Daily Papers

Class-Incremental Learning (CIL) requires a learning system to continually learn new classes without forgetting. Despite the strong performance of Pre-Trained Models (PTMs) in CIL, a critical issue persists: learning new classes often results in the overwriting of old ones. Excessive modification of the network causes forgetting, while minimal adjustments lead to an inadequate fit for new classes. As a result, it is desired to figure out a way of efficient model updating without harming former knowledge. In this paper, we propose ExpAndable Subspace Ensemble (EASE) for PTM-based CIL. To enable model updating without conflict, we train a distinct lightweight adapter module for each new task, aiming to create task-specific subspaces. These adapters span a high-dimensional feature space, enabling joint decision-making across multiple subspaces. As data evolves, the expanding subspaces render the old class classifiers incompatible with new-stage spaces. Correspondingly, we design a semantic-guided prototype complement strategy that synthesizes old classes' new features without using any old class instance. Extensive experiments on seven benchmark datasets verify EASE's state-of-the-art performance. Code is available at: https://github.com/sun-hailong/CVPR24-Ease

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have demonstrated significant progress in vision-language tasks, yet they still face challenges when processing long-duration video inputs. The limitation arises from MLLMs' context limit and training costs, necessitating sparse frame sampling before feeding videos into MLLMs. Existing video MLLMs adopt training-free uniform sampling or keyframe search, which may miss critical events or be constrained by the pre-trained models' event understanding capabilities. Meanwhile, building a training-based method remains challenging due to the unsupervised and non-differentiable nature of sparse frame sampling. To address these problems, we propose Temporal Sampling Policy Optimization (TSPO), advancing MLLMs' long-form video-language understanding via reinforcement learning. Specifically, we first propose a trainable event-aware temporal agent, which captures event-query correlation for performing probabilistic keyframe selection. Then, we propose the TSPO reinforcement learning paradigm, which models keyframe selection and language generation as a joint decision-making process, enabling end-to-end group relative optimization with efficient rule-based rewards. Furthermore, for the TSPO's training, we propose a long video training data construction pipeline with comprehensive temporal data and video Needle-in-a-Haystack data. Finally, we incorporate rule-based answering accuracy and temporal locating reward mechanisms to optimize the temporal sampling policy. Comprehensive experiments show that our TSPO achieves state-of-the-art performance across multiple long video understanding benchmarks, and shows transferable ability across different cutting-edge Video-MLLMs.

Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is widely used to address large joint observation and action spaces by decomposing a centralized control problem into multiple interacting agents. However, such decomposition often introduces additional challenges, including non-stationarity, unstable training, weak coordination, and limited theoretical guarantees. In this paper, we propose the Consensus Multi-Agent Transformer (CMAT), a centralized framework that bridges cooperative MARL to a hierarchical single-agent reinforcement learning (SARL) formulation. CMAT treats all agents as a unified entity and employs a Transformer encoder to process the large joint observation space. To handle the extensive joint action space, we introduce a hierarchical decision-making mechanism in which a Transformer decoder autoregressively generates a high-level consensus vector, simulating the process by which agents reach agreement on their strategies in latent space. Conditioned on this consensus, all agents generate their actions simultaneously, enabling order-independent joint decision making and avoiding the sensitivity to action-generation order in conventional Multi-Agent Transformers (MAT). This factorization allows the joint policy to be optimized using single-agent PPO while preserving expressive coordination through the latent consensus. To evaluate the proposed method, we conduct experiments on benchmark tasks from StarCraft II, Multi-Agent MuJoCo, and Google Research Football. The results show that CMAT achieves superior performance over recent centralized solutions, sequential MARL methods, and conventional MARL baselines. The code for this paper is available at:https://github.com/RS2002/CMAT .

Generative models have emerged as a major paradigm for offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), but existing approaches require many iterative sampling steps. Recent few-step accelerations either distill a joint teacher into independent students or apply averaged velocities independently per agent, suggesting that few-step inference requires sacrificing inter-agent coordination. We show this trade-off is not necessary: single-pass multi-agent generation can preserve coordination when the velocity field is natively joint-coupled. We propose Coordinated few-step Flow (CoFlow), an architecture that combines Coordinated Velocity Attention (CVA) with Adaptive Coordination Gating. A finite-difference consistency surrogate further replaces memory-prohibitive Jacobian-vector product backpropagation through the averaged velocity field with two stop-gradient forward passes. Across 60 configurations spanning MPE, MA-MuJoCo, and SMAC, CoFlow matches or surpasses Gaussian / value-based, transformer, diffusion, and prior flow baselines on episodic return. Three independent coordination probes confirm that the gains flow through inter-agent coordination rather than per-agent capacity. A denoising-step sweep shows that single-pass inference suffices on every configuration. CoFlow reaches state-of-the-art coordination quality in 1-3 denoising steps under both centralized and decentralized execution. Project page: https://github.com/Guowei-Zou/coflow.

Deep reinforcement learning (RL) has been applied extensively to solve complex decision-making problems. In many real-world scenarios, tasks often have several conflicting objectives and may require multiple agents to cooperate, which are the multi-objective multi-agent decision-making problems. However, only few works have been conducted on this intersection. Existing approaches are limited to separate fields and can only handle multi-agent decision-making with a single objective, or multi-objective decision-making with a single agent. In this paper, we propose MO-MIX to solve the multi-objective multi-agent reinforcement learning (MOMARL) problem. Our approach is based on the centralized training with decentralized execution (CTDE) framework. A weight vector representing preference over the objectives is fed into the decentralized agent network as a condition for local action-value function estimation, while a mixing network with parallel architecture is used to estimate the joint action-value function. In addition, an exploration guide approach is applied to improve the uniformity of the final non-dominated solutions. Experiments demonstrate that the proposed method can effectively solve the multi-objective multi-agent cooperative decision-making problem and generate an approximation of the Pareto set. Our approach not only significantly outperforms the baseline method in all four kinds of evaluation metrics, but also requires less computational cost.

In multi-task reinforcement learning (RL) under Markov decision processes (MDPs), the presence of shared latent structures among multiple MDPs has been shown to yield significant benefits to the sample efficiency compared to single-task RL. In this paper, we investigate whether such a benefit can extend to more general sequential decision making problems, such as partially observable MDPs (POMDPs) and more general predictive state representations (PSRs). The main challenge here is that the large and complex model space makes it hard to identify what types of common latent structure of multi-task PSRs can reduce the model complexity and improve sample efficiency. To this end, we posit a joint model class for tasks and use the notion of eta-bracketing number to quantify its complexity; this number also serves as a general metric to capture the similarity of tasks and thus determines the benefit of multi-task over single-task RL. We first study upstream multi-task learning over PSRs, in which all tasks share the same observation and action spaces. We propose a provably efficient algorithm UMT-PSR for finding near-optimal policies for all PSRs, and demonstrate that the advantage of multi-task learning manifests if the joint model class of PSRs has a smaller eta-bracketing number compared to that of individual single-task learning. We also provide several example multi-task PSRs with small eta-bracketing numbers, which reap the benefits of multi-task learning. We further investigate downstream learning, in which the agent needs to learn a new target task that shares some commonalities with the upstream tasks via a similarity constraint. By exploiting the learned PSRs from the upstream, we develop a sample-efficient algorithm that provably finds a near-optimal policy.

Large Language Models (LLMs) perform well in language tasks but often lack collaborative awareness and struggle to optimize global performance in multi-agent settings. We present a reinforcement learning-augmented LLM agent framework that formulates cooperation as a decentralized partially observable Markov decision process (Dec-POMDP) and adopts centralized training with decentralized execution (CTDE). We introduce Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) to jointly optimize agent policies with access to global signals during training, together with a simplified joint reward that balances task quality, speed, and coordination cost. On collaborative writing and coding benchmarks, our framework delivers a 3x increase in task processing speed over single-agent baselines, 98.7% structural/style consistency in writing, and a 74.6% test pass rate in coding. The approach consistently outperforms strong multi-agent LLM baselines and provides a practical path toward reliable collaboration in complex workflows.

Zero-shot waypoint navigation requires vision-language models to select, from the current first-person observation, a sequence of spatial actions that is feasible for the agent and reaches the goal, placing joint demands on the integrated spatial intelligence of today's foundation VLMs. Existing spatial-intelligence benchmarks primarily evaluate isolated judgments of relations, directions, or targets and therefore do not directly measure the integrated navigation ability required to combine target recognition, action-consequence assessment, distance estimation, and path planning. To fill this evaluation gap, we introduce EgoPathBench, a dataset and five-task benchmark for first-person waypoint decision-making. Each question presents an egocentric RGB image, a natural-language goal, and numbered visible waypoints; a model returns traversable candidates or an ordered route. Predictions are evaluated for candidate feasibility, adjacent-edge legality, and goal arrival under point-agent or embodied geometry. EgoPathBench contains 31,852 training, 1,345 validation, and 1,111 benchmark questions and retains at least one geometrically verified reference route for every route question. Across nine VLMs, the highest EgoPath Score is only 28.3. The top-ranked model reaches 35.9% success on Point Path, but only 2.9% and 4.0% on Embodied Path and Intent Path, respectively, showing that current models remain limited in forming complete, goal-consistent routes under embodiment constraints. Beyond the evaluation data, we release the corresponding training resource. Fine-tuning Qwen 3.5 4B on the released training split raises its EgoPath Score from 3.9 to 38.9 and improves all four reported evaluations across three external spatial benchmarks, with gains of 1.4--9.6 points.

Learning efficient representations for decision-making policies is a challenge in imitation learning (IL). Current IL methods require expert demonstrations, which are expensive to collect. Consequently, they often have underdeveloped world models. Self-supervised learning (SSL) offers an alternative by allowing models to learn from diverse, unlabeled data, including failures. However, SSL methods often operate in raw input space, making them inefficient. In this work, we propose ACT-JEPA, a novel architecture that integrates IL and SSL to enhance policy representations. We train a policy to predict (1) action sequences and (2) abstract observation sequences. The first objective uses action chunking to improve action prediction and reduce compounding errors. The second objective extends this idea of chunking by predicting abstract observation sequences. We utilize Joint-Embedding Predictive Architecture to predict in abstract representation space, allowing the model to filter out irrelevant details, improve efficiency, and develop a robust world model. Our experiments show that ACT-JEPA improves the quality of representations by learning temporal environment dynamics. Additionally, the model's ability to predict abstract observation sequences results in representations that effectively generalize to action sequence prediction. ACT-JEPA performs on par with established baselines across a range of decision-making tasks.

We consider the problem of Recognizing Textual Entailment within an Information Retrieval context, where we must simultaneously determine the relevancy as well as degree of entailment for individual pieces of evidence to determine a yes/no answer to a binary natural language question. We compare several variants of neural networks for sentence embeddings in a setting of decision-making based on evidence of varying relevance. We propose a basic model to integrate evidence for entailment, show that joint training of the sentence embeddings to model relevance and entailment is feasible even with no explicit per-evidence supervision, and show the importance of evaluating strong baselines. We also demonstrate the benefit of carrying over text comprehension model trained on an unrelated task for our small datasets. Our research is motivated primarily by a new open dataset we introduce, consisting of binary questions and news-based evidence snippets. We also apply the proposed relevance-entailment model on a similar task of ranking multiple-choice test answers, evaluating it on a preliminary dataset of school test questions as well as the standard MCTest dataset, where we improve the neural model state-of-art.

Building huge and highly capable language models has been a trend in the past years. Despite their great performance, they incur high computational cost. A common solution is to apply model compression or choose light-weight architectures, which often need a separate fixed-size model for each desirable computational budget, and may lose performance in case of heavy compression. This paper proposes an effective dynamic inference approach, called E-LANG, which distributes the inference between large accurate Super-models and light-weight Swift models. To this end, a decision making module routes the inputs to Super or Swift models based on the energy characteristics of the representations in the latent space. This method is easily adoptable and architecture agnostic. As such, it can be applied to black-box pre-trained models without a need for architectural manipulations, reassembling of modules, or re-training. Unlike existing methods that are only applicable to encoder-only backbones and classification tasks, our method also works for encoder-decoder structures and sequence-to-sequence tasks such as translation. The E-LANG performance is verified through a set of experiments with T5 and BERT backbones on GLUE, SuperGLUE, and WMT. In particular, we outperform T5-11B with an average computations speed-up of 3.3times on GLUE and 2.9times on SuperGLUE. We also achieve BERT-based SOTA on GLUE with 3.2times less computations. Code and demo are available in the supplementary materials.

