a conflict signature - 2.1-2.3x higher residual rank than naive-liar passes on the same wrong answer - strong enough to identify which of two responses is the lie with 100% accuracy and no labels, across GPT-2 small/medium (three seeds) and three instruct models. Across Qwen2.5-1.5B/7B and Phi-3-mini, instructed deception raises residual rank on every tested fact (18/18, 40/40, 34/34); on Phi-3, lies separate perfectly from both honest answers and hallucinations (AUC 1.0, Wilcoxon p~6e-11). The signature survives strategic self-constructed deception (model invents its own lie, AUC 1.0), active concealment attempts (AUC 1.0), and length-controlled replication (20/20, AUC 1.0, p~1e-6). Using basis-free relative representations, a probe trained on one model family detects deception in two other families zero-shot (mean AUC 0.933), surviving simultaneous architecture and format change (AUC 0.821), and transfers across five languages (AUC 1.000, length-controlled). The signature is read-only: detectable but not injectable (0/8 both directions). Honest limitations and six negative experiments are documented in full.

When humans cooperate, they frequently coordinate their activity through both verbal communication and non-verbal actions, using this information to infer a shared goal and plan. How can we model this inferential ability? In this paper, we introduce a model of a cooperative team where one agent, the principal, may communicate natural language instructions about their shared plan to another agent, the assistant, using GPT-3 as a likelihood function for instruction utterances. We then show how a third person observer can infer the team's goal via multi-modal Bayesian inverse planning from actions and instructions, computing the posterior distribution over goals under the assumption that agents will act and communicate rationally to achieve them. We evaluate this approach by comparing it with human goal inferences in a multi-agent gridworld, finding that our model's inferences closely correlate with human judgments (R = 0.96). When compared to inference from actions alone, we also find that instructions lead to more rapid and less uncertain goal inference, highlighting the importance of verbal communication for cooperative agents.