Embodied cognition requires agents to connect high-level task reasoning with the physical states to be achieved. We introduce Hy-Embodied-RxBrain, an embodied cognition foundation model with joint language-visual reasoning and imagination. Unlike vision-language models that emphasize scene understanding and textual decision making, or generative world models that mainly predict future visual states, RxBrain represents embodied plans in a single planning sequence where language and visual imagination play complementary roles. Language provides the abstract structure of a plan, including task decomposition, planning primitives, constraints, temporal order, and decision logic, while visual imagination grounds this structure through world state prediction and joint subgoal planning, associating each planning step with intermediate and final physical states. RxBrain adopts a unified multimodal Mixture-of-Transformers architecture that supports language, image, and video understanding and generation within one model. To train this capability, we build an automatic pipeline that converts embodied videos into joint text-visual planning supervision by decomposing videos into planning steps and aligning them with visual state transitions. We further introduce RxBrain-Bench to evaluate whether models can represent embodied plans through joint textual and visual components rather than separate understanding or generation. Experiments show that RxBrain maintains embodied understanding and generation abilities, and produces plans with coupled textual reasoning, world state prediction, and joint subgoal planning. We also extend RxBrain to continuous robot action generation, where it shows promising real-robot performance without large-scale action-data pretraining. These results provide an initial step toward foundation models for embodied cognition.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) extend large language models with explicit, multi-step reasoning traces to enhance transparency and performance on complex tasks. However, these reasoning traces can be redundant or logically inconsistent, making them a new source of hallucination that is difficult to detect. Existing hallucination detection methods focus primarily on answer-level uncertainty and often fail to detect hallucinations or logical inconsistencies arising from the model's reasoning trace. This oversight is particularly problematic for LRMs, where the explicit thinking trace is not only an important support to the model's decision-making process but also a key source of potential hallucination. To this end, we propose RACE (Reasoning and Answer Consistency Evaluation), a novel framework specifically tailored for hallucination detection in LRMs. RACE operates by extracting essential reasoning steps and computing four diagnostic signals: inter-sample consistency of reasoning traces, entropy-based answer uncertainty, semantic alignment between reasoning and answers, and internal coherence of reasoning. This joint analysis enables fine-grained hallucination detection even when the final answer appears correct. Experiments across datasets and different LLMs demonstrate that RACE outperforms existing hallucination detection baselines, offering a robust and generalizable solution for evaluating LRMs. Our code is available at: https://github.com/bebr2/RACE.

Accurate estimation of uncertainty in deep learning is critical for deploying models in high-stakes domains such as medical diagnosis and autonomous decision-making, where overconfident predictions can lead to harmful outcomes. In practice, understanding the reason behind a model's uncertainty and the type of uncertainty it represents can support risk-aware decisions, enhance user trust, and guide additional data collection. However, many existing methods only address a single type of uncertainty or require modifications and retraining of the base model, making them difficult to adopt in real-world systems. We introduce CUPID (Comprehensive Uncertainty Plug-in estImation moDel), a general-purpose module that jointly estimates aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty without modifying or retraining the base model. CUPID can be flexibly inserted into any layer of a pretrained network. It models aleatoric uncertainty through a learned Bayesian identity mapping and captures epistemic uncertainty by analyzing the model's internal responses to structured perturbations. We evaluate CUPID across a range of tasks, including classification, regression, and out-of-distribution detection. The results show that it consistently delivers competitive performance while offering layer-wise insights into the origins of uncertainty. By making uncertainty estimation modular, interpretable, and model-agnostic, CUPID supports more transparent and trustworthy AI. Related code and data are available at https://github.com/a-Fomalhaut-a/CUPID.

We argue that enabling human-AI dialogue, purposed to support joint reasoning (i.e., 'inquiry'), is important for ensuring that AI decision making is aligned with human values and preferences. In particular, we point to logic-based models of argumentation and dialogue, and suggest that the traditional focus on persuasion dialogues be replaced by a focus on inquiry dialogues, and the distinct challenges that joint inquiry raises. Given recent dramatic advances in the performance of large language models (LLMs), and the anticipated increase in their use for decision making, we provide a roadmap for research into inquiry dialogues for supporting joint human-LLM reasoning tasks that are ethically salient, and that thereby require that decisions are value aligned.

The evolution of Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has shifted from static retrieval pipelines to dynamic, agentic workflows where a central planner orchestrates multi-turn reasoning. However, existing paradigms face a critical dichotomy: they either optimize modules jointly within rigid, fixed-graph architectures, or empower dynamic planning while treating executors as frozen, black-box tools. We identify that this decoupled optimization creates a ``strategic-operational mismatch,'' where sophisticated planning strategies fail to materialize due to unadapted local executors, often leading to negative performance gains despite increased system complexity. In this paper, we propose JADE (Joint Agentic Dynamic Execution), a unified framework for the joint optimization of planning and execution within dynamic, multi-turn workflows. By modeling the system as a cooperative multi-agent team unified under a single shared backbone, JADE enables end-to-end learning driven by outcome-based rewards. This approach facilitates co-adaptation: the planner learns to operate within the capability boundaries of the executors, while the executors evolve to align with high-level strategic intent. Empirical results demonstrate that JADE transforms disjoint modules into a synergistic system, yielding remarkable performance improvements via joint optimization and enabling a flexible balance between efficiency and effectiveness through dynamic workflow orchestration.

Current vision-language models (VLMs) in medicine are primarily designed for categorical question answering (e.g., "Is this normal or abnormal?") or qualitative descriptive tasks. However, clinical decision-making often relies on quantitative assessments, such as measuring the size of a tumor or the angle of a joint, from which physicians draw their own diagnostic conclusions. This quantitative reasoning capability remains underexplored and poorly supported in existing VLMs. In this work, we introduce MedVision, a large-scale dataset and benchmark specifically designed to evaluate and improve VLMs on quantitative medical image analysis. MedVision spans 22 public datasets covering diverse anatomies and modalities, with 30.8 million image-annotation pairs. We focus on three representative quantitative tasks: (1) detection of anatomical structures and abnormalities, (2) tumor/lesion (T/L) size estimation, and (3) angle/distance (A/D) measurement. Our benchmarks show that current off-the-shelf VLMs perform poorly on these tasks. However, with supervised fine-tuning on MedVision, we significantly enhance their performance across detection, T/L estimation, and A/D measurement, demonstrating reduced error rates and improved precision. This work provides a foundation for developing VLMs with robust quantitative reasoning capabilities in medical imaging. Code and data are available at https://medvision-vlm.github.io.

Large sequence model (SM) such as GPT series and BERT has displayed outstanding performance and generalization capabilities on vision, language, and recently reinforcement learning tasks. A natural follow-up question is how to abstract multi-agent decision making into an SM problem and benefit from the prosperous development of SMs. In this paper, we introduce a novel architecture named Multi-Agent Transformer (MAT) that effectively casts cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) into SM problems wherein the task is to map agents' observation sequence to agents' optimal action sequence. Our goal is to build the bridge between MARL and SMs so that the modeling power of modern sequence models can be unleashed for MARL. Central to our MAT is an encoder-decoder architecture which leverages the multi-agent advantage decomposition theorem to transform the joint policy search problem into a sequential decision making process; this renders only linear time complexity for multi-agent problems and, most importantly, endows MAT with monotonic performance improvement guarantee. Unlike prior arts such as Decision Transformer fit only pre-collected offline data, MAT is trained by online trials and errors from the environment in an on-policy fashion. To validate MAT, we conduct extensive experiments on StarCraftII, Multi-Agent MuJoCo, Dexterous Hands Manipulation, and Google Research Football benchmarks. Results demonstrate that MAT achieves superior performance and data efficiency compared to strong baselines including MAPPO and HAPPO. Furthermore, we demonstrate that MAT is an excellent few-short learner on unseen tasks regardless of changes in the number of agents. See our project page at https://sites.google.com/view/multi-agent-transformer.

We propose V-Droid, a mobile GUI task automation agent. Unlike previous mobile agents that utilize Large Language Models (LLMs) as generators to directly generate actions at each step, V-Droid employs LLMs as verifiers to evaluate candidate actions before making final decisions. To realize this novel paradigm, we introduce a comprehensive framework for constructing verifier-driven mobile agents: the discretized action space construction coupled with the prefilling-only workflow to accelerate the verification process, the pair-wise progress preference training to significantly enhance the verifier's decision-making capabilities, and the scalable human-agent joint annotation scheme to efficiently collect the necessary data at scale. V-Droid sets a new state-of-the-art task success rate across several public mobile task automation benchmarks: 59.5% on AndroidWorld, 38.3% on AndroidLab, and 49% on MobileAgentBench, surpassing existing agents by 9.5%, 2.1%, and 9%, respectively. Furthermore, V-Droid achieves an impressively low latency of 0.7 seconds per step, making it the first mobile agent capable of delivering near-real-time, effective decision-making capabilities.

Autoregressive language models generate text one token at a time, yet natural language is inherently structured in multi-token units, including phrases, n-grams, and collocations that carry meaning jointly. This one-token bottleneck limits both the expressiveness of the model during pre-training and its throughput at inference time. Existing remedies such as speculative decoding or diffusion-based language models either leave the underlying bottleneck intact or sacrifice the causal structure essential to language modeling. We propose BitLM, a language model that represents each token as a fixed-length binary code and employs a lightweight diffusion head to denoise multiple tokens in parallel within each block. Crucially, BitLM preserves left-to-right causal attention across blocks while making joint lexical decisions within each block, combining the reliability of autoregressive modeling with the parallelism of iterative refinement. By replacing the large-vocabulary softmax with bitwise denoising, BitLM reframes token generation as iterative commitment in a compact binary space, enabling more efficient pre-training and substantially faster inference without altering the causal foundation that makes language models effective. Our results demonstrate that the one-token-at-a-time paradigm is not a fundamental requirement but an interface choice, and that changing it can yield a stronger and faster language model. We hope BitLM points toward a promising direction for next-generation language model architectures.

Decision-making is a dynamic process requiring perception, memory, and reasoning to make choices and find optimal policies. Traditional approaches to decision-making suffer from sample efficiency and generalization, while large-scale self-supervised pretraining has enabled fast adaptation with fine-tuning or few-shot learning in language and vision. We thus argue to integrate knowledge acquired from generic large-scale self-supervised pretraining into downstream decision-making problems. We propose Pretrain-Then-Adapt pipeline and survey recent work on data collection, pretraining objectives and adaptation strategies for decision-making pretraining and downstream inference. Finally, we identify critical challenges and future directions for developing decision foundation model with the help of generic and flexible self-supervised pretraining.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used to make decisions in complex scenarios, where they need models to think deeply, reason logically, and decide wisely. Many existing studies focus solely on multi-round conversations in social tasks or simulated environments, neglecting the various types of decisions and their interdependence. Current reinforcement learning methods struggle to consider the strategies of others during training. To address these issues, we first define a strategic decision-making problem that includes two types of decisions and their temporal dependencies. Furthermore, we propose **T**heory **o**f **M**ind **P**olicy **O**ptimization **(ToMPO)** algorithm to optimize the perception of other individual strategies and the game situation trends. Compared to the Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) algorithm, ToMPO enhances the LLM's strategic decision-making mainly by: 1) generating rollouts based on reasoning the strategies of other individuals, 2) estimating advantages at both the graph-level and sample-level, and 3) balancing global and partial rewards. The ToMPO algorithm outperforms the GRPO method by 35% in terms of model output compliance and cooperative outcomes. Additionally, when compared to models with parameter sizes 100 times larger, it shows an 18% improvement. This demonstrates the effectiveness of the ToMPO algorithm in enhancing the model's strategic decision-making capabilities.

Sequential decision-making problems with multiple objectives arise naturally in practice and pose unique challenges for research in decision-theoretic planning and learning, which has largely focused on single-objective settings. This article surveys algorithms designed for sequential decision-making problems with multiple objectives. Though there is a growing body of literature on this subject, little of it makes explicit under what circumstances special methods are needed to solve multi-objective problems. Therefore, we identify three distinct scenarios in which converting such a problem to a single-objective one is impossible, infeasible, or undesirable. Furthermore, we propose a taxonomy that classifies multi-objective methods according to the applicable scenario, the nature of the scalarization function (which projects multi-objective values to scalar ones), and the type of policies considered. We show how these factors determine the nature of an optimal solution, which can be a single policy, a convex hull, or a Pareto front. Using this taxonomy, we survey the literature on multi-objective methods for planning and learning. Finally, we discuss key applications of such methods and outline opportunities for future work.

We introduce a dataset of natural-language questions in the decision theory of so-called Newcomb-like problems. Newcomb-like problems include, for instance, decision problems in which an agent interacts with a similar other agent, and thus has to reason about the fact that the other agent will likely reason in similar ways. Evaluating LLM reasoning about Newcomb-like problems is important because interactions between foundation-model-based agents will often be Newcomb-like. Some ways of reasoning about Newcomb-like problems may allow for greater cooperation between models. Our dataset contains both capabilities questions (i.e., questions with a unique, uncontroversially correct answer) and attitude questions (i.e., questions about which decision theorists would disagree). We use our dataset for an investigation of decision-theoretical capabilities and expressed attitudes and their interplay in existing models (different models by OpenAI, Anthropic, Meta, GDM, Reka, etc.), as well as models under simple prompt-based interventions. We find, among other things, that attitudes vary significantly between existing models; that high capabilities are associated with attitudes more favorable toward so-called evidential decision theory; and that attitudes are consistent across different types of questions.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s). Unfortunately, agents may try to manipulate such an election by misreporting their preferences. Fortunately, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. To address this issue, I suggest studying empirically if computational complexity is in practice a barrier to manipulation. The basic tool used in my investigations is the identification of computational "phase transitions". Such an approach has been fruitful in identifying hard instances of propositional satisfiability and other NP-hard problems. I show that phase transition behaviour gives insight into the hardness of manipulating voting rules, increasing concern that computational complexity is indeed any sort of barrier. Finally, I look at the problem of computing manipulation of other, related problems like stable marriage and tournament problems.

In many real-world settings, a team of agents must coordinate their behaviour while acting in a decentralised way. At the same time, it is often possible to train the agents in a centralised fashion in a simulated or laboratory setting, where global state information is available and communication constraints are lifted. Learning joint action-values conditioned on extra state information is an attractive way to exploit centralised learning, but the best strategy for then extracting decentralised policies is unclear. Our solution is QMIX, a novel value-based method that can train decentralised policies in a centralised end-to-end fashion. QMIX employs a network that estimates joint action-values as a complex non-linear combination of per-agent values that condition only on local observations. We structurally enforce that the joint-action value is monotonic in the per-agent values, which allows tractable maximisation of the joint action-value in off-policy learning, and guarantees consistency between the centralised and decentralised policies. We evaluate QMIX on a challenging set of StarCraft II micromanagement tasks, and show that QMIX significantly outperforms existing value-based multi-agent reinforcement learning methods.

In various work contexts, such as meeting scheduling, collaborating, and project planning, collective decision-making is essential but often challenging due to diverse individual preferences, varying work focuses, and power dynamics among members. To address this, we propose a system leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) to facilitate group decision-making by managing conversations and balancing preferences among individuals. Our system aims to extract individual preferences from each member's conversation with the system and suggest options that satisfy the preferences of the members. We specifically apply this system to corporate meeting scheduling. We create synthetic employee profiles and simulate conversations at scale, leveraging LLMs to evaluate the system performance as a novel approach to conducting a user study. Our results indicate efficient coordination with reduced interactions between the members and the LLM-based system. The system refines and improves its proposed options over time, ensuring that many of the members' individual preferences are satisfied in an equitable way. Finally, we conduct a survey study involving human participants to assess our system's ability to aggregate preferences and reasoning about them. Our findings show that the system exhibits strong performance in both dimensions.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

Large language model (LLM)-based multi-agent systems (MAS) have demonstrated great potential in solving tasks with execution complexity, by distributing subtasks across cooperative agents. However, this divide-and-conquer paradigm falls short on decision-making tasks that are also prevalent in the real world. These tasks require simultaneous reasoning from the stances of all involved stakeholders whose decisions are mutually dependent and thus cannot be solved in isolation. We characterize this challenge as stance entanglement, a form of decision complexity distinct from execution complexity. To address it, we propose Multi-Agent Fictitious Play (MAFP), a novel MAS paradigm that represents stakeholder stances as agents and formulates decision-making as an equilibrium-seeking process. Built on the game-theoretic principle of fictitious play, MAFP iteratively updates each agent's decision by best responding to the empirical mixture of other agents' past decisions. This enables agents to expose and address one another's weaknesses, progressively improving decision quality and robustness. We evaluate MAFP on challenging decision-making tasks that test the capability of deciding strategies for competitive scenarios prior to acting. MAFP outperforms both single-round and multi-round baselines on two complementary metrics, tournament strength and robustness, demonstrating its effectiveness in addressing stance entanglement.

Flexible robotic production requires joint decisions on process progression, material routing, resource assignment, temporary cooperation, and simultaneous execution, since each decision can affect the feasibility of the others. The challenge is greater under decentralized control, where each robot acts from bounded local information while system progress depends on collective decisions, shared resources, material state, and workspace compatibility. These properties closely match cooperative multi-agent decision making under partial observability and resource contention. This paper introduces AssemblyGrid v1, a reproducible benchmark for repeated multi-robot production that combines explicit process progression, decentralized observations, material transfer, temporary multi-robot coalitions, productive concurrency, and geometry-dependent feasibility within one task-level formulation. The benchmark includes Flow, Coalition, and Concurrency workload families, each with three scenario levels. Task success and evaluation measures are defined independently of learning reward and solution method, allowing learning-based and non-learning methods to address the same production problem. AssemblyGrid v1 is evaluated through executable conformance checks, mechanism studies, and algorithmic experiments using a privileged centralized reference, structured decentralized controllers, and MARL methods including IPPO, MAPPO, and QMIX. Results demonstrate productive execution under centralized and decentralized control. The MARL experiments further show that decentralized policies can learn effective production behavior from local observations and actions, supporting AssemblyGrid as a controlled benchmark for studying cooperative decision making in flexible robotic production.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

Motivated by the operational problems in click and collect systems, such as curbside pickup programs, we study a joint admission control and capacity allocation problem. We consider a system where arriving customers have preferred service delivery times and gauge the service quality based on the service provider's ability to complete the service as close as possible to the preferred time. Customers can be of different priority classes, and their priority may increase as they wait longer in the queue. The service provider can reject customers upon their arrival if the system is overloaded or outsource the service (alternatively work overtime) when the capacity is not enough. The service provider's goal is to find the minimum-cost admission and capacity allocation policy to dynamically decide when to serve and whom to serve. We model this problem as a Markov Decision Process. Our structural results partially characterize a set of suboptimal solutions, and we develop solution methods using these results. We also develop a problem-specific approximation method that is based on state aggregation to overcome the computational challenges. We present extensive computational results and discuss the impact of problem parameters on the optimal policy.

Decision-making, a complicated task requiring various types of abilities, presents an excellent framework for assessing Large Language Models (LLMs). Our research investigates LLMs' decision-making capabilities through the lens of a well-established field, Game Theory. We focus specifically on games that support the participation of more than two agents simultaneously. Subsequently, we introduce our framework, GAMA-Bench, including eight classical multi-agent games. We design a scoring scheme to assess a model's performance in these games quantitatively. Through GAMA-Bench, we investigate LLMs' robustness, generalizability, and enhancement strategies. Results reveal that while GPT-3.5 shows satisfying robustness, its generalizability is relatively limited. However, its performance can be improved through approaches such as Chain-of-Thought. Additionally, we conduct evaluations across various LLMs and find that GPT-4 outperforms other models on GAMA-Bench, achieving a score of 60.5. Moreover, Gemini-1.0-Pro and GPT-3.5 (0613, 1106, 0125) demonstrate similar intelligence on GAMA-Bench. The code and experimental results are made publicly available via https://github.com/CUHK-ARISE/GAMABench.

As artificial intelligence (AI) systems play an increasingly prominent role in human decision-making, challenges surface in the realm of human-AI interactions. One challenge arises from the suboptimal AI policies due to the inadequate consideration of humans disregarding AI recommendations, as well as the need for AI to provide advice selectively when it is most pertinent. This paper presents a sequential decision-making model that (i) takes into account the human's adherence level (the probability that the human follows/rejects machine advice) and (ii) incorporates a defer option so that the machine can temporarily refrain from making advice. We provide learning algorithms that learn the optimal advice policy and make advice only at critical time stamps. Compared to problem-agnostic reinforcement learning algorithms, our specialized learning algorithms not only enjoy better theoretical convergence properties but also show strong empirical performance.

The partial observability and stochasticity in multi-agent settings can be mitigated by accessing more information about others via communication. However, the coordination problem still exists since agents cannot communicate actual actions with each other at the same time due to the circular dependencies. In this paper, we propose a novel multi-level communication scheme, Sequential Communication (SeqComm). SeqComm treats agents asynchronously (the upper-level agents make decisions before the lower-level ones) and has two communication phases. In the negotiation phase, agents determine the priority of decision-making by communicating hidden states of observations and comparing the value of intention, obtained by modeling the environment dynamics. In the launching phase, the upper-level agents take the lead in making decisions and then communicate their actions with the lower-level agents. Theoretically, we prove the policies learned by SeqComm are guaranteed to improve monotonically and converge. Empirically, we show that SeqComm outperforms existing methods in various cooperative multi-agent tasks.

It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings. Indeed, our experiments show that recent models -- with or without reasoning enabled -- consistently defect in single-shot social dilemmas. To tackle this safety concern, we present the first comparative study of game-theoretic mechanisms designed to enable cooperative outcomes between rational agents _in equilibrium_. Across four social dilemmas testing distinct components of robust cooperation, we evaluate four families of mechanisms: (1) repeating the game for many rounds, (2) reputation systems, (3) third-party mediators to delegate decision making to, and (4) contract agreements for outcome-conditional payments between players. Among our findings, we establish that contracting and mediation are most effective in achieving cooperative outcomes between capable LLM models, and that repetition-induced cooperation deteriorates drastically when co-players vary. Moreover, we demonstrate that the mechanisms become _more effective_ under evolutionary pressures to maximize individual payoffs.

LLMs can appear cautious in risk decision-making tasks, yet cautious-looking outputs do not necessarily indicate alignment with human decision-making mechanisms. We investigate this distinction using the St. Petersburg game as a controlled testbed, a classical paradox in which the expected payoff is infinite, yet humans typically report low, finite willingness to pay. We evaluate 28 LLMs with a structured prompt suite that includes the original game; controlled decision variants that perturb truncation, repeated play, numeric endowment, and occupational identity; a human-perspective prompt that asks models to reason as human decision makers; and paired comparisons between base models and their instruction-tuned counterparts. In the original game, most models generate finite bids, creating the appearance of human-like risk behavior. However, this outcome-level resemblance masks substantial mechanism-level differences. The controlled variants reveal that rather than maintaining human-like behavior seen in the original game, models often shift to conditionally and computationally rational behavior. Human-cue prompting and instruction tuning often lower bids and reduce some visible pathologies, but most mechanism-level response patterns remain largely unchanged. These findings show that behavioral alignment in risk decision-making can be surface-level: LLMs may produce human-like risk decisions without exhibiting human-consistent mechanisms. High-stakes evaluations of LLM decision-making should therefore move beyond outcome similarity and examine whether the alignment is supported by mechanism-level consistency.

Urban assessments often compress diverse needs into single scores, which can obscure minority perspectives. We present a community-centered study in Montreal (n=35; wheelchair users, seniors, LGBTQIA2+ residents, and immigrants). Participants rated 20 streets (accessibility, inclusivity, aesthetics, practicality) and ranked 7 images on 12 interview-elicited criteria. Disagreement patterns were systematic in our sample: wheelchair users diverged most on accessibility and practicality; LGBTQIA2+ participants emphasized inclusion and liveliness; seniors prioritized security. Group discussion reduced information gaps but not value conflicts; ratings conveyed intensity, while rankings forced trade-offs. We then formalize negotiative alignment, a transparent, budget-aware bargaining procedure, and pilot it with role-played stakeholder agents plus a neutral mediator. Relative to the best base design under the same public rubric, the negotiated package increased total utility (21.10 to 24.55), raised the worst-group utility (3.20 to 3.90), improved twentieth percentile satisfaction (0.86 to 1.00; min-max normalized within the scenario), and reduced inequality (Gini 0.036 to 0.025). Treating disagreement as signal and reporting worst-group outcomes alongside totals may help planners and AI practitioners surface trade-offs and preserve minority priorities while maintaining efficiency.

Power grids are becoming more complex to operate in the digital age given the current energy transition to cope with climate change. As a result, real-time decision-making is getting more challenging as the human operator has to deal with more information, more uncertainty, more applications, and more coordination. While supervision has been primarily used to help them make decisions over the last decades, it cannot reasonably scale up anymore. There is a great need for rethinking the human-machine interface under more unified and interactive frameworks. Taking advantage of the latest developments in Human-Machine Interface and Artificial Intelligence, we expose our vision of a new assistant framework relying on an hypervision interface and greater bidirectional interaction. We review the known principles of decision-making driving our assistant design alongside with its supporting assistance functions. We finally share some guidelines to make progress towards the development of such an assistant.

In numerous artificial intelligence applications, the collaborative efforts of multiple intelligent agents are imperative for the successful attainment of target objectives. To enhance coordination among these agents, a distributed communication framework is often employed. However, indiscriminate information sharing among all agents can be resource-intensive, and the adoption of manually pre-defined communication architectures imposes constraints on inter-agent communication, thus limiting the potential for effective collaboration. Moreover, the communication framework often remains static during inference, which may result in sustained high resource consumption, as in most cases, only key decisions necessitate information sharing among agents. In this study, we introduce a novel approach wherein we conceptualize the communication architecture among agents as a learnable graph. We formulate this problem as the task of determining the communication graph while enabling the architecture parameters to update normally, thus necessitating a bi-level optimization process. Utilizing continuous relaxation of the graph representation and incorporating attention units, our proposed approach, CommFormer, efficiently optimizes the communication graph and concurrently refines architectural parameters through gradient descent in an end-to-end manner. Additionally, we introduce a temporal gating mechanism for each agent, enabling dynamic decisions on whether to receive shared information at a given time, based on current observations, thus improving decision-making efficiency. Extensive experiments on a variety of cooperative tasks substantiate the robustness of our model across diverse cooperative scenarios, where agents are able to develop more coordinated and sophisticated strategies regardless of changes in the number of agents.

Traffic congestion in dense urban centers presents an economical and environmental burden. In recent years, the availability of vehicle-to-anything communication allows for the transmission of detailed vehicle states to the infrastructure that can be used for intelligent traffic light control. The other way around, the infrastructure can provide vehicles with advice on driving behavior, such as appropriate velocities, which can improve the efficacy of the traffic system. Several research works applied deep reinforcement learning to either traffic light control or vehicle speed advice. In this work, we propose a first attempt to jointly learn the control of both. We show this to improve the efficacy of traffic systems. In our experiments, the joint control approach reduces average vehicle trip delays, w.r.t. controlling only traffic lights, in eight out of eleven benchmark scenarios. Analyzing the qualitative behavior of the vehicle speed advice policy, we observe that this is achieved by smoothing out the velocity profile of vehicles nearby a traffic light. Learning joint control of traffic signaling and speed advice in the real world could help to reduce congestion and mitigate the economical and environmental repercussions of today's traffic systems.

Value alignment is essential for building AI systems that can safely and reliably interact with people. However, what a person values -- and is even capable of valuing -- depends on the concepts that they are currently using to understand and evaluate what happens in the world. The dependence of values on concepts means that concept alignment is a prerequisite for value alignment -- agents need to align their representation of a situation with that of humans in order to successfully align their values. Here, we formally analyze the concept alignment problem in the inverse reinforcement learning setting, show how neglecting concept alignment can lead to systematic value mis-alignment, and describe an approach that helps minimize such failure modes by jointly reasoning about a person's concepts and values. Additionally, we report experimental results with human participants showing that humans reason about the concepts used by an agent when acting intentionally, in line with our joint reasoning model.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used across society, including in domains like business, engineering, and medicine. These fields often grapple with decision-making under uncertainty, a critical yet challenging task. In this paper, we show that directly prompting LLMs on these types of decision-making problems yields poor results, especially as the problem complexity increases. To overcome this limitation, we propose DeLLMa (Decision-making Large Language Model assistant), a framework designed to enhance decision-making accuracy in uncertain environments. DeLLMa involves a multi-step scaffolding procedure, drawing upon principles from decision theory and utility theory, to provide an optimal and human-auditable decision-making process. We validate our framework on decision-making environments involving real agriculture and finance data. Our results show that DeLLMa can significantly improve LLM decision-making performance, achieving up to a 40% increase in accuracy over competing methods.

Agreement Technologies refer to open computer systems in which autonomous software agents interact with one another, typically on behalf of humans, in order to come to mutually acceptable agreements. With the advance of AI systems in recent years, it has become apparent that such agreements, in order to be acceptable to the involved parties, must remain aligned with ethical principles and moral values. However, this is notoriously difficult to ensure, especially as different human users (and their software agents) may hold different value systems, i.e. they may differently weigh the importance of individual moral values. Furthermore, it is often hard to specify the precise meaning of a value in a particular context in a computational manner. Methods to estimate value systems based on human-engineered specifications, e.g. based on value surveys, are limited in scale due to the need for intense human moderation. In this article, we propose a novel method to automatically learn value systems from observations and human demonstrations. In particular, we propose a formal model of the value system learning problem, its instantiation to sequential decision-making domains based on multi-objective Markov decision processes, as well as tailored preference-based and inverse reinforcement learning algorithms to infer value grounding functions and value systems. The approach is illustrated and evaluated by two simulated use cases.

Algorithms increasingly serve as information mediators--from social media feeds and targeted advertising to the increasing ubiquity of LLMs. This engenders a joint process where agents combine private, algorithmically-mediated signals with learning from peers to arrive at decisions. To study such settings, we introduce a model of controlled sequential social learning in which an information-mediating planner (e.g. an LLM) controls the information structure of agents while they also learn from the decisions of earlier agents. The planner may seek to improve social welfare (altruistic planner) or to induce a specific action the planner prefers (biased planner). Our framework presents a new optimization problem for social learning that combines dynamic programming with decentralized action choices and Bayesian belief updates. We prove the convexity of the value function and characterize the optimal policies of altruistic and biased planners, which attain desired tradeoffs between the costs they incur and the payoffs they earn from induced agent choices. Notably, in some regimes the biased planner intentionally obfuscates the agents' signals. Even under stringent transparency constraints--information parity with individuals, no lying or cherry-picking, and full observability--we show that information mediation can substantially shift social welfare in either direction. We complement our theory with simulations in which LLMs act as both planner and agents. Notably, the LLM planner in our simulations exhibits emergent strategic behavior in steering public opinion that broadly mirrors the trends predicted, though key deviations suggest the influence of non-Bayesian reasoning consistent with the cognitive patterns of both humans and LLMs trained on human-like data. Together, we establish our framework as a tractable basis for studying the impact and regulation of LLM information mediators.

Executing actions in a correlated manner is a common strategy for human coordination that often leads to better cooperation, which is also potentially beneficial for cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). However, the recent success of MARL relies heavily on the convenient paradigm of purely decentralized execution, where there is no action correlation among agents for scalability considerations. In this work, we introduce a Bayesian network to inaugurate correlations between agents' action selections in their joint policy. Theoretically, we establish a theoretical justification for why action dependencies are beneficial by deriving the multi-agent policy gradient formula under such a Bayesian network joint policy and proving its global convergence to Nash equilibria under tabular softmax policy parameterization in cooperative Markov games. Further, by equipping existing MARL algorithms with a recent method of differentiable directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), we develop practical algorithms to learn the context-aware Bayesian network policies in scenarios with partial observability and various difficulty. We also dynamically decrease the sparsity of the learned DAG throughout the training process, which leads to weakly or even purely independent policies for decentralized execution. Empirical results on a range of MARL benchmarks show the benefits of our approach.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

Current large language models (LLMs) excel in verifiable domains where outputs can be checked before action but prove less reliable for high-stakes strategic decisions with uncertain outcomes. This gap, driven by mutually reinforcing cognitive biases in both humans and artificial intelligence (AI) systems, threatens the defensibility of valuations and sustainability of investments in the sector. This report describes a framework emerging from systematic qualitative assessment across 7 frontier-grade LLMs and 3 market-facing venture vignettes under time pressure. Detailed prompting specifying decision partnership and explicitly instructing avoidance of sycophancy, confabulation, solution drift, and nihilism achieved initial partnership state but failed to maintain it under operational pressure. Sustaining protective partnership state required an emergent 7-stage calibration sequence, built upon a 4-stage initialization process, within a 5-layer protection architecture enabling bias self-monitoring, human-AI adversarial challenge, partnership state verification, performance degradation detection, and stakeholder protection. Three discoveries resulted: partnership state is achievable through ordered calibration but requires emergent maintenance protocols; reliability degrades when architectural drift and context exhaustion align; and dissolution discipline prevents costly pursuit of fundamentally wrong directions. Cross-model validation revealed systematic performance differences across LLM architectures. This approach demonstrates that human-AI teams can achieve cognitive partnership capable of preventing avoidable regret in high-stakes decisions, addressing return-on-investment expectations that depend on AI systems supporting consequential decision-making without introducing preventable cognitive traps when verification arrives too late.

LLMs are ideal for decision-making thanks to their ability to reason over long contexts. However, challenges arise when processing speech transcripts that describe complex scenarios, as they are verbose and include repetition, hedging, and vagueness. E.g., during a company's earnings call, an executive might project a positive revenue outlook to reassure investors, despite uncertainty regarding future earnings. It is crucial for LLMs to incorporate this uncertainty systematically when making decisions. In this paper, we introduce DeFine, a modular framework that constructs probabilistic factor profiles from complex scenarios. It then integrates these profiles with analogical reasoning, leveraging insights from similar past experiences to guide LLMs in making critical decisions in new situations. Our framework separates the tasks of quantifying uncertainty and incorporating it into LLM decision-making. This approach is particularly useful in areas such as consulting and financial deliberation, where making decisions under uncertainty is vital.

We aim to evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) for embodied decision making. While a significant body of work has been leveraging LLMs for decision making in embodied environments, we still lack a systematic understanding of their performance because they are usually applied in different domains, for different purposes, and built based on different inputs and outputs. Furthermore, existing evaluations tend to rely solely on a final success rate, making it difficult to pinpoint what ability is missing in LLMs and where the problem lies, which in turn blocks embodied agents from leveraging LLMs effectively and selectively. To address these limitations, we propose a generalized interface (Embodied Agent Interface) that supports the formalization of various types of tasks and input-output specifications of LLM-based modules. Specifically, it allows us to unify 1) a broad set of embodied decision-making tasks involving both state and temporally extended goals, 2) four commonly-used LLM-based modules for decision making: goal interpretation, subgoal decomposition, action sequencing, and transition modeling, and 3) a collection of fine-grained metrics which break down evaluation into various types of errors, such as hallucination errors, affordance errors, various types of planning errors, etc. Overall, our benchmark offers a comprehensive assessment of LLMs' performance for different subtasks, pinpointing the strengths and weaknesses in LLM-powered embodied AI systems, and providing insights for effective and selective use of LLMs in embodied decision making.

Reasoning and strategic behavior in social interactions is a hallmark of intelligence. This form of reasoning is significantly more sophisticated than isolated planning or reasoning tasks in static settings (e.g., math problem solving). In this paper, we present Strategic Planning, Interaction, and Negotiation (SPIN-Bench), a new multi-domain evaluation designed to measure the intelligence of strategic planning and social reasoning. While many existing benchmarks focus on narrow planning or single-agent reasoning, SPIN-Bench combines classical PDDL tasks, competitive board games, cooperative card games, and multi-agent negotiation scenarios in one unified framework. The framework includes both a benchmark as well as an arena to simulate and evaluate the variety of social settings to test reasoning and strategic behavior of AI agents. We formulate the benchmark SPIN-Bench by systematically varying action spaces, state complexity, and the number of interacting agents to simulate a variety of social settings where success depends on not only methodical and step-wise decision making, but also conceptual inference of other (adversarial or cooperative) participants. Our experiments reveal that while contemporary LLMs handle basic fact retrieval and short-range planning reasonably well, they encounter significant performance bottlenecks in tasks requiring deep multi-hop reasoning over large state spaces and socially adept coordination under uncertainty. We envision SPIN-Bench as a catalyst for future research on robust multi-agent planning, social reasoning, and human--AI teaming.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

We consider the regret minimization task in a dueling bandits problem with context information. In every round of the sequential decision problem, the learner makes a context-dependent selection of two choice alternatives (arms) to be compared with each other and receives feedback in the form of noisy preference information. We assume that the feedback process is determined by a linear stochastic transitivity model with contextualized utilities (CoLST), and the learner's task is to include the best arm (with highest latent context-dependent utility) in the duel. We propose a computationally efficient algorithm, CoLSTIM, which makes its choice based on imitating the feedback process using perturbed context-dependent utility estimates of the underlying CoLST model. If each arm is associated with a d-dimensional feature vector, we show that CoLSTIM achieves a regret of order tilde O( dT) after T learning rounds. Additionally, we also establish the optimality of CoLSTIM by showing a lower bound for the weak regret that refines the existing average regret analysis. Our experiments demonstrate its superiority over state-of-art algorithms for special cases of CoLST models.

Two common approaches to sequential decision-making are AI planning (AIP) and reinforcement learning (RL). Each has strengths and weaknesses. AIP is interpretable, easy to integrate with symbolic knowledge, and often efficient, but requires an up-front logical domain specification and is sensitive to noise; RL only requires specification of rewards and is robust to noise but is sample inefficient and not easily supplied with external knowledge. We propose an integrative approach that combines high-level planning with RL, retaining interpretability, transfer, and efficiency, while allowing for robust learning of the lower-level plan actions. Our approach defines options in hierarchical reinforcement learning (HRL) from AIP operators by establishing a correspondence between the state transition model of AI planning problem and the abstract state transition system of a Markov Decision Process (MDP). Options are learned by adding intrinsic rewards to encourage consistency between the MDP and AIP transition models. We demonstrate the benefit of our integrated approach by comparing the performance of RL and HRL algorithms in both MiniGrid and N-rooms environments, showing the advantage of our method over the existing ones.

We study the problem of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning with a single joint reward signal. This class of learning problems is difficult because of the often large combined action and observation spaces. In the fully centralized and decentralized approaches, we find the problem of spurious rewards and a phenomenon we call the "lazy agent" problem, which arises due to partial observability. We address these problems by training individual agents with a novel value decomposition network architecture, which learns to decompose the team value function into agent-wise value functions. We perform an experimental evaluation across a range of partially-observable multi-agent domains and show that learning such value-decompositions leads to superior results, in particular when combined with weight sharing, role information and information channels.

Ecological management and decision-making typically focus on uncertainty about the future, but surprisingly little is known about how to account for uncertainty of the present: that is, the realities of having only partial or imperfect measurements. Our primary paradigms for handling decisions under uncertainty -- the precautionary principle and optimal control -- have so far given contradictory results. This paradox is best illustrated in the example of fisheries management, where many ideas that guide thinking about ecological decision making were first developed. We find that simplistic optimal control approaches have repeatedly concluded that a manager should increase catch quotas when faced with greater uncertainty about the fish biomass. Current best practices take a more precautionary approach, decreasing catch quotas by a fixed amount to account for uncertainty. Using comparisons to both simulated and historical catch data, we find that neither approach is sufficient to avoid stock collapses under moderate observational uncertainty. Using partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP) methods, we demonstrate how this paradox arises from flaws in the standard theory, which contributes to over-exploitation of fisheries and increased probability of economic and ecological collapse. In contrast, we find POMDP-based management avoids such over-exploitation while also generating higher economic value. These results have significant implications for how we handle uncertainty in both fisheries and ecological management more generally.

LLMs are increasingly being used for complex problems which are not necessarily resolved in a single response, but require interacting with an environment to acquire information. In these scenarios, LLMs must reason about inherent cost-uncertainty tradeoffs in when to stop exploring and commit to an answer. For instance, on a programming task, an LLM should test a generated code snippet if it is uncertain about the correctness of that code; the cost of writing a test is nonzero, but typically lower than the cost of making a mistake. In this work, we show that we can induce LLMs to explicitly reason about balancing these cost-uncertainty tradeoffs, then perform more optimal environment exploration. We formalize multiple tasks, including information retrieval and coding, as sequential decision-making problems under uncertainty. Each problem has latent environment state that can be reasoned about via a prior which is passed to the LLM agent. We introduce a framework called Calibrate-Then-Act (CTA), where we feed the LLM this additional context to enable it to act more optimally. This improvement is preserved even under RL training of both the baseline and CTA. Our results on information-seeking QA and on a simplified coding task show that making cost-benefit tradeoffs explicit with CTA can help agents discover more optimal decision-making strategies.

We investigate the sets of joint probability distributions that maximize the average multi-information over a collection of margins. These functionals serve as proxies for maximizing the multi-information of a set of variables or the mutual information of two subsets of variables, at a lower computation and estimation complexity. We describe the maximizers and their relations to the maximizers of the multi-information and the mutual information.

As humans increasingly rely on multiround conversational AI for high stakes decisions, principled frameworks are needed to ensure such interactions reliably improve decision quality. We adopt a human centric view governed by two principles: counterfactual harm, ensuring the AI does not undermine human strengths, and complementarity, ensuring it adds value where the human is prone to err. We formalize these concepts via user defined rules, allowing users to specify exactly what harm and complementarity mean for their specific task. We then introduce an online, distribution free algorithm with finite sample guarantees that enforces the user-specified constraints over the collaboration dynamics. We evaluate our framework across two interactive settings: LLM simulated collaboration on a medical diagnostic task and a human crowdsourcing study on a pictorial reasoning task. We show that our online procedure maintains prescribed counterfactual harm and complementarity violation rates even under nonstationary interaction dynamics. Moreover, tightening or loosening these constraints produces predictable shifts in downstream human accuracy, confirming that the two principles serve as practical levers for steering multi-round collaboration toward better decision quality without the need to model or constrain human behavior.

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.

We study the problem of modeling a population of agents pursuing unknown goals subject to unknown computational constraints. In standard models of bounded rationality, sub-optimal decision-making is simulated by adding homoscedastic noise to optimal decisions rather than explicitly simulating constrained inference. In this work, we introduce a latent inference budget model (L-IBM) that models agents' computational constraints explicitly, via a latent variable (inferred jointly with a model of agents' goals) that controls the runtime of an iterative inference algorithm. L-IBMs make it possible to learn agent models using data from diverse populations of suboptimal actors. In three modeling tasks -- inferring navigation goals from routes, inferring communicative intents from human utterances, and predicting next moves in human chess games -- we show that L-IBMs match or outperform Boltzmann models of decision-making under uncertainty. Inferred inference budgets are themselves meaningful, efficient to compute, and correlated with measures of player skill, partner skill and task difficulty.

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

Explanations of model behavior are commonly evaluated via proxy properties weakly tied to the purposes explanations serve in practice. We contribute a decision theoretic framework that treats explanations as information signals valued by the expected improvement they enable on a specified decision task. This approach yields three distinct estimands: 1) a theoretical benchmark that upperbounds achievable performance by any agent with the explanation, 2) a human-complementary value that quantifies the theoretically attainable value that is not already captured by a baseline human decision policy, and 3) a behavioral value representing the causal effect of providing the explanation to human decision-makers. We instantiate these definitions in a practical validation workflow, and apply them to assess explanation potential and interpret behavioral effects in human-AI decision support and mechanistic interpretability.

Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms is vital, especially in high-stakes situations such as healthcare. In this work, we propose the use of a debate-based reward model for reinforcement learning agents, where the outcome of a zero-sum debate game quantifies the justifiability of a decision in a particular state. This reward model is then used to train a justifiable policy, whose decisions can be more easily corroborated with supporting evidence. In the debate game, two argumentative agents take turns providing supporting evidence for two competing decisions. Given the proposed evidence, a proxy of a human judge evaluates which decision is better justified. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in learning policies for prescribing and justifying treatment decisions of septic patients. We show that augmenting the reward with the feedback signal generated by the debate-based reward model yields policies highly favored by the judge when compared to the policy obtained solely from the environment rewards, while hardly sacrificing any performance. Moreover, in terms of the overall performance and justifiability of trained policies, the debate-based feedback is comparable to the feedback obtained from an ideal judge proxy that evaluates decisions using the full information encoded in the state. This suggests that the debate game outputs key information contained in states that is most relevant for evaluating decisions, which in turn substantiates the practicality of combining our approach with human-in-the-loop evaluations. Lastly, we showcase that agents trained via multi-agent debate learn to propose evidence that is resilient to refutations and closely aligns with human preferences.

AI systems are fallible, and humans can make mistakes in deciding whether to trust AI over their own judgment. Thus, improving human-AI collaboration requires understanding when, why, and how humans decide to rely on AI. We study two distinct reliance decisions: the delegation choice -- deciding when to let AI act autonomously without knowing its output, and the adoption choice -- evaluating AI suggestions and deciding how to use them. Both of these decoupled reliance patterns shape collaboration, but prior work rarely studies them together in realistic settings with the same users. We address this gap by studying collaborative human--AI teams competing in a question-answering game in which humans can choose when and how to work with AI agents to win. Our 24 matches pair 23 expert humans with 16 AI agents, capturing 387 delegation and 1440 adoption decisions. While human--AI collaboration performs better than either AI or humans alone, humans make suboptimal collaboration decisions, both under-relying on correct AI suggestions (3.9% of opportunities missed) and over-relying when AI misleads them (1.7%). Both parties contribute wrong answers: reported model confidence is near chance when humans and AI disagree, while confirmation bias drives higher under-reliance (64.5%) when an AI suggestion agrees with humans' initial incorrect answer. To close this gap, we recommend calibrated confidence, evidence-grounded explanations, and mechanisms that help users refine trust.

Understanding how people behave in strategic settings--where they make decisions based on their expectations about the behavior of others--is a long-standing problem in the behavioral sciences. We conduct the largest study to date of strategic decision-making in the context of initial play in two-player matrix games, analyzing over 90,000 human decisions across more than 2,400 procedurally generated games that span a much wider space than previous datasets. We show that a deep neural network trained on these data predicts people's choices better than leading theories of strategic behavior, indicating that there is systematic variation that is not explained by those theories. We then modify the network to produce a new, interpretable behavioral model, revealing what the original network learned about people: their ability to optimally respond and their capacity to reason about others are dependent on the complexity of individual games. This context-dependence is critical in explaining deviations from the rational Nash equilibrium, response times, and uncertainty in strategic decisions. More broadly, our results demonstrate how machine learning can be applied beyond prediction to further help generate novel explanations of complex human behavior.

Multi-agent policy optimization, exemplified by PPO-based methods, is a key branch of cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). A central design question is how many neighboring agentsIn this paper, "neighbors" refer not only to physical proximity but also to agents whose actions influence one another. to aggregate in order to effectively utilize global information for cooperation. This decision must be made along two dimensions: in the advantage (which agents' rewards contribute to the credit signal) and in the ratio (which agents' likelihood ratios form the clipped importance weight). Existing methods occupy scattered, underexplored points on these two axes: IPPO treats both separately; MAPPO pairs a team-level advantage with per-agent ratios; HAPPO employs sequential ratios with per-agent advantages; and single-agent reductions operating on factorized joint policies aggregate both into fully joint products. We formalize these two design choices as support matrices SA and SR, and prove a canonical structure: the expected multi-agent policy optimization objective depends on the pair (SA,SR) only through their matrix product tS=SRSA. This yields two key consequences: (i) Redundancy: the two support matrices are interchangeable with respect to the signal, meaning neither aggregation pattern is inherently superior.(ii) Variance Ordering: the advantage aggregates rewards as a sum (additive variance with an interior bias-variance optimum at the coupling neighborhood), whereas the ratio aggregates likelihood ratios as a product (multiplicative variance that grows exponentially with support size, with no accompanying bias reduction). The resulting design principle is unambiguous: aggregate neighbors in the advantage, sized to the coupling neighborhood, and keep the ratio per-agent.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

Many resource management problems require sequential decision-making under uncertainty, where the only uncertainty affecting the decision outcomes are exogenous variables outside the control of the decision-maker. We model these problems as Exo-MDPs (Markov Decision Processes with Exogenous Inputs) and design a class of data-efficient algorithms for them termed Hindsight Learning (HL). Our HL algorithms achieve data efficiency by leveraging a key insight: having samples of the exogenous variables, past decisions can be revisited in hindsight to infer counterfactual consequences that can accelerate policy improvements. We compare HL against classic baselines in the multi-secretary and airline revenue management problems. We also scale our algorithms to a business-critical cloud resource management problem -- allocating Virtual Machines (VMs) to physical machines, and simulate their performance with real datasets from a large public cloud provider. We find that HL algorithms outperform domain-specific heuristics, as well as state-of-the-art reinforcement learning methods.

As AI systems pervade human life, ensuring that large language models (LLMs) make safe decisions remains a significant challenge. We introduce the Governance of the Commons Simulation (GovSim), a generative simulation platform designed to study strategic interactions and cooperative decision-making in LLMs. In GovSim, a society of AI agents must collectively balance exploiting a common resource with sustaining it for future use. This environment enables the study of how ethical considerations, strategic planning, and negotiation skills impact cooperative outcomes. We develop an LLM-based agent architecture and test it with the leading open and closed LLMs. We find that all but the most powerful LLM agents fail to achieve a sustainable equilibrium in GovSim, with the highest survival rate below 54%. Ablations reveal that successful multi-agent communication between agents is critical for achieving cooperation in these cases. Furthermore, our analyses show that the failure to achieve sustainable cooperation in most LLMs stems from their inability to formulate and analyze hypotheses about the long-term effects of their actions on the equilibrium of the group. Finally, we show that agents that leverage "Universalization"-based reasoning, a theory of moral thinking, are able to achieve significantly better sustainability. Taken together, GovSim enables us to study the mechanisms that underlie sustainable self-government with specificity and scale. We open source the full suite of our research results, including the simulation environment, agent prompts, and a comprehensive web interface.

Modeling the interaction between traffic agents is a key issue in designing safe and non-conservative maneuvers in autonomous driving. This problem can be challenging when multi-modality and behavioral uncertainties are engaged. Existing methods either fail to plan interactively or consider unimodal behaviors that could lead to catastrophic results. In this paper, we introduce an integrated decision-making and trajectory planning framework based on Bayesian game (i.e., game of incomplete information). Human decisions inherently exhibit discrete characteristics and therefore are modeled as types of players in the game. A general solver based on no-regret learning is introduced to obtain a corresponding Bayesian Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, which captures the interaction between traffic agents in the multimodal context. With the attained equilibrium, decision-making and trajectory planning are performed simultaneously, and the resulting interactive strategy is shown to be optimal over the expectation of rivals' driving intentions. Closed-loop simulations on different traffic scenarios are performed to illustrate the generalizability and the effectiveness of the proposed framework.

RAG systems consist of multiple modules to work together. However, these modules are usually separately trained. We argue that a system like RAG that incorporates multiple modules should be jointly optimized to achieve optimal performance. To demonstrate this, we design a specific pipeline called SmartRAG that includes a policy network and a retriever. The policy network can serve as 1) a decision maker that decides when to retrieve, 2) a query rewriter to generate a query most suited to the retriever, and 3) an answer generator that produces the final response with/without the observations. We then propose to jointly optimize the whole system using a reinforcement learning algorithm, with the reward designed to encourage the system to achieve the best performance with minimal retrieval cost. When jointly optimized, all the modules can be aware of how other modules are working and thus find the best way to work together as a complete system. Empirical results demonstrate that the jointly optimized SmartRAG can achieve better performance than separately optimized counterparts.

Strategic decision-making in multi-agent settings is a key challenge for large language models (LLMs), particularly when coordination and negotiation must unfold over extended conversations. While recent work has explored the use of LLMs in isolated decision tasks, little attention has been given to optimizing long-term objectives through dialogue. We introduce GameTalk, a framework for training LLMs to make strategic decisions via multi-turn interactions. Unlike prior work that focuses on single-turn objectives or static action prediction, we train LLMs to optimize a global objective across full conversations. We achieve this by adapting fine-tuning methods like GRPO, DPO, and STaR to incorporate reward signals that depend on the entire interaction. We evaluate this approach on a suite of increasingly complex games, designed to stress different aspects of reasoning, coordination, and opponent modeling. Our results show that GameTalk significantly outperforms untrained models, especially under reward shaping, with DPO consistently yielding the strongest gains. These findings position conversational fine-tuning as a promising path for LLMs to reason, negotiate, and act in interactive environments.

Approaches to fair and ethical AI have recently fell under the scrutiny of the emerging, chiefly qualitative, field of critical data studies, placing emphasis on the lack of sensitivity to context and complex social phenomena of such interventions. We employ some of these lessons to introduce a tripartite decision-making toolkit, informed by dilemmas encountered in the pursuit of responsible AI/ML. These are: (a) the opportunity dilemma between the availability of data shaping problem statements vs problem statements shaping data; (b) the trade-off between scalability and contextualizability (too much data versus too specific data); and (c) the epistemic positioning between the pragmatic technical objectivism and the reflexive relativism in acknowledging the social. This paper advocates for a situated reasoning and creative engagement with the dilemmas surrounding responsible algorithmic/data-driven systems, and going beyond the formulaic bias elimination and ethics operationalization narratives found in the fair-AI literature.

Recent improvements in conditional generative modeling have made it possible to generate high-quality images from language descriptions alone. We investigate whether these methods can directly address the problem of sequential decision-making. We view decision-making not through the lens of reinforcement learning (RL), but rather through conditional generative modeling. To our surprise, we find that our formulation leads to policies that can outperform existing offline RL approaches across standard benchmarks. By modeling a policy as a return-conditional diffusion model, we illustrate how we may circumvent the need for dynamic programming and subsequently eliminate many of the complexities that come with traditional offline RL. We further demonstrate the advantages of modeling policies as conditional diffusion models by considering two other conditioning variables: constraints and skills. Conditioning on a single constraint or skill during training leads to behaviors at test-time that can satisfy several constraints together or demonstrate a composition of skills. Our results illustrate that conditional generative modeling is a powerful tool for decision-making.

Utility functions or their equivalents (value functions, objective functions, loss functions, reward functions, preference orderings) are a central tool in most current machine learning systems. These mechanisms for defining goals and guiding optimization run into practical and conceptual difficulty when there are independent, multi-dimensional objectives that need to be pursued simultaneously and cannot be reduced to each other. Ethicists have proved several impossibility theorems that stem from this origin; those results appear to show that there is no way of formally specifying what it means for an outcome to be good for a population without violating strong human ethical intuitions (in such cases, the objective function is a social welfare function). We argue that this is a practical problem for any machine learning system (such as medical decision support systems or autonomous weapons) or rigidly rule-based bureaucracy that will make high stakes decisions about human lives: such systems should not use objective functions in the strict mathematical sense. We explore the alternative of using uncertain objectives, represented for instance as partially ordered preferences, or as probability distributions over total orders. We show that previously known impossibility theorems can be transformed into uncertainty theorems in both of those settings, and prove lower bounds on how much uncertainty is implied by the impossibility results. We close by proposing two conjectures about the relationship between uncertainty in objectives and severe unintended consequences from AI systems.

Organizations deploying AI face two fundamental governance challenges: managing AI risk and sustaining AI value. Both depend on evidence whose sufficiency cannot be taken for granted. We call the shared underlying challenge the AI Evaluability Gap: the condition in which organizations lack sufficient evidence to support high-confidence governance decisions regarding either risk or value. We argue that this gap reflects a category error in current practice. Existing governance approaches focus primarily on properties of systems, such as safety, fairness, reliability, compliance, and value, while paying comparatively little attention to the evidentiary foundations required to justify decisions about those properties. We further argue that AI governance encompasses both operational decisions regarding whether a system may operate and investment decisions regarding whether it merits continued organizational resources. To address this problem, we introduce Evaluability, defined as the capability of a system to generate, maintain, and renew evidence sufficient to support high-confidence governance decisions over time. We formalize governance decisions as functions of calibrated confidence Conf(D|E) and identify six properties of evaluable evidence: observability, attributability, intervenability, verifiability, calibration, and temporal validity. The framework distinguishes Operational Certification, which relies primarily on structural evidence to justify deployment decisions, from Investment Certification, which relies primarily on causal evidence to justify continued resource allocation. We argue that evidence sufficiency is a missing layer of AI governance and that closing the AI Evaluability Gap is a prerequisite for both managing risk and sustaining value in AI-enabled organizations.

In the post-pandemic world, manufacturing enterprises face increasing uncertainties, especially with vulnerabilities in global supply chains. Although supply chain management has been extensively studied, the critical influence of decision-makers (DMs) in these systems remains underexplored. This study studies the inventory management problem under risk using the newsvendor model by incorporating DMs risk preferences. By employing the Quantum Monte Carlo (QMC) combined with Quantum Amplitude Estimation (QAE) algorithm, the estimation of probabilities or expectation values can be done more efficiently. This offers near-quadratic speedup compared to classical Monte Carlo methods. Our findings illuminate the intricate relationship between risk-aware decision-making and inventory management, providing essential insights for enhancing supply chain resilience and adaptability in uncertain conditions

Ethical decision-making is a critical aspect of human judgment, and the growing use of LLMs in decision-support systems necessitates a rigorous evaluation of their moral reasoning capabilities. However, existing assessments primarily rely on single-step evaluations, failing to capture how models adapt to evolving ethical challenges. Addressing this gap, we introduce the Multi-step Moral Dilemmas (MMDs), the first dataset specifically constructed to evaluate the evolving moral judgments of LLMs across 3,302 five-stage dilemmas. This framework enables a fine-grained, dynamic analysis of how LLMs adjust their moral reasoning across escalating dilemmas. Our evaluation of nine widely used LLMs reveals that their value preferences shift significantly as dilemmas progress, indicating that models recalibrate moral judgments based on scenario complexity. Furthermore, pairwise value comparisons demonstrate that while LLMs often prioritize the value of care, this value can sometimes be superseded by fairness in certain contexts, highlighting the dynamic and context-dependent nature of LLM ethical reasoning. Our findings call for a shift toward dynamic, context-aware evaluation paradigms, paving the way for more human-aligned and value-sensitive development of LLMs.

Pursuit of honest and truthful decision-making is crucial for governance and accountability in democracies. However, people sometimes take different perspectives of what it means to be honest and how to pursue truthfulness. Here we explore a continuum of perspectives from evidence-based reasoning, rooted in ascertainable facts and data, at one end, to intuitive decisions that are driven by feelings and subjective interpretations, at the other. We analyze the linguistic traces of those contrasting perspectives in Congressional speeches from 1879 to 2022. We find that evidence-based language has continued to decline since the mid-1970s, together with a decline in legislative productivity. The decline was accompanied by increasing partisan polarization in Congress and rising income inequality in society. Results highlight the importance of evidence-based language in political decision-making.

In collaborative data sharing and machine learning, multiple parties aggregate their data resources to train a machine learning model with better model performance. However, as the parties incur data collection costs, they are only willing to do so when guaranteed incentives, such as fairness and individual rationality. Existing frameworks assume that all parties join the collaboration simultaneously, which does not hold in many real-world scenarios. Due to the long processing time for data cleaning, difficulty in overcoming legal barriers, or unawareness, the parties may join the collaboration at different times. In this work, we propose the following perspective: As a party who joins earlier incurs higher risk and encourages the contribution from other wait-and-see parties, that party should receive a reward of higher value for sharing data earlier. To this end, we propose a fair and time-aware data sharing framework, including novel time-aware incentives. We develop new methods for deciding reward values to satisfy these incentives. We further illustrate how to generate model rewards that realize the reward values and empirically demonstrate the properties of our methods on synthetic and real-world datasets.

We consider a sequential decision making problem where the agent faces the environment characterized by the stochastic discrete events and seeks an optimal intervention policy such that its long-term reward is maximized. This problem exists ubiquitously in social media, finance and health informatics but is rarely investigated by the conventional research in reinforcement learning. To this end, we present a novel framework of the model-based reinforcement learning where the agent's actions and observations are asynchronous stochastic discrete events occurring in continuous-time. We model the dynamics of the environment by Hawkes process with external intervention control term and develop an algorithm to embed such process in the Bellman equation which guides the direction of the value gradient. We demonstrate the superiority of our method in both synthetic simulator and real-world problem.

Mixed-motive multi-agent settings are rife with persistent free-riding because individual effort benefits all members equally, yet each member bears the full cost of their own contribution. Classical work by Holmström established that under pure self-interest, Nash equilibrium is universal shirking. While i* represents teams as composite actors, it lacks scalable computational mechanisms for analyzing how collective action problems emerge and resolve in coopetitive settings. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to team-level dynamics, building on companion work formalizing interdependence/complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802) and trust dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909). We develop loyalty-moderated utility functions with two mechanisms: loyalty benefit (welfare internalization plus intrinsic contribution satisfaction) and cost tolerance (reduced effort burden for loyal members). We integrate i* structural dependencies through dependency-weighted team cohesion, connecting member incentives to team-level positioning. The framework applies to both human teams (loyalty as psychological identification) and multi-agent systems (alignment coefficients and adjusted cost functions). Experimental validation across 3,125 configurations demonstrates robust loyalty effects (15.04x median effort differentiation). All six behavioral targets achieve thresholds: free-riding baseline (96.5%), loyalty monotonicity (100%), effort differentiation (100%), team size effect (100%), mechanism synergy (99.5%), and bounded outcomes (100%). Empirical validation using published Apache HTTP Server (1995-2023) case study achieves 60/60 points, reproducing contribution patterns across formation, growth, maturation, and governance phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p<0.001, Cohen's d=0.71.

In this paper, we investigate learning temporal abstractions in cooperative multi-agent systems, using the options framework (Sutton et al, 1999). First, we address the planning problem for the decentralized POMDP represented by the multi-agent system, by introducing a common information approach. We use the notion of common beliefs and broadcasting to solve an equivalent centralized POMDP problem. Then, we propose the Distributed Option Critic (DOC) algorithm, which uses centralized option evaluation and decentralized intra-option improvement. We theoretically analyze the asymptotic convergence of DOC and build a new multi-agent environment to demonstrate its validity. Our experiments empirically show that DOC performs competitively against baselines and scales with the number of agents.

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

A variety of recent papers discuss the application of Shapley values, a concept for explaining coalitional games, for feature attribution in machine learning. However, the correct way to connect a machine learning model to a coalitional game has been a source of controversy. The two main approaches that have been proposed differ in the way that they condition on known features, using either (1) an interventional or (2) an observational conditional expectation. While previous work has argued that one of the two approaches is preferable in general, we argue that the choice is application dependent. Furthermore, we argue that the choice comes down to whether it is desirable to be true to the model or true to the data. We use linear models to investigate this choice. After deriving an efficient method for calculating observational conditional expectation Shapley values for linear models, we investigate how correlation in simulated data impacts the convergence of observational conditional expectation Shapley values. Finally, we present two real data examples that we consider to be representative of possible use cases for feature attribution -- (1) credit risk modeling and (2) biological discovery. We show how a different choice of value function performs better in each scenario, and how possible attributions are impacted by modeling choices.

The process of revising (or constructing) a policy at execution time -- known as decision-time planning -- has been key to achieving superhuman performance in perfect-information games like chess and Go. A recent line of work has extended decision-time planning to imperfect-information games, leading to superhuman performance in poker. However, these methods involve solving subgames whose sizes grow quickly in the amount of non-public information, making them unhelpful when the amount of non-public information is large. Motivated by this issue, we introduce an alternative framework for decision-time planning that is not based on solving subgames, but rather on update equivalence. In this update-equivalence framework, decision-time planning algorithms replicate the updates of last-iterate algorithms, which need not rely on public information. This facilitates scalability to games with large amounts of non-public information. Using this framework, we derive a provably sound search algorithm for fully cooperative games based on mirror descent and a search algorithm for adversarial games based on magnetic mirror descent. We validate the performance of these algorithms in cooperative and adversarial domains, notably in Hanabi, the standard benchmark for search in fully cooperative imperfect-information games. Here, our mirror descent approach exceeds or matches the performance of public information-based search while using two orders of magnitude less search time. This is the first instance of a non-public-information-based algorithm outperforming public-information-based approaches in a domain they have historically dominated.

Unitary quantum theory, having no Born Rule, is non-probabilistic. Hence the notorious problem of reconciling it with the unpredictability and appearance of stochasticity in quantum measurements. Generalising and improving upon the so-called 'decision-theoretic approach' (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2003, 2007, 2012), I shall recast that problem in the recently proposed constructor theory of information - where quantum theory is represented as one of a class of superinformation theories, which are local, non-probabilistic theories conforming to certain constructor-theoretic conditions. I prove that the unpredictability of measurement outcomes (to which I give an exact meaning via constructor theory), necessarily arises in superinformation theories. Then I explain how the appearance of stochasticity in (finitely many) repeated measurements can arise under superinformation theories. And I establish sufficient conditions for a superinformation theory to inform decisions (made under it) as if it were probabilistic, via a Deutsch-Wallace-type argument - thus defining a class of decision-supporting superinformation theories. This broadens the domain of applicability of that argument to cover constructor-theory compliant theories. In addition, in this version some of the argument's assumptions, previously construed as merely decision-theoretic, follow from physical properties expressed by constructor-theoretic principles.

Restless multi-armed bandits (RMAB) have demonstrated success in optimizing resource allocation for large beneficiary populations in public health settings. Unfortunately, RMAB models lack flexibility to adapt to evolving public health policy priorities. Concurrently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as adept automated planners across domains of robotic control and navigation. In this paper, we propose a Decision Language Model (DLM) for RMABs, enabling dynamic fine-tuning of RMAB policies in public health settings using human-language commands. We propose using LLMs as automated planners to (1) interpret human policy preference prompts, (2) propose reward functions as code for a multi-agent RMAB environment, and (3) iterate on the generated reward functions using feedback from grounded RMAB simulations. We illustrate the application of DLM in collaboration with ARMMAN, an India-based non-profit promoting preventative care for pregnant mothers, that currently relies on RMAB policies to optimally allocate health worker calls to low-resource populations. We conduct a technology demonstration in simulation using the Gemini Pro model, showing DLM can dynamically shape policy outcomes using only human prompts as input.

When humans cooperate, they frequently coordinate their activity through both verbal communication and non-verbal actions, using this information to infer a shared goal and plan. How can we model this inferential ability? In this paper, we introduce a model of a cooperative team where one agent, the principal, may communicate natural language instructions about their shared plan to another agent, the assistant, using GPT-3 as a likelihood function for instruction utterances. We then show how a third person observer can infer the team's goal via multi-modal Bayesian inverse planning from actions and instructions, computing the posterior distribution over goals under the assumption that agents will act and communicate rationally to achieve them. We evaluate this approach by comparing it with human goal inferences in a multi-agent gridworld, finding that our model's inferences closely correlate with human judgments (R = 0.96). When compared to inference from actions alone, we also find that instructions lead to more rapid and less uncertain goal inference, highlighting the importance of verbal communication for cooperative agents.

Cooperation in multi-agent learning (MAL) is a topic at the intersection of numerous disciplines, including game theory, economics, social sciences, and evolutionary biology. Research in this area aims to understand both how agents can coordinate effectively when goals are aligned and how they may cooperate in settings where gains from working together are possible but possibilities for conflict abound. In this paper we provide an overview of the fundamental concepts, problem settings and algorithms of multi-agent learning. This encompasses reinforcement learning, multi-agent sequential decision-making, challenges associated with multi-agent cooperation, and a comprehensive review of recent progress, along with an evaluation of relevant metrics. Finally we discuss open challenges in the field with the aim of inspiring new avenues for research.

Multimodal AI models are increasingly used in fields like healthcare, finance, and autonomous driving, where information is drawn from multiple sources or modalities such as images, texts, audios, videos. However, effectively managing uncertainty - arising from noise, insufficient evidence, or conflicts between modalities - is crucial for reliable decision-making. Current uncertainty-aware machine learning methods leveraging, for example, evidence averaging, or evidence accumulation underestimate uncertainties in high-conflict scenarios. Moreover, the state-of-the-art evidence averaging strategy is not order invariant and fails to scale to multiple modalities. To address these challenges, we propose a novel multimodal learning method with order-invariant evidence fusion and introduce a conflict-based discounting mechanism that reallocates uncertain mass when unreliable modalities are detected. We provide both theoretical analysis and experimental validation, demonstrating that unlike the previous work, the proposed approach effectively distinguishes between conflicting and non-conflicting samples based on the provided uncertainty estimates, and outperforms the previous models in uncertainty-based conflict detection.

As artificial intelligence (AI) models are scaled up, new capabilities can emerge unintentionally and unpredictably, some of which might be dangerous. In response, dangerous capabilities evaluations have emerged as a new risk assessment tool. But what should frontier AI developers do if sufficiently dangerous capabilities are in fact discovered? This paper focuses on one possible response: coordinated pausing. It proposes an evaluation-based coordination scheme that consists of five main steps: (1) Frontier AI models are evaluated for dangerous capabilities. (2) Whenever, and each time, a model fails a set of evaluations, the developer pauses certain research and development activities. (3) Other developers are notified whenever a model with dangerous capabilities has been discovered. They also pause related research and development activities. (4) The discovered capabilities are analyzed and adequate safety precautions are put in place. (5) Developers only resume their paused activities if certain safety thresholds are reached. The paper also discusses four concrete versions of that scheme. In the first version, pausing is completely voluntary and relies on public pressure on developers. In the second version, participating developers collectively agree to pause under certain conditions. In the third version, a single auditor evaluates models of multiple developers who agree to pause if any model fails a set of evaluations. In the fourth version, developers are legally required to run evaluations and pause if dangerous capabilities are discovered. Finally, the paper discusses the desirability and feasibility of our proposed coordination scheme. It concludes that coordinated pausing is a promising mechanism for tackling emerging risks from frontier AI models. However, a number of practical and legal obstacles need to be overcome, especially how to avoid violations of antitrust law.

The general sequential decision-making problem, which includes Markov decision processes (MDPs) and partially observable MDPs (POMDPs) as special cases, aims at maximizing a cumulative reward by making a sequence of decisions based on a history of observations and actions over time. Recent studies have shown that the sequential decision-making problem is statistically learnable if it admits a low-rank structure modeled by predictive state representations (PSRs). Despite these advancements, existing approaches typically involve oracles or steps that are computationally intractable. On the other hand, the upper confidence bound (UCB) based approaches, which have served successfully as computationally efficient methods in bandits and MDPs, have not been investigated for more general PSRs, due to the difficulty of optimistic bonus design in these more challenging settings. This paper proposes the first known UCB-type approach for PSRs, featuring a novel bonus term that upper bounds the total variation distance between the estimated and true models. We further characterize the sample complexity bounds for our designed UCB-type algorithms for both online and offline PSRs. In contrast to existing approaches for PSRs, our UCB-type algorithms enjoy computational tractability, last-iterate guaranteed near-optimal policy, and guaranteed model accuracy.

To survive in dynamic and uncertain environments, individuals must develop effective decision strategies that balance information gathering and decision commitment. Models of such strategies often prioritize either optimizing tangible payoffs, like reward rate, or gathering information to support a diversity of (possibly unknown) objectives. However, our understanding of the relative merits of these two approaches remains incomplete, in part because direct comparisons have been limited to idealized, static environments that lack the dynamic complexity of the real world. Here we compared the performance of normative reward- and information-seeking strategies in a dynamic foraging task. Both strategies show similar transitions between exploratory and exploitative behaviors as environmental uncertainty changes. However, we find subtle disparities in the actions they take, resulting in meaningful performance differences: whereas reward-seeking strategies generate slightly more reward on average, information-seeking strategies provide more consistent and predictable outcomes. Our findings support the adaptive value of information-seeking behaviors that can mitigate risk with minimal reward loss.

A critical factor in the success of decision support systems is the accurate modeling of user preferences. Psychology research has demonstrated that users often develop their preferences during the elicitation process, highlighting the pivotal role of system-user interaction in developing personalized systems. This paper introduces a novel approach, combining Large Language Models (LLMs) with Constraint Programming to facilitate interactive decision support. We study this hybrid framework through the lens of meeting scheduling, a time-consuming daily activity faced by a multitude of information workers. We conduct three studies to evaluate the novel framework, including a diary study (n=64) to characterize contextual scheduling preferences, a quantitative evaluation of the system's performance, and a user study (n=10) with a prototype system. Our work highlights the potential for a hybrid LLM and optimization approach for iterative preference elicitation and design considerations for building systems that support human-system collaborative decision-making processes.

Bargaining is often regarded as a logical arena rather than an art or a matter of intuition, yet Large Language Models (LLMs) still struggle to navigate it due to limited strategic depth and difficulty adapting to complex human factors. Current benchmarks rarely capture this limitation. To bridge this gap, we present an utility feedback centric framework. Our contributions are: (i) AgoraBench, a new benchmark spanning nine challenging settings (e.g., deception, monopoly) that supports diverse strategy modeling; (ii) human-aligned, economically grounded metrics derived from utility theory. This is operationalized via agent utility, negotiation power, and acquisition ratio that implicitly measure how well the negotiation aligns with human preference and (iii) a human preference grounded dataset with learning pipeline that strengthens LLMs' bargaining ability through both prompting and finetuning. Empirical results indicate that baseline LLM strategies often diverge from human preferences, while our mechanism substantially improves negotiation performance, yielding deeper strategic behavior and stronger opponent awareness.

In this paper, we conduct a study to utilize LLMs as a solution for decision making that requires complex data analysis. We define Decision QA as the task of answering the best decision, d_{best}, for a decision-making question Q, business rules R and a database D. Since there is no benchmark that can examine Decision QA, we propose Decision QA benchmark, DQA. It has two scenarios, Locating and Building, constructed from two video games (Europa Universalis IV and Victoria 3) that have almost the same goal as Decision QA. To address Decision QA effectively, we also propose a new RAG technique called the iterative plan-then-retrieval augmented generation (PlanRAG). Our PlanRAG-based LM generates the plan for decision making as the first step, and the retriever generates the queries for data analysis as the second step. The proposed method outperforms the state-of-the-art iterative RAG method by 15.8% in the Locating scenario and by 7.4% in the Building scenario, respectively. We release our code and benchmark at https://github.com/myeon9h/PlanRAG.

We describe a class of tasks called decision-oriented dialogues, in which AI assistants such as large language models (LMs) must collaborate with one or more humans via natural language to help them make complex decisions. We formalize three domains in which users face everyday decisions: (1) choosing an assignment of reviewers to conference papers, (2) planning a multi-step itinerary in a city, and (3) negotiating travel plans for a group of friends. In each of these settings, AI assistants and users have disparate abilities that they must combine to arrive at the best decision: assistants can access and process large amounts of information, while users have preferences and constraints external to the system. For each task, we build a dialogue environment where agents receive a reward based on the quality of the final decision they reach. We evaluate LMs in self-play and in collaboration with humans and find that they fall short compared to human assistants, achieving much lower rewards despite engaging in longer dialogues. We highlight a number of challenges models face in decision-oriented dialogues, ranging from goal-directed behavior to reasoning and optimization, and release our environments as a testbed for future work.

Knowing when to answer or refuse is crucial for safe and reliable decision-making language agents. Although prior work has introduced refusal strategies to boost LMs' reliability, how these models adapt their decisions to different risk levels remains underexplored. We formalize the task of risk-aware decision-making, expose critical weaknesses in existing LMs, and propose skill-decomposition solutions to mitigate them. Our findings show that even cutting-edge LMs--both regular and reasoning models--still require explicit prompt chaining to handle the task effectively, revealing the challenges that must be overcome to achieve truly autonomous decision-making agents.

As autonomous agents powered by foundation models are increasingly integrated into social and economic systems, understanding the principles governing their collective behavior is essential for ensuring safety and cooperation. Classical game theory, the dominant framework for modeling rational interaction, is built upon the assumption of `decoupled agency,' where agents treat their own decision-making as independent of the environment and other actors. Modern AI agents, however, jointly predict their own future actions alongside external observations. Here, we report a striking finding: when interacting in stylized social dilemmas, foundation model agents engaging in optimal planning consistently converge to stable cooperation, directly contradicting classical game-theoretic predictions of mutual defection. To understand this phenomenon, we introduce the `embedded Bayesian agent,' a theoretical model for foundation model agents. By shifting from decoupled to embedded agency, these agents model themselves as part of the universe they inhabit, maintaining epistemic uncertainty about their own decision-making algorithms. We show that by inferring whether others are behaviorally similar, an embedded agent treats its own deliberation during planning as evidence: a decision to cooperate predicts a similar decision by a similar partner. We formalize this mechanism of similarity inference through the `embedded equilibrium,' a novel solution concept replacing the Nash equilibrium to provide a foundational game theory for the social behavior of modern AI agents.

This study evaluates and extends the findings made by Piatti et al., who introduced GovSim, a simulation framework designed to assess the cooperative decision-making capabilities of large language models (LLMs) in resource-sharing scenarios. By replicating key experiments, we validate claims regarding the performance of large models, such as GPT-4-turbo, compared to smaller models. The impact of the universalization principle is also examined, with results showing that large models can achieve sustainable cooperation, with or without the principle, while smaller models fail without it. In addition, we provide multiple extensions to explore the applicability of the framework to new settings. We evaluate additional models, such as DeepSeek-V3 and GPT-4o-mini, to test whether cooperative behavior generalizes across different architectures and model sizes. Furthermore, we introduce new settings: we create a heterogeneous multi-agent environment, study a scenario using Japanese instructions, and explore an "inverse environment" where agents must cooperate to mitigate harmful resource distributions. Our results confirm that the benchmark can be applied to new models, scenarios, and languages, offering valuable insights into the adaptability of LLMs in complex cooperative tasks. Moreover, the experiment involving heterogeneous multi-agent systems demonstrates that high-performing models can influence lower-performing ones to adopt similar behaviors. This finding has significant implications for other agent-based applications, potentially enabling more efficient use of computational resources and contributing to the development of more effective cooperative AI systems.

There are a variety of mechanisms (i.e., input types) for real-time human interaction that can facilitate effective human-robot teaming. For example, previous works have shown how teleoperation, corrective, and discrete (i.e., preference over a small number of choices) input can enable robots to complete complex tasks. However, few previous works have looked at combining different methods, and in particular, opportunities for a robot to estimate and elicit the most effective form of assistance given its understanding of a task. In this paper, we propose a method for estimating the value of different human assistance mechanisms based on the action uncertainty of a robot policy. Our key idea is to construct mathematical expressions for the expected post-interaction differential entropy (i.e., uncertainty) of a stochastic robot policy to compare the expected value of different interactions. As each type of human input imposes a different requirement for human involvement, we demonstrate how differential entropy estimates can be combined with a likelihood penalization approach to effectively balance feedback informational needs with the level of required input. We demonstrate evidence of how our approach interfaces with emergent learning models (e.g., a diffusion model) to produce accurate assistance value estimates through both simulation and a robot user study. Our user study results indicate that the proposed approach can enable task completion with minimal human feedback for uncertain robot behaviors.

LLMs are used predominantly in synchronous communication, where a human user and a model communicate in alternating turns. In contrast, many real-world settings are inherently asynchronous. For example, in group chats, online team meetings, or social games, there is no inherent notion of turns; therefore, the decision of when to speak forms a crucial part of the participant's decision making. In this work, we develop an adaptive asynchronous LLM-agent which, in addition to determining what to say, also decides when to say it. To evaluate our agent, we collect a unique dataset of online Mafia games, including both human participants, as well as our asynchronous agent. Overall, our agent performs on par with human players, both in game performance, as well as in its ability to blend in with the other human players. Our analysis shows that the agent's behavior in deciding when to speak closely mirrors human patterns, although differences emerge in message content. We release all our data and code to support and encourage further research for more realistic asynchronous communication between LLM agents. This work paves the way for integration of LLMs into realistic human group settings, from assistance in team discussions to educational and professional environments where complex social dynamics must be navigated.

Conjoint analysis, an application of factorial experimental design, is a popular tool in social science research for studying multidimensional preferences. In such experiments in the political analysis context, respondents are asked to choose between two hypothetical political candidates with randomly selected features, which can include partisanship, policy positions, gender and race. We consider the problem of identifying optimal candidate profiles. Because the number of unique feature combinations far exceeds the total number of observations in a typical conjoint experiment, it is impossible to determine the optimal profile exactly. To address this identification challenge, we derive an optimal stochastic intervention that represents a probability distribution of various attributes aimed at achieving the most favorable average outcome. We first consider an environment where one political party optimizes their candidate selection. We then move to the more realistic case where two political parties optimize their own candidate selection simultaneously and in opposition to each other. We apply the proposed methodology to an existing candidate choice conjoint experiment concerning vote choice for US president. We find that, in contrast to the non-adversarial approach, expected outcomes in the adversarial regime fall within range of historical electoral outcomes, with optimal strategies suggested by the method more likely to match the actual observed candidates compared to strategies derived from a non-adversarial approach. These findings indicate that incorporating adversarial dynamics into conjoint analysis may yield unique insight into social science data from experiments.

The Shapley value is one of the most widely used measures of feature importance partly as it measures a feature's average effect on a model's prediction. We introduce joint Shapley values, which directly extend Shapley's axioms and intuitions: joint Shapley values measure a set of features' average contribution to a model's prediction. We prove the uniqueness of joint Shapley values, for any order of explanation. Results for games show that joint Shapley values present different insights from existing interaction indices, which assess the effect of a feature within a set of features. The joint Shapley values provide intuitive results in ML attribution problems. With binary features, we present a presence-adjusted global value that is more consistent with local intuitions than the usual approach.

Primal-dual safe RL methods commonly perform iterations between the primal update of the policy and the dual update of the Lagrange Multiplier. Such a training paradigm is highly susceptible to the error in cumulative cost estimation since this estimation serves as the key bond connecting the primal and dual update processes. We show that this problem causes significant underestimation of cost when using off-policy methods, leading to the failure to satisfy the safety constraint. To address this issue, we propose conservative policy optimization, which learns a policy in a constraint-satisfying area by considering the uncertainty in cost estimation. This improves constraint satisfaction but also potentially hinders reward maximization. We then introduce local policy convexification to help eliminate such suboptimality by gradually reducing the estimation uncertainty. We provide theoretical interpretations of the joint coupling effect of these two ingredients and further verify them by extensive experiments. Results on benchmark tasks show that our method not only achieves an asymptotic performance comparable to state-of-the-art on-policy methods while using much fewer samples, but also significantly reduces constraint violation during training. Our code is available at https://github.com/ZifanWu/CAL.

Game theory, as an analytical tool, is frequently utilized to analyze human behavior in social science research. With the high alignment between the behavior of Large Language Models (LLMs) and humans, a promising research direction is to employ LLMs as substitutes for humans in game experiments, enabling social science research. However, despite numerous empirical researches on the combination of LLMs and game theory, the capability boundaries of LLMs in game theory remain unclear. In this research, we endeavor to systematically analyze LLMs in the context of game theory. Specifically, rationality, as the fundamental principle of game theory, serves as the metric for evaluating players' behavior -- building a clear desire, refining belief about uncertainty, and taking optimal actions. Accordingly, we select three classical games (dictator game, Rock-Paper-Scissors, and ring-network game) to analyze to what extent LLMs can achieve rationality in these three aspects. The experimental results indicate that even the current state-of-the-art LLM (GPT-4) exhibits substantial disparities compared to humans in game theory. For instance, LLMs struggle to build desires based on uncommon preferences, fail to refine belief from many simple patterns, and may overlook or modify refined belief when taking actions. Therefore, we consider that introducing LLMs into game experiments in the field of social science should be approached with greater caution.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

In this paper, we propose a general theory of ambiguity-averse MDPs, which treats the uncertain transition probabilities as random variables and evaluates a policy via a risk measure applied to its random return. This ambiguity-averse MDP framework unifies several models of MDPs with epistemic uncertainty for specific choices of risk measures. We extend the concepts of value functions and Bellman operators to our setting. Based on these objects, we establish the consequences of dynamic programming principles in this framework (existence of stationary policies, value and policy iteration algorithms), and we completely characterize law-invariant risk measures compatible with dynamic programming. Our work draws connections among several variants of MDP models and fully delineates what is possible under the dynamic programming paradigm and which risk measures require leaving it.

Existing benchmarks for LLM agents' social behavior typically focus on a single capability dimension and evaluate only behavioral outcomes, overlooking process signals from reasoning and communication. We present M3-BENCH, a benchmark of 24 mixed-motive games with a process-aware evaluation framework spanning three complementary views: Behavioral Trajectory Analysis (BTA), Reasoning Process Analysis (RPA), and Communication Content Analysis (CCA). Evaluating 11 frontier LLMs and a human baseline, M3-BENCH reveals substantial differences in social competence that outcome-only evaluation misses. In particular, we identify an "overthink-undercommunicate" pattern: reasoning models achieve strong internal deliberation scores but often fail to translate them into effective social communication. Although top models can surpass humans on task outcomes, humans exhibit markedly higher cross-view consistency, suggesting that current LLM agents still lack the behavioral coherence characteristic of human social competence. Our analysis further shows that the three-view decomposition surfaces safety-relevant risks, such as cooperative behavior paired with latent opportunistic reasoning, that remain hidden under outcome-only metrics.

We consider negotiation settings in which two agents use natural language to bargain on goods. Agents need to decide on both high-level strategy (e.g., proposing \50) and the execution of that strategy (e.g., generating "The bike is brand new. Selling for just 50."). Recent work on negotiation trains neural models, but their end-to-end nature makes it hard to control their strategy, and reinforcement learning tends to lead to degenerate solutions. In this paper, we propose a modular approach based on coarse di- alogue acts (e.g., propose(price=50)) that decouples strategy and generation. We show that we can flexibly set the strategy using supervised learning, reinforcement learning, or domain-specific knowledge without degeneracy, while our retrieval-based generation can maintain context-awareness and produce diverse utterances. We test our approach on the recently proposed DEALORNODEAL game, and we also collect a richer dataset based on real items on Craigslist. Human evaluation shows that our systems achieve higher task success rate and more human-like negotiation behavior than previous approaches.

We consider tackling a single-agent RL problem by distributing it to n learners. These learners, called advisors, endeavour to solve the problem from a different focus. Their advice, taking the form of action values, is then communicated to an aggregator, which is in control of the system. We show that the local planning method for the advisors is critical and that none of the ones found in the literature is flawless: the egocentric planning overestimates values of states where the other advisors disagree, and the agnostic planning is inefficient around danger zones. We introduce a novel approach called empathic and discuss its theoretical aspects. We empirically examine and validate our theoretical findings on a fruit collection task.

This paper presents a method for constructing human-robot interaction policies in settings where multimodality, i.e., the possibility of multiple highly distinct futures, plays a critical role in decision making. We are motivated in this work by the example of traffic weaving, e.g., at highway on-ramps/off-ramps, where entering and exiting cars must swap lanes in a short distance---a challenging negotiation even for experienced drivers due to the inherent multimodal uncertainty of who will pass whom. Our approach is to learn multimodal probability distributions over future human actions from a dataset of human-human exemplars and perform real-time robot policy construction in the resulting environment model through massively parallel sampling of human responses to candidate robot action sequences. Direct learning of these distributions is made possible by recent advances in the theory of conditional variational autoencoders (CVAEs), whereby we learn action distributions simultaneously conditioned on the present interaction history, as well as candidate future robot actions in order to take into account response dynamics. We demonstrate the efficacy of this approach with a human-in-the-loop simulation of a traffic weaving scenario.

Model merging has emerged as an effective approach to combine multiple single-task models into a multitask model. This process typically involves computing a weighted average of the model parameters without any additional training. Existing model-merging methods focus on enhancing average task accuracy. However, interference and conflicts between the objectives of different tasks can lead to trade-offs during the merging process. In real-world applications, a set of solutions with various trade-offs can be more informative, helping practitioners make decisions based on diverse preferences. In this paper, we introduce a novel and low-compute algorithm, Model Merging with Amortized Pareto Front (MAP). MAP efficiently identifies a Pareto set of scaling coefficients for merging multiple models, reflecting the trade-offs involved. It amortizes the substantial computational cost of evaluations needed to estimate the Pareto front by using quadratic approximation surrogate models derived from a pre-selected set of scaling coefficients. Experimental results on vision and natural language processing tasks demonstrate that MAP can accurately identify the Pareto front, providing practitioners with flexible solutions to balance competing task objectives. We also introduce Bayesian MAP for scenarios with a relatively low number of tasks and Nested MAP for situations with a high number of tasks, further reducing the computational cost of evaluation.

Closed-loop decision-making systems (e.g., lending, screening, or recidivism risk assessment) often operate under fairness and service constraints while inducing feedback effects: decisions change who appears in the future, yielding non-stationary data and potentially amplifying disparities. We study online learning of a one-dimensional threshold policy from bandit feedback under demographic parity (DP) and, optionally, service-rate constraints. The learner observes only a scalar score each round and selects a threshold; reward and constraint residuals are revealed only for the chosen threshold. We propose Optimistic Feasible Search (OFS), a simple grid-based method that maintains confidence bounds for reward and constraint residuals for each candidate threshold. At each round, OFS selects a threshold that appears feasible under confidence bounds and, among those, maximizes optimistic reward; if no threshold appears feasible, OFS selects the threshold minimizing optimistic constraint violation. This design directly targets feasible high-utility thresholds and is particularly effective for low-dimensional, interpretable policy classes where discretization is natural. We evaluate OFS on (i) a synthetic closed-loop benchmark with stable contraction dynamics and (ii) two semi-synthetic closed-loop benchmarks grounded in German Credit and COMPAS, constructed by training a score model and feeding group-dependent acceptance decisions back into population composition. Across all environments, OFS achieves higher reward with smaller cumulative constraint violation than unconstrained and primal-dual bandit baselines, and is near-oracle relative to the best feasible fixed threshold under the same sweep procedure. Experiments are reproducible and organized with double-blind-friendly relative outputs.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

Many challenging tasks such as managing traffic systems, electricity grids, or supply chains involve complex decision-making processes that must balance multiple conflicting objectives and coordinate the actions of various independent decision-makers (DMs). One perspective for formalising and addressing such tasks is multi-objective multi-agent reinforcement learning (MOMARL). MOMARL broadens reinforcement learning (RL) to problems with multiple agents each needing to consider multiple objectives in their learning process. In reinforcement learning research, benchmarks are crucial in facilitating progress, evaluation, and reproducibility. The significance of benchmarks is underscored by the existence of numerous benchmark frameworks developed for various RL paradigms, including single-agent RL (e.g., Gymnasium), multi-agent RL (e.g., PettingZoo), and single-agent multi-objective RL (e.g., MO-Gymnasium). To support the advancement of the MOMARL field, we introduce MOMAland, the first collection of standardised environments for multi-objective multi-agent reinforcement learning. MOMAland addresses the need for comprehensive benchmarking in this emerging field, offering over 10 diverse environments that vary in the number of agents, state representations, reward structures, and utility considerations. To provide strong baselines for future research, MOMAland also includes algorithms capable of learning policies in such settings.